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GLOSARRY

Avian Influenza: Influenza A caused by strains of a subtype H5N1 that have
produced epidemics in domestic birds with periodic associated human infections,
commonly known as bird flu.
Capacity: The combination of all the strengths and resources available within a
community, society or organization that can reduce the level of risk, or the effects of a
disaster1. Capacity and vulnerability can usefully be considered as part of the same
continuum, since one increase as the other decreases.
Hazard: “A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon, human activity or
condition that may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, loss of livelihoods
and services, social and economic disruption or environmental damage.”2
Sustainable Livelihoods: “A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities
required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable which can cope with and
recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and
provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation.”3
Mitigation: “The lessening or limitation of the adverse impacts of hazards and related
disasters.”4
Poverty: "Poverty is a human condition characterized by the sustained or chronic
deprivation of the resources, capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for
the enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic,
political and social rights."5
Preparedness: Activities and measures taken before hazard events occur to ensure
effective response to the impact of hazards, including the issuance of timely and
effective early warnings and the temporary evacuation of people from threatened
locations.
Prevention: “The outright avoidance of potential adverse impacts of hazards and related
disasters through action taken in advance.”6
1

UN/ISDR, (2009), “Terminology: Basic Terms of Disaster Risk Reduction”, Available at:
http://www.unisdr.org/eng/terminology/terminology-2009-eng.html
2
Ibid.
3
Chambers, Robert and Gordon Conway, “Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Practical Concepts for the 21st
Century”, IDS Discussion Paper 296, (Brighton, UK: IDS, February 1992).
4
UN/ISDR (2009).
5
United Nations Committee on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights, (2001). “Poverty and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” 10/05/2001.
6
UN/ISDR (2009).
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Resilience: “The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to
hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable
level of functioning”.7
Disaster Risk: The product of hazard and vulnerability measured in terms of the
quantitative and qualitative damage expected as a result of the exposure of vulnerable
people to hazard.
Risk Analysis: A methodology to determine the nature and extent of risk by
analyzing potential hazards and evaluating existing conditions of vulnerability that
could pose a potential threat or harm to people, property, livelihoods and the
environment on which they depend.

Vulnerability: “The potential to suffer harm or loss, related to the capacity to anticipate a
hazard, cope with it, resist it and recover from its impact. Both vulnerability and
resilience, are determined by physical, environmental, social, economic, political,
cultural and institutional factors.8
Restocking: In the context of avian influenza, “restocking refers to the process of
introducing new birds to replace those lost through death caused by the disease or
through culling to prevent spread of the disease”9.

Traditional Poultry Keeping: Poultry keeping within a household setting with flocks of
less than 500 birds on rooftops, backyards or in the house with the aim of
producing meat and eggs for home consumption and sales on a small scale.

7

UN/ISDR, (2004),“Terminology: Basic Terms of Disaster Risk Reduction”, Available at:
http://www.unisdr.org/eng/library/lib-terminology-eng%20home.htm
8
Twigg, John , "Vulnerability and Capacity Analysis", Tools for Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction,
Guidance Note No. 9, ProVention Consortium, 12.
9
FAO, (2009), “Avian Influenza Glossary”, Available at: http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/glossary.html
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ABSTRACT

The study provides an overview of the literature on disaster risk reduction, its
relation with various development approaches and the livelihood framework. The study
also examines the theoretical debates surrounding the relation between disasters and
sustainable development. In addition, the study explores the various disasters that
occurred in Egypt between 1990 and 2008. The study explores “rapid onset” natural
disasters in Egypt (earthquakes and floods), a number of frequent human-made disasters
(road, maritime, train accidents and fires), and “slow onset” hybrid disasters (Avian and
Human Influenza and landslides) and their scope, causes, and implications on the
livelihoods of the affected population. In addition, the study reviews the current legal
framework as it relates to disasters in Egypt and the various institutions at the national
and local levels. In addition, the case study examines the Avian and Human Influenza
(AHI) crisis between February 2006 and April 2009 in Egypt and explores its impact on
the livelihoods of traditional poultry keepers in Fayoum. The field work conducted for
this study explores the reasons behind the increased vulnerability to bird flu among
traditional poultry keepers in Fayoum, and examines the ways in which the AHI crisis
affected their livelihood assets and strategies. Moreover, the study explores the role of
veterinary services in prevention and mitigation of the AHI crisis and how it affected the
susceptibility to AHI.

xii

1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

STUDY JUSTIFICATION AND RATIONALE
The political circumstances surrounding disasters in Egypt was the main reason
behind the researcher’s choice of this topic. The GoE constantly reacts after a crisis has
taken place, and the government’s emergency response and relief efforts are always
chaotic, delayed, unplanned, and inefficient. Moreover, it is apparent that in several crises
the government did not employ any preventive measures to reduce the risks of disasters
before they occurred, despite the fact that these potential disasters risks are extremely
visible. It is against this background that the researcher explored Disaster Risk Reduction
(DRR) theory and how it can be applied to the Egyptian context. DRR is based on the
premises that disasters are not random events and that their occurrence and impact
depend on people’s vulnerability and their ability to cope with hazardous events. Upon
further investigation, the researcher discovered that “pre-disaster planning” can indeed
contribute to reducing vulnerability and increasing the capability of the affected
communities, thus leading to improved livelihoods.
Until the mid 1970s, development theorists believed that disasters were natural
phenomena that could only be responded to after the disaster takes place (crisis
management, post-disaster relief, and humanitarian/emergency aid). In the late 1970s, it
was realized by development scholars that disasters are not unforeseen “natural events”
that governments should implement preventive measures even before a disaster takes
place. In addition, despite the fact that humanitarian assistance was increasing compared
to development assistance, disaster relief was a short term solution that failed to cope
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with the increased losses resulting from “complex disasters”. These developments led to
the recognition, in the 1980s, that disasters are the result of accumulated risk produced by
years of accumulated vulnerabilities due to economic, social, political and cultural
factors. DRR is a means of bridging the gap between development and humanitarian
agendas. The reason why the researcher chose to examine DRR as a development
approach is that DRR measures take a long-term approach designed to protect livelihood
assets of communities and individuals from the impact of hazards1.
This topic has not been extensively dealt with before with respect to Egypt both in
theory and in practice. This study is a modest attempt to contribute to the literature
through linking DRR to various development approaches, examining how disasters are a
result of the interaction of vulnerability and hazards, and through viewing disasters from
a livelihood lens. In addition, there is limited scholarly documentation of disasters in
Egypt and their impact on livelihoods. This study will attempt to fill this gap by
documenting recent disasters that took place in Egypt from 1990 until 2008. Also, this
study will examine the impacts of these disasters on vulnerable populations’ livelihoods,
in specific, and on development efforts in general. DRR is still not adopted as a
mainstream approach in development planning within the GoE since it is not popular
among developing countries. This study will contribute to policy making by looking at
the current structure and mechanisms that deal with disasters in Egypt before they even
take place and examine whether they adopt a DRR approach or not. The case study will
examine the Avian and Human Influenza (AHI) crisis and how the increased
vulnerability of the traditional poultry sector in Fayoum as a result of embedded cultural
1

CONCERN USA, “Approached to Disaster Risk Reduction”, Emergency Unit, September 2005,
Available at: http://www.concernusa.org/media/pdf/2007/10/Concern_ApproachestoDRR%20paper%20%20final.pdf , 1.
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practices and unhygienic poultry keeping methods among other factors2 are increasing
the AHI risk among traditional poultry keepers and increasing its likeliness of turning
into a pandemic stage, an area which has not been thoroughly investigated even after the
continuous AHI outbreaks.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following key questions will be examined:
1. What is the relation between disasters and development approaches in theory? And
how can the DRR approach utilize the sustainable livelihoods approach?
2. What is the correlation between disaster risk, sustainable livelihoods and sustainable
development in the case of Egypt?
3. What are the governmental bodies that deal with disasters in Egypt? What are their
functions and responsibilities?
4. Is DRR mainstreamed in current development planning and policies of entities at the
strategic, central and local levels in Egypt?
5. What are the elements that make up the vulnerability context of traditional poultry
keepers in Fayoum?
6. How did Avian Influenza affect the livelihoods of traditional poultry keepers in
Fayoum?
7. How did the policies and processes dealing with the Avian Influenza crisis at the local
level affect the access of poultry keepers to livelihood resources and the formulation of
their livelihood strategies?

2

All factors contributing to the vulnerability context of traditional poultry keepers to AHI will be examined
in chapter 5.
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RESEARCH PROBLEM
The following preliminary statements can be made from Figure 1: Problem Tree, which
the author developed:
1. One of the root causes of the problem is the absence of a culture of prevention among
government officials and vulnerable communities.
2. The lack of political will, inadequate qualified human resources, and budget
constrains limit the capability of the GoE to reduce disaster risks.
3. The GoE failed to incorporate both hazard mapping and vulnerability assessment, i.e.
risk analysis, in government planning.
4. There is a lack of national comprehensive strategy for reducing the risk of disasters in
Egypt.
5. People's vulnerability increased due to a combination of dynamic pressures (such as
rapid urbanization) and root causes (such as a lack of prevention and mitigation efforts).
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Figure 1: Problem Tree
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The purpose of the thesis is to access whether disaster risk reduction can contribute to the
attainment of sustainable livelihood outcomes. In order to reach the above goal, the
objectives of the research are to:
1. Examine the relation between disaster risk, vulnerabilities, and hazards;
2. Explore the link between DRR discourse, development approaches, and the
Sustainable Livelihood Approach;
3. Explore whether there is an interconnection between disasters/hazards,
vulnerabilities, and livelihoods in the Egyptian context;
4. Examine how disaster impacts on livelihoods will be a key obstacle for the GoE
in achieving the MDGs;
5. Examine and analyze current legal and institutional arrangements dealing with
disasters in Egypt and the extent to which they are in line with the DRR approach;
6. Examine the Avian and Human Influenza Crisis in Fayoum, the AHI vulnerability
context, impact on the livelihoods of poultry keepers, and explore the governments’
prevention and mitigation efforts.
RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
Low level hazards are magnified by high vulnerabilities in Egypt, which lead to
increase in disaster risk among vulnerable groups. Impact of disasters will destroy
people’s livelihood assets as a result of income and capability deprivation and thus result
in the failure of the attainment of sustainable livelihood outcomes in the Egyptian
society.
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METHODOLOGY
This section explores the method of investigation that was utilized to test the
research hypothesis and answer the research questions. The researcher used a qualitative
approach to conduct the research since it is the most suitable way to gather in-depth
information. Some scholars, especially political economists, claim that quantitative
techniques provide more ‘‘rigor analysis’’ than qualitative techniques. However, this
view is criticized on the basis that the determinant of whether the approach is ‘‘rigor’’ or
not depends on the proper application of both techniques; both quantitative and
qualitative techniques can lead to misleading conclusions if badly applied3. It is argued
that different techniques are appropriate to different settings and different methods are
essential to tackle different research questions and problems4.
The initial phase of this research involved an extensive review of the literature on
disaster risk reduction in general. The literature review is based mainly on secondary
sources from academic journals, books, as well as discussion papers of international
development organizations. This was followed by a reliance on a combination of analyses
of primary data and secondary sources to balance each other. The primary sources,
utilized in chapters three and four, are official documents, reports on disasters in Egypt,
and semi-structured interviews with government officials and DRR specialists in
international development organizations. This primary data on DRR was gathered in an
informal and friendly environment due to the sensitivity of the issue of disasters and its
taboo nature among government officials. Moreover, the case study formulated on AHI

3

White, Howard, “Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches in Poverty Analysis”,
World Development, Vol. 30, Issue 3, (2002): 511.
4
Ibid.

8
was mainly based on primary data collected during the field work in Fayoum
governorate.
Choice of Governorate
The reason why the researcher has chosen the Fayoum governorate for the field
work is that Fayoum is a hot spot for AHI in Egypt since it is characterized by a moderate
weather all year round and has two important natural attractions for migratory water
birds, which are Qarun Lake and Wadi El Rayan Lake. The location of Fayoum, with its
natural attractions, is an important factor that increases its vulnerability to HPAI. It is
also one of the largest poultry producing governorates in Egypt and terribly affected by
the AHI Crisis. Despite the fact that the impact on the traditional poultry keeping sector
was not accounted for in the statistics gathered by the government, the GoE official data
revealed that the AHI impact on commercial farms in Fayoum was immense. Medium
and large commercial farms lost an estimated 725,000 birds in Fayoum only5. In addition,
Fayoum reported seven H5N1 confirmed human cases, which put it in second place after
Al Monofeya in terms of positive human cases.

Moreover, Fayoum is the worst

governorate in Egypt in terms of Human Development. According to the UNDP Human
Development Index (HDI) published in Egypt Human Development Report 2008,
Fayoum HDI is 0.669, which ranks Fayoum in the 22 place out of 22 governorates6.
Another rationale behind the researcher’s choice was the implementation of a UNDP
funded project in Fayoum to mitigate the impact of AHI on poultry keepers by an NGO,
the Catholic Relief Services (CRS), which had strong local presence in Fayoum.

5

Catholic Relief Services, "Business Development Services to Mitigate the AI Risks of Women Microentrepreneurs in Egypt", Project Proposal Submitted to UNDP, July 2006.
6
UNDP, “Egypt Human Development Report 2008: Egypt’s Social Contract”, United Nations
Development Programme, and The Institute of National Planning in Egypt, 2008: 301.
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The researcher’s choice of districts was primarily influenced by the CRS project
and the location of the implementing CDAs, which are located in Fayoum and Tamiah
districts. The reason why CRS chose to focus on Fayoum and Tamiah districts is because
they are the poorest districts in terms of GDP and human development and they have the
highest overall contribution to the informal sector in terms of labor. The researcher also
conducted field work in these two districts to examine the variations between different
villages and to explore whether each community had its own cultural and behavioral
patterns, livelihood and coping strategies, and whether the project had different impacts
on different villages. In addition, the researcher chose to conduct the field work in a third
district, which is Snoras district, which the CRS is not working in to compare and
contrast information gathered from other two districts to have a richer study. One of
Business Enterprise Support Tools Foundation (BEST)7 staff was a key informant in
Snoras district due to her extensive personal contacts and social capital. She arranged for
personal interviews and group discussions with women in this district.
Choice of NGO
The reason why the researcher has chosen to cooperate with the CRS is that it is
the only NGO that is currently working on mitigating the impacts of Avian Influenza in
Egypt from a long term DRR perspective and not from a short term emergency point of
view, which is in line with the objectives of this study. The CRS project entitled Business
Development Services to mitigate the AHI Risks of Women Micro-entrepreneurs in
Fayoum, which is funded by UNDP, employed risk coping and mitigation initiatives that
attempted to alter the socio-economic impact of AHI on traditional poultry keepers and

7

BEST in Fayoum is the implementing partner of CRS, which is the umbrella organization that facilitates
project outreach and coordinates with CDAs.
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the micro-poultry industry. In addition, the CRS and UNDP gave the researcher the
permission to undertake the proposed field work and the researcher utilized CRS wide
social network of informants; Mr. Mohamed Ashraf, AHI Project Manager, provided
outstanding support by arranging the researcher visits to Fayoum and scheduling the
meetings with BEST employees, CDAs staff, as well as women BDS clients.
Case Study Methodology
A case study was formulated to test the research hypothesis. The field work relied
primarily on the Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) technique, which emerged in the 1970s
and became popular in the development field in the 1980s. Robert Chambers described
the RRA technique as “the attempt to learn about rural conditions in a cost effective
way.”8 Chambers argued that RRA is a "fairly-quick and-fairly-clean” appraisal as
opposed to the “quick and dirty” appraisal of rural development tourism and the “long
and dirty” technique of extensive questionnaire surveys9. The RRA is the most suitable
method for the purpose of this case study since one of the research objectives of the field

work is to observe the cultural practices and behavioral patterns that increase poultry
keepers’ vulnerability to AHI and examine the dynamics of the AHI crisis on women’s
livelihoods. However, the researcher was careful not to fall into the RRA pitfalls. One of
the RRA criticisms is that “rapid” has become a liability since it has been used to
legitimize biased “rural development tourism”, which are brief rural visits by urban-based
professionals10. Robert Chambers argued that the word “rapid” was needed in the late
1970s to offset the long and large questionnaires, however it is better to replace the first
8

Chambers, Robert, “Rapid Rural Appraisal: Rationale and Repertoire”, Public Administration and
Development, Vol. 1, Issue 2, (1981): 95-106.
9
Ibid.
10
Chambers, Robert, “Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA): Challenges, Potentials and Paradigm”, World
development, Vol. 11, No.10,(1994):1441.
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R of RRA with “relaxed” rather than “rapid” in order to ensure that enough time is made
available to see, listen and learn from the poor11.
In addition, the researcher adopted the Triangulation technique, one of the main
principles of RRA, which uses a combination of methods from different sources to crosscheck and verify responses gathered in different ways, such as semi-structured interviews
with key informants, focus group discussions, case studies, transect walks and direct
observation. This study proposes the application of the triangulation technique since it will
attempt to overcome the reliability, accuracy and representative weaknesses of qualitative
methods. Furthermore, in RRA, both the researcher and the researched collaborate and

learn from each other to decide possible solutions to the research questions12.
Field Work: RRA Methods
In order to examine the socio-economic impact of AHI in Fayoum, the researcher
gathered primary data from the field in three districts in Fayoum governorate (Fayoum,
Tamiya, and Snoras Districts) from 26th February to 20th March 2009. The field work
involved semi-structured interviews, focus groups discussions, case studies, and transect
walks and direct observation. Each method will be explained consecutively.
a. Semi-structured Interviews
The semi-structured interviews are regarded as the core of the RRA technique
and are based on a list of open ended questions, which provided the framework for
discussions. There are three sets of semi-structured interviews; the first group consists of
CRS project staff, BEST key informants and CDAs extension officers, while the second
group consists of government veterinaries, and the third and most important group of
11

Ibid.
Rifkin, S.B, “Rapid Rural Appraisal: Its Use and Value for Health Planners and Managers”,
Public Administration, Vol. 47, Issue 3, (1996): 509–526.

12

12
interviewees is composed of traditional poultry keepers. The researcher interviewed CRS
project staff and BEST staff to gather essential information on the trends in different
communities with respect to the reasons behind the spread of AHI, and the prevention
and mitigation of AHI in Fayoum, and also to examine the challenges and constrains the
project staff faced when dealing with government officials and traditional poultry keepers
during project implementation. In addition, government officials were interviewed to be
able to detect the gap in the local government’s initiatives in theory and practice. Also,
the field work examined how government policies affected women’s asset accumulation
and whether they enabled women to cope with the AHI crisis or not. The list of
interviewees is available in Appendix 1.
With respect to the semi-structured interviews with women, the researcher
interviewed a total number of 25 traditional poultry keeper in four villages. The
researcher first piloted the interview questions with officials at BEST to make sure that
they are culture sensitive, and that they will be well received by rural women, and as a
result some modifications were made to the original questions. A sample of the
questionnaire is attached in Appendix 2. With regard to the selection of interviewees, in
Zawyet El Karatsa Village, Manshaet Baghdad Village in Fayoum district and Kafr
Mahfouz in Tamiah district, four extension officers who are from the villages and are
well acquainted with the households were asked to give suggestions of women.
Moreover, with regard to Ezbet Al Hawashy Village and Al Adel village in Snoras
district, Mrs. Manal Ibrahim, Specialist at BEST in Fayoum, was the key informant due
to her wide range of contacts in this district. She was the one who organized and
moderated the interviews and focus group discussions since the CRS is not working in
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this area in Fayoum. The researcher made sure to interview beneficiaries of the Business
Development Services (BDS) of the CRS project as well as non-BDS clients to ensure
that the sample is inclusive of the entire community. In addition, the researcher used the
“snowballing sampling” technique, where each women was asked to recommend another
person to be interviewed. In order to overcome the bias of selection of interviewees, the
researcher interviewed anonymous women in the villages walking in streets. The
researcher also made sure that the interviews are conducted in an informal and
forthcoming setting to be able to gather accurate information on women’s practices and
behavior with respect to AHI. The full list of women interviewees was compiled in
Appendix 1.
b. Focus Groups
Focus group discussions are particularly useful to obtain information regarding
social norms, cultural customs and livelihood patterns. As part of the field work, the
researcher conducted four focus groups (total of 40 women), in several villages/districts;
the two focus groups in in Zawyet El Karatsa Village and Al Mandara Village in Fayoum
district was for women who utilized CRS BDS services, while the other two focus groups
in Al Adel Village in Snoras district consisted of women who did not work with CRS.
The extension officers working with traditional poultry keepers played a key role in
gathering women. In all four focus groups, women were suspicious of the researcher’s
intentions and the reason behind the gathering. The researcher made it clear for women in
the beginning of each focus group, that the researcher is a student working on a thesis and
is not affiliated with any governmental entity, and that the researcher was there to learn
from their experiences. At first, women were fearful and shy and refused to elaborately
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discuss the issues at hand, however after intensive “icebreaking” techniques they
gradually started opening up and discussing the issues raised. Focus group discussions
have several advantages, including access to a larger body of knowledge, and instant
mutual checking13. The self-correcting mechanism during group discussions was revealed
when for example a poultry keeper gives an excessively idealistic picture of her polutry
raising and slaughtering practices in the wake of the AHI crisis and is immediately
challenged and corrected by the other women in the group.
c. Case Studies
During the field work, the researcher has formulated two case studies, which
examined the household profile, livelihood assets pre and post AHI outbreaks, household
members’ livelihood strategies before and after the AHI crisis, and poultry keepers
coping techniques. The reason behind the researcher’s choice of these case studies is that
the first case was characterized by outstanding success in mitigating the effects of AHI
and the second one failed to employ coping strategies in the wake of the AHI crisis and
stopped raising poultry altogether. Although examined cases cannot be generalized and
are individual experiences, they provided significant in-depth in the data collected.
d. Transect Walks and Direct Observation
Transect walks and direct observation are vital elements in any field work since
one of the disadvantages of the RRA technique is that it can be misled by embedded
myths within a community. Transect walks is based on the idea that the researcher walks
systematically with an informant through a village, observing, asking, and listening while
recording findings. The importance of walking, seeing and asking questions lie in their
13
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ability to provide the researcher with vital information about customs and practices that
are often regarded by rural communities as common daily routine that they can fail to
narrate to an outsider. It was also interesting to observe the body language of the
extension officers and how they interact with women. Moreover, direct observations
during transect walks are valuable for cross checking differences between claimed and
actual practices. According to Robert Chambers, rural people often have beliefs about
their values and activities which do not correspond with the reality14. He continues to
argue that it is common to be told about a custom that has either lapsed or perhaps was
never practiced at all15. The observation technique can be insightful in the sense that it
reveals the gap between actual actions and claimed practices. One of the best ways to
study the socio-cultural patterns and local behavior of community members is by simply
being there.
e. Desk Research
The researcher conducted desk research on the CRS project in Fayoum based on
the project document, project progress reports, and final evaluation report. In addition,
the researcher also utilized secondary data found in the FAO/WFP impact assessment
entitled "Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: Rapid Assessment of HPAI Socio-Economic
Impact on Vulnerable Households in Egypt"16 conducted in four governorates in Egypt,
in which Fayoum is one of them, since it utilizes the sustainable livelihoods framework to
assess HPAI socio-economic impact on traditional poultry keepers and is in conformity
with the research. In addition, another secondary source that was of great importance to
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the study was the UNICEF behavioral report entitled “Avian Influenza Survey:
Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices of the Egyptian Public”17, which was a community
survey in twelve governorates that provided information on Avian Influenza-related
knowledge and attitudes. The overall goal of this survey was to provide baseline data
that would contribute to raising the awareness and improving the practices of the public
related to AHI. The immediate objectives were to provide baseline data on the level of
awareness of the most at-risk groups; establish a quantitative technique to understand
attitudes and practices of the most at-risk groups related poultry breeding, cooking,
buying, and slaughtering; and provide data on the perceptions of the most at-risk groups
related to the roles of various parties in eliminating the disease. The researcher utilized
these quantitative studies to compliment the research qualitative findings.
RESEARCH CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS
In general the researcher did not encounter any major problems that necessitated
changing the research design; however the researcher faced some minor challenges
during the course of the research. One of the challenges was the inadequate theoretical
critique of the DRR discourse. Despite the availability of a wide array of scholarly
journals, books, working papers, policy papers, reports, guidelines, and case studies on
DRR, however there is very limited academic material on critiques of DRR theory due to
the novelty of the disaster risk reduction area of work.
Moreover, the nature of the study and the sensitivity of the topic of disasters in
Egypt limited the willingness of some informants, especially government officials, to
openly discuss disaster related issues, vulnerabilities, and impacts of disasters on
17
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vulnerable communities’ livelihoods. In addition, similar terminologies, which had
extremely different meanings and applications, were usually used interchangeable by
government officials. As a result, the information gathered from the CMDR at the central
level and from different local levels at Fayoum governorate was based on the
interviewees’ personal interpretations of risk reduction. This challenge was faced by
cross checking all data obtained from personal interviews with supplementary sources
such as official reports, minutes of committee meetings, and official guidelines.
Furthermore, there was limited access to primary documents and sources with
regard to disasters in Egypt. The researcher encountered serious challenges while
collecting data, for the third chapter, on recent disasters that occurred in Egypt due the
scarcity of primary as well as secondary sources. The topic of disasters is still politically
sensitive and considered a taboo issue among government officials in Egypt. The
researcher had difficulty gathering required information for various hazards and disasters
in Egypt since most of the available primary documents were classified. The researcher
would overcome this challenge by utilizing the researcher’s wide network of informal
connections to obtain necessary documents and reports and schedule interviews with high
level officials. This challenge was also faced during the research process of the fourth
chapter on the GoE institutional arrangements with regard to disasters; the researcher was
not allowed to obtain a copy of the current laws and regulations dealing with disasters in
Egypt, and had to rely on secondary sources for the legal framework section. These
sources were not comprehensive since they did not cover all the laws and regulations
with respect to disaster management. In addition, there was very few documentation of
the socio-economic impact of disasters on the Egyptian population, and there was a lack
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of secondary sources that link the socio-economic impacts of disasters to the stagnation
of the development process in Egypt. Future studies would have to be conducted to
review each and every disaster and its socio-economic impact on the affected
communities in specific and its effects on the overall development process in general.
The fact that being a female researcher facilitated the field work in Fayoum to a
great extent since it allowed the interviewer to engage poultry keepers in serious
discussions in informal household settings. However, one of the challenges was that the
researcher had to be accompanied at all times by an extension officer the poultry keepers’
households. Although the researcher work was definitely facilitated by the company of
the extension workers, in some instances this was not a blessing since women refused to
give any figures with respect to their income from poultry in front of the extension
officer. The main reason behind this attitude is that women are afraid from the extension
officer’s evil eyes, commonly known as Hasad, since the officer is usually a member of
the same village. For sensitive subjects like income, women were suspicious of these
questions and often responded with misleading and inaccurate data. Moreover, the
researcher and the extension officer were not allowed to inspect women’s poultry at
rooftops and in backyards so as not to figure out the exact flock size and not to observe
how the poultry is kept and maintained. Poultry rearing is one of the important livelihood
strategies among rural women in Fayoum and AHI is a very sensitive issue among
poultry keepers since it means the loss if their main source of livelihood that is why
women was fearful to share genuine information on their practices after the AHI
outbreaks.

19
Another research limitation is that the study was conducted just after the end of the
CRS project, which did not allow the researcher to examine the long term impact of the
project on women’s poultry keeping practices. Another constraint was the inability to
acquire quantitative data from women with respect to the outbreak in poultry; recall was
an unreliable technique for collecting data since poultry keepers could not support their
arguments about the situation almost three years ago. When for instance the researcher
asked about the numbers of dead or sick poultry during the initial AHI outbreaks in 2006,
they would respond by “some died” or “all of the poultry died”. That is why in many
instance the researcher compliments the qualitative findings with quantitative data from
secondary sources.

CHAPTER 2
THE LINK BETWEEN DISASTER RISK REDUCTION,
DEVELOPMENT DISCOURCE AND LIVELIHOODS IN THEORY.

INTRODUCTION
The objective of the first chapter is to outline the theoretical origins of Disaster
Risk Reduction (DRR) and its main principles, to reveal the relation between DRR and
different development approaches in theory, to establish a theoretical link between the
DRR approach and the sustainable livelihood approach, and to examine the theoretical
debates surrounding disasters and sustainable development. The first section of the
literature review will set the ground for the thesis by clarifying similar yet different
concepts attributed to the disaster risk reduction literature and how inaccurate
understanding of certain terminologies can cause great confusion in the DRR discourse.
The reason why several DRR terminologies were explored in this chapter and were not
just included in the glossary is because these concepts are often perceived by government
officials as synonymous, however in theory these terminologies differ significantly.
Terminologies such as “disaster management” and “disaster risk reduction” differ
completely in theory since the first deals with managing response to disasters, while the
second deals with managing risks and the underlying causes that lead to disasters. These
differences have huge policy implications since dealing with a disaster after it takes place
is totally different from trying to alter the root causes of disasters’ risks. It is very
common among government officials in developing countries to inaccurately use
“disaster management” terminology and attribute it with DRR concepts.
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Afterwards, the study will examine the construction of disaster risk by looking at
the meanings and implications of concepts such as hazard and vulnerability. The notion
of vulnerability will be closely examined in this section, since it is the entry point
between the DRR approach and the livelihoods approach. The conceptual framework that
will be used in this study is the Pressure and Release Model (PAR) examined in the Risk
Analysis Framework section. Afterwards, disaster risk reduction theoretical origins from
the lenses of various development approaches will be examined.
The following section of the literature review will explore the theoretical linkages
between disaster risk reduction and poverty reduction and how they are regarded as a
“codependent pair”; the literature review will reveal how disasters were proven to hold
back development gains and increase poverty, and at the same time how poverty is also
attributed for increasing disaster risks. In addition, the sustainable livelihood approach to
poverty reduction will be examined to explain how disasters were proven to increase
communities’ vulnerabilities, and thus impede the attainment of their sustainable
livelihood outcomes. Finally, the last section will look at the various critiques of the
disaster risk reduction approach in the literature.
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF KEY TERMINOLOGY
It is crucial before going into depth in the DRR approach to first define some key
terminologies and differentiate between them. Despite the fact that DRR related
concepts have different meanings and thus applications, they are used interchangeably
both in the literature and in practice. This section will introduce basic concepts as to
begin the study on solid grounds. The first question that should be raised is: what do we
mean by a disaster? A disaster is “the occurrence of an extreme hazard event that
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impacts on vulnerable communities”1 resulting in “serious disruption of the functioning
of society, causing widespread human, material or environmental losses which exceed
the ability of affected society to cope using only its own resources”2. The Centre for
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), established in Brussels, Belgium in
1973 at the Université Catholique de Louvain and a part of WHO’s Global Programme
for Emergency Preparedness and Response, outlined certain criteria for an incident to be
called “a disaster”, and thus would be entered into CRED database known as EMDAT;
the criteria are either when 10 or more people reported killed, 100 people reported
affected, declaration of a state of emergency, or there is a call for international
assistance3. In addition, the term "natural disaster" is widely used in the literature on
disasters, which refers to the occurrence of “rapid onset” natural hazards such as
earthquakes, floods, landslides, storms, hurricanes, volcanoes, tsunamis… etc.
However, this study would not limit itself to rapid onset natural disasters but would also
incorporate human-made disasters, and “slow-onset” hybrid disasters.
Thus, this study will deal with the three types of disasters, which are natural,
human-made, and hybrid disasters for several reasons. The reason why this study will be
dealing with “natural disasters” is the wide misconception associated with them, in which
they are unavoidable “acts of God” that governments cannot prevent nor control and
should only react to. This passive view is wide spread among governments in developing
countries and local communities. Moreover, the reason why this study will be dealing
with human-induced and hybrid disasters is due to their significant increase, high
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occurrence and socio-economic impact. A study was made to quantify the frequency,
nature and changes of human-made disasters in industrialized countries in the 20th
century, by analyzing two disaster databases (EM-DAT and EMA), showed that there
was an exponential growth in the frequency of human-made disasters due to an increase
in traditional hazards4. Despite the fact that there has been an extensive literature on the
frequency of natural disasters and a comprehensive understanding of their probable
incidence and damages, there are few publications on human-made disasters and their
impacts on sustainable human development. Recently, there has been a growing literature
on human-made disasters manifested in the climate change literature as one of the most
serious environmental problems and an obstacle to the achievement of sustainable human
development5. The impacts of climate change on development are expected to manifest
primarily through impacts on natural resources, on which the poor depend heavily, and
on human health. Temporal and spatial changes in rainfall patterns and shifts in
temperatures compound existing crises facing the water and agriculture sectors due to
growing populations6.
Finally and most importantly, in many instances the disaster is a combination of a
natural hazard and human-made actions, which are referred to as “hybrid disaster”7. For
example, Avian and Human Influenza can be perceived as both a natural phenomena and
a human induced disaster at the same time, since the origin of the AHI is natural but
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human practices and behaviors is what causes the disaster. Therefore, this chapter should
take into account this shortcoming of the literature and be more inclusive by
incorporating both natural, human-made, and hybrid disasters in the definition of
“disasters”. Then what does the term “disaster risk” refers to?
“Disaster risk” is the probability of harmful consequences or expected losses
resulting from interactions between hazards and vulnerable conditions.

It is the

“potential disaster losses, in lives, health status, livelihoods, assets and services, which
could occur to a particular community or a society over some specified future time
period”8. Then these losses could be reduced according to the “relatively new conceptual
framework within the development field” 9, which is “disaster risk reduction”. DRR is
defined as “reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyze and manage the
causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened
vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and
improved preparedness for adverse events”10 in order to “avoid (prevention) or to limit
(mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of disasters” 11.
It is also necessary to differentiate between two fundamental terms that are
inaccurately used interchangeably in the literature, which are “disaster risk reduction”
and “disaster management” since they are inaccurately used by policy makers. These two
terms are not synonyms; the key word that dramatically differentiates between these two
phrases is the term "risk". DRR entails all efforts (pre-disaster) prevention, mitigation and
preparedness compared with “disaster management” that deals with (post-disaster)
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rescue, relief, and humanitarian response. “Disaster management”, also known as
“emergency management”, is “the organization and management of resources and
responsibilities for addressing all aspects of emergencies, in particular preparedness,
response and initial recovery steps”12. The revolutionary White Paper on Disaster
Management (1999) in South Africa clearly emphasize that the difference between
“disaster risk reduction” and “disaster management” is in “reducing risks”. The paper
stated that a "fundamental purpose of the policy is to advocate an approach to disaster
management that focuses on reducing risks – the risk of loss of life, economic loss and
damage to property, especially to those sections of the population who are most
vulnerable due to poverty and a general lack of resources… A shared awareness and
responsibility needs to be created to reduce risk in our homes, communities, places of
work and in society."13 While some theorists and practitioners also use a third more
inclusive term that is “disaster risk management”, which incorporate both DRR predisaster planning since it contains the term “risk” and disaster management post-disaster
response and relief measures. “Disaster risk management” refers to both disaster risk
reduction initiatives (prevention, mitigation and preparedness) and humanitarian action
(emergency response, relief and reconstruction).14
LITERATURE REVIEW
For the past years, the DRR approach has been gaining significant weight in the
development arena. DRR, according to the UNDP, is "the systematic development and
application of policies, strategies and practices to minimize vulnerabilities, reduce
exposure to hazards and the unfolding of disaster impacts throughout a society, in the
12
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broad context of sustainable development."15 This definition should be complemented
with another one that incorporates the notion of reducing risks. The UN/ISDR 1994
definition complements the UNDP one by stating that DRR is “the conceptual framework
of elements considered with the possibilities to minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks
throughout a society, to avoid (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the
adverse impacts of hazards, within the broad context of sustainable development”16.
UN/ISDR further updated its definition of DRR in 2009 to refer to the “concept and
practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyze and manage the
causal factors of disasters, including reduced exposure to hazards, and lessened
vulnerability of people and property”17. Then how did DRR came about in theory?
The DRR theory is dominated by two schools of thought: the Neo-Marxists and
the Behavioralists18. The first school of thought, the neo-Marxist, occupies a middle
position between the classical Marxist and Weberian theories of class by incorporating
Max Weber’s broader understanding of social inequality. The neo-Marxist approach to
disasters, which evolved in the 1970s, stressed the inequitable power relationships
between the developed and the developing world that accelerated the process of
impoverishment, which in turn exacerbated the vulnerabilities of marginal populations in
the global South19. Since the neo-Marxists viewed disasters as deeply embedded within
the social structures that shaped everyday development experiences, they argued that “the
more complex understanding of vulnerability enables researchers to conceptualize how
15
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social systems generate the conditions that place different kinds of people (often
differentiated along axes of class, race, ethnicity, gender, or age) at different levels of risk
from the same hazard and suffering from the same event.”20 However, neo-Marxist
approach was criticized for over-privileging economic class in its analysis and failing to
identify the effect of vulnerability on “individuals” as an agency of analysis21.
The second school of thought that dealt with disaster research is the “behavioral
approach”. Behavioralism emerged in political science in the United States when Charles
E. Merriam, in his presidential address to the American Political Science Association in
1925, stated “someday we may take another angle of approach than the formal… and
begin to look at political behavior as one of the essential objects of inquiry”22. During the
next decade the behavioral approach focused on studying individuals rather than larger
political units; it was interested in studying what people said or thought. Armed with the
newly developed tools of survey research, it turned away from the study of constitutions
and from saying how states ought to be ruled to the study of the behavior of political
actors and to statements about how states actually were ruled. Behaviorists were mostly
drawn to subjects about whom quantitative data could be obtained, and thus the study of
mass political behavior was promoted23. There is a misconception that "political
behavioralism" is identical with "quantification" in political studies. Quantitative
measurement and analysis of data is a commonly recognized as an important
characteristic of behavioral work in politics, but it is by no means its central
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characteristic24. The 1970s witnessed an increased interest among behavioral scientists to
address disaster- related issues; a special issue of the American Behavioral Scientist in
1970 was entirely on organizational and group behavior in disasters25.
The behavioral approach to disasters emerged as a result of the “typical”
misconceptions associated with individual behavior such as “personal and social chaos”,
“disaster syndrome”, “social jungle”, and “being hostile”26. The behavioral approach
responded to these stereotypes by arguing that, after recognizing a danger, the behavior
of people is adaptive, aimed at protecting their families, others, and themselves27.
Behavioralists even argue that “much of the initial rescue work is done by the victims
themselves who do not wait to be told what to do, and contrary to the predominant image,
that movement toward the impact area is more significant than movement away.”28 In
general, behavioralists were pre-occupied with the ways in which individuals responded
to disasters; however they didn't study how individuals influence the occurrence of
disasters in any way.
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They downplayed the role of social structures in shaping

vulnerability, and thus they focused on disaster response and recovery (post disaster
response and relief). The neo-Marxists criticized the non-political nature of the
behavioralists30. The question that should be raised is: how did disaster risk reduction
first evolved in the development discourse in general?
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The development of the concept of disaster risk reduction came very late in the
development literature; the late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a sudden interest among
development scholars to address the issue of disaster in theory. Until the mid 1970s,
development theorists believed that disasters are “acts of nature” that can only be
responded to after a disaster has taken place, which is known as humanitarian/emergency
aid. The 1980s marked a new thinking in disaster research, in which disasters were no
longer perceived as natural phenomena since they were proved to be the result of
accumulated risks produced by the interaction of vulnerabilities due to economic, social,
political and cultural factors and underlying hazards. Thus, the case for preventative
action was made on these grounds.
G.N. Ritchie, founder of the Cranfield Disaster Management Center, had noted in
1976 the importance of development in preventing disasters31. Frederick Cuny's book
Disasters and Development, published in 1983, was the first serious attempt to address
the ways in which disasters are a cause of underdevelopment and showed how disasters
can interrupt the development processes32. Cuny argued that the increase in disaster risk
is a consequence of the entrenched cycle of poverty in developing countries; He
continued to argue that the roots of poverty and the roots of vulnerability are the same, in
which the increased marginalization of the population is caused by high birth rates and
the lack of resources to meet the needs of this exploding population33. Moreover,
Kenneth Hewitt in 1983 in his book Interpretations of Calamity argued how western
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societies developed “citadels of expertise” remote from the lives of ordinary people to
“quarantine” disasters and deal with it as an “archipelago of isolated misfortunes” rather
than a result of social and economic relations in the society34.
Moreover, Mary Anderson in 1985 published her early work

A Re-

conceptualization of the Linkages between Disasters and Development, which provided
great insights into the relation between disasters and development; Anderson argued that,
first, disasters are indicator of the failure of development, and second development is the
process of reducing vulnerability to disasters35. In 1987, R.C. Kent dealt with the causes
of disasters and how vulnerabilities can worsen conditions of disasters36. In addition, in
1989 Mary Anderson and Peter Woodrow advanced the concept of Vulnerability and
Capacity Analysis (VCA) in Rising from the Ashes. The VCA framework differentiates
between “needs” and “vulnerabilities” by arguing that vulnerabilities precedes disasters
and is a result of long-term processes while needs are the short term demands of the
community arising from the crisis itself37. Every society has both strengths and
weaknesses (i.e. capacities and vulnerabilities) and when a disaster occurs this means that
society’s vulnerabilities outweighs its capacities38. They continued to argue that
“development is the process by which vulnerabilities are reduced and capacities
increased.”39
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From this point onwards, an interest has emerged in linking disasters to the degree
of development of nations and to the disparities that exist within a nation. Fredrick
Krimgold, one of the early theorists of pre-disaster planning, stated that "the primary goal
of pre-disaster planning may be seen as the prevention and mitigation of disasters."40 Predisaster planning is the term used to illustrate the wide range of efforts made to reduce
the risk of disasters before they take place. There are three types of pre-disaster planning:
disaster prevention, disaster mitigation and disaster preparedness.41 This study will only
be dealing with both disaster prevention and mitigation.
DISATSER RISK= HAZARD x VULNERABILITY
Terms such disaster risk, vulnerabilities, hazards have different meanings and
interpretations for different people. This section will explore the concepts of hazards,
vulnerabilities and risks and examine the relation between them. Disasters can essentially
be viewed as a function of the risk process, i.e. disaster risk result from the interaction of
hazard, conditions of vulnerability and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce the
negative consequences of risk.42 According to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), a
10-year non-binding global plan to make the world safer from disasters adopted by 168
Governments at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Kobe-Hyogo, Japan in
2005, the starting point for reducing disaster risk and for promoting a culture of disaster
resilience lie in, first, the knowledge of the hazards, and second the knowledge of the
physical, social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities to disasters that most
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societies face.43 That is why the terms hazard and vulnerability will be both examined,
however more attention will be given to the notion of “vulnerability” since the exact
same hazard can have different impacts on various communities with varying degrees of
vulnerability. In addition, there is a general consensus in disaster research that the
frequency of natural hazards has not increased in recent decades, however there is an
apparent increase in the number of disasters and their impacts, which led scholars to
argue that vulnerabilities within societies are increasing44.
Hazards are potentially damaging physical events, phenomena or human
activities that have the potential to cause the loss of life, injury, loss of livelihoods and
services, property damage, infrastructure damage, agricultural loss, damage to the
environment, or disrupt economic processes45. They can have different origins: natural
hazards (e.g. seismic, geological, hydro-meteorological and biological/health related
hazards), human-made hazards (e.g. technological hazards), and hybrid hazards (e.g.
epidemics).46 Hazard research has been dominated by the physical hazard agent rather
than the social outcomes of hazardous events and the underlying social structures which
create conditions of risks47. Hazard research has been generally criticized for its lack of
attention to social theory48. According to K. Hewitt (1983), the early hazard work favored
the concentration of power at the individual unit of analysis and used qualitative
measurement techniques and hence neglected the political and economic contexts49.
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This “dominant view” in hazard research that was governed by solely scientific discourse
was criticized for its over-emphasis of the technical aspects of hazards50. Hewitt’s
Interpretation of Calamity criticized this “dominant view” by arguing that most of the
impacts of disasters are “characteristics of the societies” they occur in51. This critique has
marked a new engagement in hazard research away from technical solutions and towards
political economy with the "vulnerability approach" as the leading perspective, which
emphasize the socio-political root causes of hazardous processes52.
In the early 1980s, the vulnerability approach to disasters began with a rejection
of the assumption that disasters are “acts of nature” and the result of external natural
phenomena that man has no control over.53 The emergence of the “vulnerability
perspective” marked the shift from “reactive hazard approach” to “proactive risk
reduction approach”; the vulnerability approach mainly focused on the “social geography
of harm”54. Quarantelli (1986) argued that disasters are a not a result of “physical
happenings” but they are “social events”; he continues to say that disasters are the
“manifestations of the vulnerabilities of a social system.”55 Vulnerability for long time
was seldom addressed because conventional hazard research dealt with symptoms rather
than causes; the reason for this bias is because, according to Piers Blaikie et al (1994),
“vulnerability is deeply rooted, and any fundamental solutions involve political change,
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radical reform of the international economic system, and the development of public
policy to protect rather than exploit people.”56
The term vulnerability has different meanings and interpretations for different
people. The most common understanding of vulnerability is that it is “the degree of
susceptibility to a natural hazard”.57 One of the overriding questions in vulnerability
studies is whether the concept of vulnerability primarily refers to people and their
activities or refers to systems.58 Vulnerability is experienced at various levels; it refers to
both people/communities and to systems. The first type is people’s vulnerability to
disasters and the extent to which they are at risk; for example having a house unable to
withstand earthquakes, and the extent to which they can cope with the impacts, through
such provisions as health care. The case study will examine traditional poultry keepers’
vulnerability to AHI. The second is the vulnerability of institutions and public services
such as the infrastructure59.
There are several dimensions of vulnerabilities such as physical, cultural, social,
economic, political, institutional and environmental vulnerabilities. Buildings at risk,
unsafe infrastructure, and rapid urbanization, among others are the causes of physical
vulnerability.60 The social vulnerability originate from occupation of unsafe areas, highdensity occupation of sites and building, lack of mobility, low perceptions of risk,
vulnerable occupations, vulnerable groups and individuals, and lack of education.61
Social vulnerability is a crucial dimension in creating the conditions in which disasters
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can happen.62 Although social circumstances maybe associated with vulnerability to
disasters, they should not be considered the same thing. Some of the causes behind
economic vulnerability are mono-crop agriculture, non-diversified economy, subsistence
economies, and welfare dependency.63 While environmental vulnerability can be
attributed to deforestation, pollution of ground, water and air, destruction of natural storm
barriers, and climate change.64 The question is does vulnerability lead to poverty or does
poverty eventually lead to increased vulnerability?
Vulnerability is both a condition and a result of poverty since it cannot be reduced
to a one-dimensional cause-effect relationship with poverty. Vulnerability can be seen as
a cause of poverty, as a reason why the poor remain poor, and at the same time an effect
of poverty. UNDP’s Disaster Risk index (DRI) proves that vulnerability and poverty are
largely co-dependent. According to empirical evidence, it is especially the poor in
developing countries who lack the administrative, organizational, institutional, financial,
and political capacity to effectively cope with disasters and who are particularly
vulnerable. While only 11% of the people exposed to natural hazards live in countries
characterized by a low level of human development, they account for more than 53% of
the total number of recorded deaths.65 The researcher believes that in order to reduce
disaster risks two separate regimes, the vulnerability approach and the livelihood
approach, needs to be converged, which will be elaborated upon in the DRR and
Livelihood section. The following section will examine the conceptual framework used
in this study that explains the elements of vulnerability and how they shape disaster risks.
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The "Pressure" and "Release" Model
The Pressure and Release Model (PAR) will be the main conceptual framework
for this study. The PAR model was first initiated by Piers Blaikie et al in 199466 and then
republished by Ben Wisner et al in 200467; the model is founded on the premises that a
disaster is the intersection of two opposing forces, which are the processes generating
vulnerability on one side and the impact and severity of the natural hazard event on the
other side. The PAR model “resembles a nutcracker, with increasing pressure on people
arising from two sides.”68 The PAR model is an organizing framework outlining a
hierarchy of causal factors that together constitute the pre-conditions for a disaster, as
shown in figure 2. This pathway is referred to as “progression of vulnerability”; it is a
sequence of factors and processes that leads us from the disaster event and its immediate
causes back to ever more distant factors that initially may seem to have little to do with
causing the disaster69. The “progression of vulnerability” is a result of the interaction of
three factors, which are “root causes”, “dynamic pressures” and “unsafe conditions”
resulting in increased vulnerability among affected population.
The first set of factors contributing to the “progression of vulnerability” are “root
causes”, which result from economic, demographic and political processes leading to the
limited access to power and resources. These “root causes” are the product of economic
structures, legal definitions of rights, gender relations, and other elements of ideological
nature that reflects the distribution of power in a society.70 For example, people who are
economically marginal (such as urban squatters) or live in marginal environments (such
66

Blaikie, Piers et al., At Risk.
Wisner, Ben et al., At Risk, 87.
68
Wisner, Ben et al., At Risk, 50.
69
Ibid.
70
Ibid, 24.
67

37
as arid or semi arid) tend to hold no economic and political powers which creates sources
of vulnerability to these groups. Their limited access to livelihoods and resources are
likely to generate higher levels of vulnerability.
The second factor is “dynamic pressures” which are the processes and activities
that translate the effects of the root causes into vulnerability of unsafe conditions. These
pressures include macro-forces (rapid population growth, rapid urbanization, debt
repayment schedules, epidemic diseases and malnutrition) and micro-forces (such as lack
of local institutions, lack of local investment, and lack of training). A clear example on
how the “dynamic pressures” operate to channel root causes into unsafe conditions is
endemic disease and malnutrition; undernourished and diseased populations suffer the
most in disasters or when there is disruption to their livelihoods71.
The third factor that contributes to a rise in people's vulnerability is “unsafe
conditions” (such as fragile physical environment, fragile local economy, and fragile
local institutions), in which for instance people have to live in dangerous locations
because they are unable to afford living in safe buildings and work in unsafe
environments. All these "Pressures" in addition to hazardous events will lead to increased
disaster risks. The “Release” aspect arises from the realization that to release the pressure
that causes disasters, the entire chain of causation needs to be addressed right back to the
root causes, and not just the immediate causes or triggers of the hazard itself or the unsafe
conditions of vulnerability72.
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Figure 2: “The PAR Model”

Source: Wisner et al. (2004), p.51.

DRR THEORETICAL LINKAGES
WITH DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES
There are three main approaches that directly connect DRR to the development
discourse, which are the: a) human capability approach; b) governance paradigm; c)
human rights based approach. These approaches will be addressed consecutively.
The Human Capability Approach
The Human Capability Approach (HCA), which emerged as a result of the
adoption of Amartya Sen's Capability Approach as a conceptual framework in several
UNDP Human Development Reports (HDRs) 73. Academic support for the critique of
"believing that economic growth is the sole goal for development"74 has been gaining
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weight since the publication of HDRs in 1990 with its Human Development Index (HDI)
that measures equity, health and education and not just economic activity. HCA is being
applied to inform policy choices in many areas, from poverty reduction to sustainable
development. Sen’s theory of development as capabilities expansion is a starting point for
HCA75; Sen's approach defined human development as the process of enlarging a
person’s ‘‘functionings and capabilities to function, the range of things that a person
could do and be in her life.’’76 The most basic capabilities for human development are to
lead long and healthy lives, to be knowledgeable, to have access to the resources needed
for a decent standard of living and to be able to participate in the life of the community.77
Human development is about removing the obstacles to what a person can do in life,
obstacles such as illiteracy, ill health, or lack of access to resources. This is the entry
point for the DRR approach into the capability approach.
The negative socioeconomic effects felt by those vulnerable and exposed to
hazards will impact in numerous ways on the capacity of people to achieve and enjoy
human development gains. This will also mean that levels of human development will
shape people’s capacity to be resilient in the face of hazard stress and shock. The authors
of HDRs recognized the negative correlation between the increase in human vulnerability
and lack of capabilities, which in turn make these individuals prone to hazards risks that
easily disturb human development. The publication of the 2007/2008 HDR entitled
“Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World” had marked a shift in
the climate change discourse from being a mere environmental issue to a major human
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development issue. The 2008 HDR asserted that climate change related disasters (floods,
storms, and droughts) are destroying human development opportunities and increasing
inequalities among and within developing countries. The 2008 HDR reveals that climate
change risks (such as reduced agricultural productivity, higher water insecurity, increased
droughts, increased flooding, extreme weather events, and increased health risks) would
ultimately affect the most vulnerable nations and lead to the reversal of human
development.
In addition, the 2001 World Disasters Report prepared by the IFRC, which
compared the impact of natural events on countries with high, medium and low scores on
the HDI, revealed that two-thirds of the deaths from 2,557 disasters occurred at countries
with low HDI.78 UNDP took this analytical work even further in 2002 by commissioning
the quantitative study of more than 200 possible indicators of disaster risk vulnerability
and producing a vulnerability index for use in its World Vulnerability Report79. Overall,
the human capability approach provides a coherent disaster risk sensitive framework.
Governance Paradigm
Good governance has recently been at the forefront of development discourse;
good governance implies managing public affairs in a democratic, transparent,
accountable, participatory and equitable manner. Joachim Ahrensn and Patrick M.
Rudolph argue in their article The Importance of Governance in Risk Reduction and
Disaster Management that institution building with the aim of improving the quality of
governance is required to reduce disaster risk; consequently, susceptibility to disaster can
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be interpreted as a consequence of institutional failure.80 In this sense, there is a strong
interdependence between good governance and DRR. It can be argued that good
governance is a prerequisite for DRR. According to Action Aid, good governance is
regarded as a “corner stone of successful DRR strategies”.81 Some theorists (Ahrens,
2000, 2002; Fordham, 200382; Warner, 200383) argue that institutional failure resulting in
bad governance can be regarded as one of the root causes of institutional vulnerability
resulting in increased disaster risk. Then what constitutes an effective governance
structure that would foster disaster risk reduction?
There are four dimensions of an effective governance structure that fosters
development and supports risk reduction, which are: accountability, participation,
predictability and transparency84. The first dimension is “accountability”, which involves
an agreement on clear roles and responsibilities of organizations as well as policy makers
that ensures that politicians can be held responsible for their actions and it is reinforced
through “participation”, which is the second dimension, manifested through formal or
informal channels for citizens to influence policymakers.85 Governments should
decentralize and strengthen local governments so decision making and accountability on
DRR is improved. The third dimension is “predictability”, in which clearly defined laws
and policies regulate DRR and their consistent implementation complements
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accountability.86 Transparency, the forth dimension, is the free access of information by
the public, which is reflected by the publication of reliable DRR information by
government agencies in a timely manner.87 Transparency should reduce the incidence of
corrupt behavior, improves the analysis and articulation of public policy choices, and
enhances their acceptance. For examples, the high level of corruption due to a lack of
transparency and accountability resulted in high death toll in two major earthquakes in
Turkey in 1999, mainly due to the non-enforcement of appropriate building codes88.
Access to information is a crucial element in reducing communities' vulnerability.
Moreover, the capacity of poor people to cope with hazards depends on their access to
resources (material ones as well as information), which is in turn determined by the
institutional and legal frameworks in the country.89 Both the institutional and legal
structure dealing with disasters in Egypt will be deliberately explored in chapter four
from a governance perspective.
Human Rights Approach
There is a wide consensus among disaster scholars on a human rights based
approach to disaster prevention, mitigation and vulnerability reduction, in which all
people should have a universal right to be protected from the impacts of disasters.
According to G. Kent (2001), international human rights laws implicitly address the right
to protection from disasters90. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Article 3
states, ‘‘everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person.’’ In addition,
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Article 25 states that ‘‘everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, or old age or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control.’’ Disasters indeed are conditions under which an
individual may face ‘‘lack of livelihoods in circumstances beyond his control’’. Thus the
right to an adequate standard of living is not suspended in disasters.
G. Kent (2001) suggests that all people have a human right to protection from
disasters, and consequently governments have an obligation to provide that protection.91
People are entitled to know how risk-prone they are to disasters and should have access
to a safe environment as part of their human rights92. Thus, the right to a safe and secure
environment should become a human rights issue.93 The basis for disaster risk reduction
efforts should be a rights-based approach, focusing on how to empower vulnerable
communities to engage in prevention, mitigation and preparedness.
In addition, proponents of the human-rights agenda in the disaster-development
discourse advocate for a modification in international laws. According to Wisner (2001a),
UN agencies in DRR realm have provided technical knowledge, support for institution
building, and financial assistance through grants and loans, however there efforts lacked
the moral obligation that will drive local political will.94 There is an urgent need for
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globally agreed standards of disaster risk reduction exemplified in treaties, covenants and
other agreements, which will force nation states to reduce peoples’ vulnerabilities.
DISASTERS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
There are three well recognized linkages between disasters and sustainable
development in the literature. First, one of the predominant debates in the disasterdevelopment literature is that vulnerabilities continue to increase due to failed
development; Hewitt (1995) argues that “if there could be such a thing as sustainable
development, disasters would represent a major threat to it, or a sign of its failure”95.
There is a wide consensus in the literature that rapid urbanization, the concentration of
populations in hazard prone areas, and the spread of unsafe buildings reduce the human
capacity to absorb and recover from the impact of a hazard, and thus lead to increased
disaster risk96. Blaikie et al (1994) argues that rapid urbanization, one of the “dynamic
pressures”, is a key factor in the growth of vulnerability. Rapid urbanization is attributed
to several factors of underdevelopment such as a result of rural disasters and search for
employment97. These features of “failed development” will be explored in chapter three
and examined whether they are among the “dynamic pressures” resulting in increased
vulnerabilities in the Egyptian context or not.
A second debate is that disasters would set back sustainable human development
and increase poverty of an entire region or a nation as a result of the loss of livelihood
resources, and interruption of development projects.98 There is a wide consensus among
development scholars that disasters disrupt and can set back sustainable human
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development through the loss of livelihood resources.99 A study of the impact of the 1998
Bangladesh floods on micro finance institutions revealed that over 62% of all micro
finance clients had lost their homes, which meant the loss of the work place for many
clients as well100. In addition, nearly 50% had lost their everyday household possessions,
and over 75% had their ability to generate income either destroyed or at least temporarily
suspended.101 For example, in the 1990s, the Asia region saw losses to infrastructure
reach US$10 billion per year due to natural disasters.102 In addition, in Ecuador, climatic
effects of El Nino in 1997-1998 increased the headcount poverty rate from 34 percent in
1995 to 46 percent in 1998103. In Honduras, where there was widespread loss in
agricultural output following Hurricane Mitch in October 1998, the poverty rate increased
from 43 to 46 percent but more so for rural households. In the Dominican Republic,
headcount poverty increased from 36 to 40 percent after a combination of drought and
terms-of-trade shocks in 1990104.
Moreover, disasters hold back progress toward achieving the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) either directly through the loss of lives, livelihoods and
infrastructure or indirectly through the diversion of fund from development to emergency
relief. Many countries are not on course to meet MDG1, the prime goal of halving
extreme poverty and hunger by 2015. Country progress reports on MDGs frequently note
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progress on MDG 1 being affected by disasters105. For example, in the MDG reports of
China, Nepal, Tanzania, and Mozambique various disasters are cited as key pressures and
causes for continuing levels of rural poverty. Another example which affects achieving
MDG 2 is that disaster-hit families often fail to send children to school, while schools
may be closed down by earthquakes or floods106. Moreover, disasters can disrupt
development by transferring resources from development projects to humanitarian relief
efforts. Despite the fact that total official development assistance (ODA) fell in real terms
during the 1990s, emergency funding has risen. OECD estimates for "emergency and
disasters assistance" from DAC donors have risen from an average of 4.8% of total ODA
in 1990-94 to 7.2% in 1999-2003, and in 2003 exceeded $ 6 billion or 7.8% of ODA.107
Another relation is that disaster risk reduction is developmental since it involves
the reduction of human, social, economic, political and environmental vulnerabilities. It
is now widely recognized in the development community that the implementation of
development projects towards vulnerability and risk reduction is the solution to prevent
and mitigate disasters. "Disaster risk management" is the new term used by most donors
to integrate pre and post disaster activities (planning phase, prevention phase, mitigation
phase, preparedness, warning phase, disaster impact phase, rescue phase, relief phase,
rehabilitation and reconstruction phase).108 Most international organizations such as WB,
DFID and UNDP started to integrate disaster risk management into its development
programming since risk reduction initiatives was proved to protect livelihoods from
vulnerabilities and boost their capacity to cope with specific hazard impacts, thus helping
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to make human development sustainable. This is the core rationale for integrating disaster
risk reduction into development planning. For example, in 2001 the death toll resulting
from Hurricane Michelle, which hit very densely inhabited areas in Cuba, were limited to
five people. This success has been attributed to the political commitment to reduce risk
among vulnerable groups, preparedness training and planning, effective communication
of early warning that were implemented by professional local personnel with responsive
communities.109
Moreover, a range of case studies and reports testifies to the cost-effectiveness of
disaster risk reduction activities. In general, cost-benefit analysis of a wide range of
initiatives, from local to global levels, shows that every $1 spent on mitigation can
typically save $4-10 in the cost of recovering from disasters110. In addition, the WB and
the US Geological Survey calculated that economic losses worldwide from disasters
during the 1990s could have been reduced by US$ 280 billion worldwide if US$ 40
billion were invested in mitigation and preparedness111. When dealing with particular
nations, an example would be that the value of cattle saved on a flood shelter of 4 acres in
Bangladesh during the 1998 floods was as much as £150,000 against a construction cost
of only £8,650, according to Oxfam112. Another example, in Darbhanga district in North
Bihar, India, a cost-benefit analysis of disaster mitigation and preparedness interventions
suggests that for every Indian rupee spent, 3.76 rupees of benefits were realized. The Net
Present Value (NPV) of the project was calculated at £46,000113.
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DRR AND SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS FRAMEWORK
The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) explicitly addresses the vulnerability
context, which provides a strong entry point for integrating it into the disaster risk
reduction approach. The livelihoods approach provides a framework in which DRR can
be part of a long-term sustainable development work, in which vulnerabilities should be
reduced to achieve sustainable livelihood outcomes. The main objective of the SLA is to
enable people to become more resilient to shocks and trends by supporting people to
build up their assets and formulate livelihood strategies. The SLA was first initiated by
Robert Chambers and Gordon Conway in 1992; afterwards it was also endorsed by
DFID in Carney (1998) and then by others including Drinkwater and McEwan (1994),
Leach et al. (1997), Moser (1998), Scoones (1998) and Bellington (1999)114.
Chambers and Conway define the concept of sustainable livelihoods as the
“capabilities, assets, and activities required for a means of living: a livelihood is
sustainable which can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance
its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next
generation; and which contributes net benefits to other livelihoods in the long and short
term.”115 The Institute of Development Studies (IDS) livelihoods team proposed a
somewhat modified definition, which is that “a livelihood comprises the capabilities,
assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means
of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and
shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural
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resource base”116. The main difference between this definition and the earlier one by
Chambers and Conway is that it does not include the requirement that for livelihoods to
be considered sustainable they should also “contribute net benefits to other livelihoods in
the long and short term”. In this sense the IDS version is more realistic117.
Figure 3: “Sustainable Livelihoods Framework”

Source: DFID (1999). “Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets.”Available at: http://www.livelihoods.org

The basic elements of the framework, as shown in figure 3, are Vulnerability
Context, Livelihoods Assets, Transforming Structures and Processes, Livelihood
Strategies and, Livelihood Outcomes. The Vulnerability Context shapes people’s
livelihoods and determines the availability of their assets, which are affected by trends
(e.g. population trends, resource trends, and economic trends), shocks (e.g. disasters), and
seasonality (in prices, production, and employment opportunities)118. These shocks and
trends can directly destroy people’s assets or can force people to dispose of their assets as
part of their coping strategies. The Livelihood Assets which can be destroyed or depleted
are human capital (e.g. skills, knowledge, and health), physical (e.g. transportation,
116
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shelter, water supply, and energy supply), social capital (e.g., networks, membership of
groups, relationships of trust, access to institutions), financial capital (e.g., savings,
credit, remittances, and pensions), and natural capital (e.g., land, water, wildlife, and
environmental resources).119 The Transforming Structures and Processes are the levels of
governments, institutions, organizations, policies, legislation, culture, and the private
sector that shape livelihoods. They have a direct effect on access to assets, since the
structures and processes can affect the creation of assets, determine access to assets, and
influence rates of asset accumulation. In general, Transforming Structures and Processes
are seen as directly determining access to various types of livelihoods strategies. The
livelihood strategies are the combination of people’s activities and choices (including
productive activities, investment strategies, reproductive choices, etc.) in attempting to
achieve their Livelihood Outcomes, which are their objectives120.
Originally, the SLA approach was developed specifically for the analysis of a
wide range of agrarian policies. None the less, it can be of great use in disaster theory
since the occurrence of a disaster or a “shock” implies non-sustainability of the affected
livelihoods. The decrease in the vulnerability context depends on people's capacity to
anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from hazard impacts by formulating coping
strategies. People’s capacities can be increased through collective action within a
favorable institutional environment (local, national and international) to establish societal
resilience121. From the above description, it is evident that the SLA places much
emphasis on two key DRR terms, which are vulnerability and capacity. SLA provides
good opportunities for incorporating strong DRR component in development
119
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programmes in order to properly assess risk, vulnerabilities and capacities122. A focus on
livelihoods has broadened the scope of disaster mitigation policy to include questions of
social structure and social agency. Given the positive attributes of DRR to sustainable
livelihoods in specific and sustainable human development in general, the question that
should be raised is: why DRR tend to be overlooked in development planning?
There are several barriers to mainstreaming DRR in development planning. First
there is inaccurate assumption that development efforts, which aim to reduce poverty,
will automatically address vulnerability in a given society. However, several scholars
argue that development efforts is still not leading to sustainable livelihood outcomes, and
this limited progress can partly be explained by its failure to take proper account of
disaster risk, which requires systematic assessment of exposure to “shocks” for different
groups of people, and explicit attention to options for reducing this vulnerability, to be
part of the process of designing development interventions.123 The second factor has to do
with the lack of commitment among policy makers. Ben Wisner points out that there is a
broad gap between the declarations that accompany disasters about reforming institutions
and regulatory frameworks and the political will and capacity to implement these
reforms124.

For politicians, progress on risk reduction is much less visible than

emergency response125. In addition, policy makers tend to be reluctant to address disaster
risk reduction due to the limited resources, and they believe that donors will be more
willing to give emergency aid than prevention/ mitigation aid. The third constrain was the
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separation of donors' humanitarian assistance and development assistance which
complicates funding for DRR, since it is a cross-cutting issue between the two sections.
CRITIQUE OF DISASTER RESEARCH
After reviewing the literature on DRR, it is very crucial to address the theoretical
critiques attributed to disaster theory. Due to the novelty of the DRR approach, there
were limited scholarly critiques with respect to the DRR approach since the “risk
reduction” literature in it of itself emerged as a critique to the “dominant modernist”
disaster theory. DRR theory surfaced as a response to “disaster imperialism”, in which
international interventions in the aftermath of a disaster is justified126. The critiques of
the disaster paradigm are “distributed along a continuum of epistemological positions”127,
according to Stallings (1997).
At one end of the continuum there is the “dominant modernist approach” that
regards risk as solely an object of hazard that can be measured independently of social
and cultural processes. Theories associated with the modernist approach are technoscientific, statistical and engineered based. Kenneth Hewitt's Interpretations of Calamity
(1983) was one of the early critiques of the “dominant disaster paradigm” affiliated with
the classical modernist view. Hewitt described how societies developed “citadels of
expertise to quarantine disaster as an archipelago of isolated misfortunes” distinct from
the lives of ordinary people rather than a consequence of social and economic
relations128. The modernization theory, which was represented in the “dominant
paradigm”, was rejected by the Structuralists in favor of reliance of local knowledge in
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reducing disasters risks and not “imported technology”129. The “modernist approach” to
disasters, risk and vulnerability is criticized for being a historically constructed “neocolonial discourse”, which denigrates large regions of the worlds as tropical, poverty
stricken and disaster prone130.
At the other extreme end of the continuum is the “strong constructionist
approach”, where nothing is a risk in itself but is a product of historically, and socially
and politically created “ways of seeing”. Bankoff’s (2001) article “Rendering the World
Unsafe: Vulnerability as Western Discourse” is an extreme critique of the “dominant
disaster paradigm”. Bankoff argues that disaster risk and vulnerability are historically
constructed in “neo-colonial discourses”

131

. He continues to state that the concept of

“natural disasters” is part of a wider historical and cultural geography of risk that depicts
large parts of the world as “dangerous places” through which the West inflict its control
over most nations of the globe. Bankoff portrays the notion of “vulnerability” in the late
20th century like the notion of “tropicality” in the 17th-19th century and the notion of
“development” in Post WW2, which denigrates large regions of the world as “disasterprone”, “poverty-stricken”, and “tropical others” respectively132. In addition, the
“vulnerability approach” has been under severe criticism since it is regarded to be from
“a knowledge system formed within a dominant Western liberal consciousness and
greatly reflects the values of this culture”133. Modernist proponent’s criticizes the social
constructionist approach because it does not lead to improvement in disaster prevention
practice. Moving across the continuum, there are what could be termed the “weak
129
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constructionist” approaches, where disaster risk is an objective hazard but is always
mediated through social and cultural processes, according to Oliver Smith and Hoffman
(1999).
In the middle of the continuum lies the “Structuralist” critique, also known as the
“constructionist paradigm”, which is one of the most moderate criticisms of disasters
theories; it emerged as a result of the slow progress in reducing disaster losses134.
Structuralists argue that disasters in the developing world are a result of global forces and
pressures and marginalization of the poor and not solely a direct result of the hazardous
events135. The structural critique is a radical interpretation of disasters, contrary to the
behavioral approach to disasters, in which it doesn’t pay much attention to the hazard
itself and focuses on the limitations imposed by global forces on individual action136. The
Structuralist critique is based on the notion that disasters stems from Third World
countries dependency on developed nations137. However, the Structuralist approach is
criticized for the lack of practical risk reduction measures. In addition, there is the “Poststructural critique” that argues that notions such as “disaster management cycle”; i.e.
prevention, mitigation and preparedness ate “technical constructs” imposed on different
cultures, economic political and gender realities138.
In addition, Allan Lavell introduced several critiques in his article The Impact of
Disasters on Development Gains: Clarity or Controversy regarding disaster-development
relationship. He argued that any serious analysis of the disaster-development relation
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must use a temporal framework that examine the full "life cycle" of a disaster and not just
the short-term impact after disaster occurs139. He also argued that the focus on the
impacts of disasters on development divert our attention from a fundamental concern,
which is the impact of development on disasters. Another criticism of the DRR discourse
is the use of economic criteria and cost-benefit analysis for attempting to justify risk
prevention and mitigation. Critics argued that the “attainment of securer living conditions
for the poor and a substantial reduction in their vulnerability is more a case of ethics,
equity and social justice, than economic rationale and efficiency.”140
Another critique to the field of disaster research was its lack of gender
dimensions. Feminists argue that a gender-bias exists in disaster research and that
women's

roles, experiences, and perspectives need to be further investigated and

affiliated with DRR. Maureen Fordham’s article "Gender, Disaster and Development" in
Natural Disasters and Development in a Globalizing World revealed that despite the fact
the gender is a key dimension of social difference, it has been absent as an analytical
variable in disaster research141. Disaster research was criticized for being genderinsensitive since many books on hazards and disasters failed to include gender in their
indexes and even in the text as a whole due to the dominance of men in the field of
disaster management.142 A considerable amount of literature published over the past
decade emphasized the extent to which gender inequalities often result in women bearing
a disproportionate burden of the costs of disasters (Byrne and Baden 1995; Delaney and
Shrader 2000; Enarson 2001b; Twigg 2004). An "alternative perspective" was introduced
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in 1997 by Ariyabandu143, which suggests that the differential impact of disasters on
women is a manifestation of the failure of disaster mitigation policies to grasp that gender
power relations in the society is the primary reason for increasing women's vulnerability
to disasters144.
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CHAPTER 3
DISASTERS IN EGYPT

INTRODUCTION
The objective of this chapter is to examine whether there is an interconnection
between disaster risks, vulnerabilities, and livelihoods in the Egyptian context. The
first section will explore recent disasters that occurred in Egypt in the last two decades
classified according to the three types of disasters, which are natural, human made
and hybrid disasters. The scope, consequences and causes of each disaster will be
examined. This chapter will also explore the ramifications of recent disasters that
occurred in Egypt on sustainable development by revealing how disasters’ impacts
pose a challenge towards achieving the MDGs through the disruption of livelihood
assets, which thus lead to the failure of attaining vulnerable group’s livelihood
outcomes.
The reason why this study devoted an entire section on exploring the recent
disasters that occurred in Egypt is to examine the overall disaster situation in Egypt,
to reveal their interrelation with people’s vulnerabilities, to explore the impact of
different types of disasters on population’s livelihoods, and to reveal the negative
socio-economic effects of disasters on the development process in the Egyptian
context. An observation of all different disasters in Egypt will shed light on various
trends and patterns in Egypt by, first, identifying certain risk patterns prior to the
disaster. Second, it gives us an indication of the concentration and distribution of
vulnerability within the Egyptian society and, third, provides us with patterns of lack
of government responsiveness before, during and after crisis and explains the major
drivers of these patterns.
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OVERVIEW OF RECENT DISASTERS IN EGYPT
According to Dr. Samir Riad in a report submitted to the UNDP, “Egypt is a
country that is relatively free from catastrophic natural disasters… but their socioeconomic impacts are more serious.” 1 The researcher doesn’t agree with this
statement and finds it somehow misleading since Egypt is not “relatively free from
natural disasters”. While relative to other countries, Egypt may not be the lowest on
the list, nevertheless Egypt is susceptible to several natural hazards and is
characterized by a large number of human-made and hybrid disasters, as will be
revealed in the following sections. This alleged claim that Egypt is “relatively free
from disasters” often justify why the GOE is not committed and concerned with DRR
issues and why government officials lack the political will to reduce disaster risks, a
claim that will be further investigated in chapter four.
This section will explore recent disasters that occurred in Egypt between 1990
and 2008, classified according to the three types of disasters, which are natural
(earthquakes and floods), human-made (road, maritime, train, and fire accidents) and
hybrid disasters (Avian and Human Influenza and Landslides). During the past
decades, Egypt has experienced a number of major crises which has resulted in many
economic, social, environmental and human losses. Egypt is among 28 developing
countries who have suffered direct losses of more than 1 billion USD from only
“sudden-onset” extreme natural disasters in the past 20 years, according to the Munich
Re, one of the largest reinsurance companies that compile international statistics on
disasters2. This figure is just an indication of the situation; the prevalence of “slow
1
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onset” disasters is even greater in scale and has more damaging effects than the
“sudden-onset” disasters, as will be revealed in the following sections.
It is worth noting that during the research process, specifically for this
chapter, the researcher has encountered serious obstruction in data collection due to
the scarcity of primary resources on disasters and potential hazards in Egypt due to
the sensitivity of the topic. The researcher was denied access to IDSC documents due
to their confidentiality that would have been of great use to this chapter, which are
The National Plan to Manage Disasters of Earthquakes in Egypt, The National Plan
to Manage Disasters of Flash Floods in Egypt, and Emergency Plan to Address Major
Fires in Egypt. The researcher tried to overcome this by relying on a variety of other
published primary and secondary sources tackling specific hazards and disasters in
Egypt.
Natural Disasters
Natural disasters are “catastrophic events resulting from natural hazards, such
as volcanic eruptions, tornados, earthquakes, floods… etc., over which man has no
control”. 3 In the previous definition of natural disasters, the researcher refutes the
latter part of the definition since the statement “over which man has no control”
indirectly advocates for a culture of response rather than a culture of prevention,
supports humanitarian relief rather than risk-sensitive development agenda, and is not
gender-sensitive; the researcher prefers to replace it with this phrase “over which
humans have limited control”. Despite the fact that the numbers of natural hazards
events has not increased in recent decades in Egypt, the numbers of natural disasters,
in terms of losses, have increased rapidly in Egypt. Natural disaster risks is a
combination of the factors that determine the potential for people to be exposed to
3
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particular types of natural hazards; it depends primarily on how social systems and
their associated power relations impact on different social groups (through their class,
gender, ethnicity, etc.)4 . In other words, to understand disasters we must not only
examine the natural hazardous events that might affect people, but also explore the
different levels of vulnerability of different groups of people, which is determined by
social systems and power and not solely by natural forces5. The question is what are
the “dynamic pressures” that increase society’s vulnerabilities to natural hazards in
Egypt?
There are a number of pressures that contribute to increased vulnerability to
natural hazards, one of which is rapid urbanization. There is a wide consensus in the
literature that rapid urbanization is a major factor in the growth of vulnerability,
particularly of low-income families living within squatter settlements6. It is argued
that rapid urbanization has been a major driver for the expansion of megacities and for
the proliferation of informal housing quarters in hazardous places, which are highly
vulnerable to disaster.7 This movement of large numbers of people to urban cities is
particularly critical in the case of mega-cities since the urbanization process results in
land pressure as migrants from rural areas move into already overcrowded cities and
these new arrivals have no alternative other than occupying unsafe land, constructing
unsafe houses, and working in unsafe environments 8 . According to Blaikie et al.
(1994), “there is a consensus that urbanization has contributed considerably to the
severe losses of certain urban earthquakes for recent years.”9
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With regard to Egypt, rapid urbanization might be attributed to the increase in
population’s vulnerabilities. According to the UN Department of Economic and
Social Affairs Population Division, Cairo-Giza is a “mega city” and among the twenty
largest cities in the world located in hazard prone areas with a population of around
10 million in 1996 and a projected population of around 15 million in 201510. In
1950, the urbanization rate in North Africa was the highest in Egypt at 31.9 % and it
will continue to increase to reach an expected 54.4 % by 2030 11 . Among the 30
largest urban agglomerations in 1950, the city of Cairo was one of them at number 25
with 2.410 million. Cairo grew by 5-folds in 2000 and was number 20 with 9.462
million, and by 2015 Cairo will be number 18 with 11.531 million 12 . This rapid
urbanization increases Cairo’s vulnerability to natural hazards such as earthquakes,
floods, and storms. Another example is Shubra el Kheima in Egypt, which grew by
25-fold; it had 0.04 million in 1950, grew to 0.94 million in 2000, and is estimated to
reach 1.23 million in 201513.
The following tables summarize natural disasters that occurred in Egypt in the
past ten years. Despite the low level natural hazards in Egypt, natural disasters’
impacts are tremendously increasing. It should be noted that this study do not classify
landslides and epidemics as “natural disasters” but as “hybrid disasters” as will be
shown in subsequent sections. The two main natural disasters in Egypt in the past two
decades were the 1992 earthquakes and the 1994 flash floods that resulted in severe
livelihoods losses of the affected populations. The following sections will examine the
scope, causes and consequences of these two main natural disasters in order to
identify vulnerability trends and government risk intensifying patterns.
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Table 1: Top 10 Natural Disasters in Egypt (1999- 2008)
Disaster
Date
Mass movement dry
6/9/2008
Epidemic
1/1/2006
Flood
20/12/2002
Storm
22/01/2004
Flood
3/3/2002
Extreme temperature
Jan-2000

No Killed
98
15
14
13
4
3

Source: EM-DAT. Available at: http://www.em-dat.net. Accessed on 15/11/2008

Table 2: Top 10 Natural Disasters in Egypt (1999-2008) by numbers of affected
people
Disaster
Date
Total Affected
Flood
3/3/2002
800
Mass movement dry
6/9/2008
697
Earthquake
24/08/2002
250
Epidemic
10/6/2004
120
Extreme temperature
Jan-2000
105
Flood
20/12/2002
70
Storm
22/01/2004
42
Epidemic
1/1/2006
23
Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database. Available at: http://www.emdat.net. Accessed on 15/11/2008

Table 3: Natural Disasters in Egypt (1975 - 2001) by numbers of affected people
Total
Earthquakes
Floods
Windstorms
Killed

Affected

Killed

1,386

280,342

571

Affected

34,998

Killed

Affected

Killed

Affected

673

229,868

51

15,071

Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database. Available at: http://www.emdat.net

a. Earthquakes
Scope
Despite the fact the Egypt is not a highly seismic country; earthquakes are
potential hazards in Egypt. Earthquakes history extends back to 2800 BC, since Egypt
is located near a number of major plate tectonic boundaries that generate significant
seismic activity. 14 The most active plates are concentrated in the North of Egypt,
which makes the vulnerability to earthquake hazard the most at the North-East and the
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least in the South-West.15 An IDSC report revealed an increase in the total number of
earthquakes over the past years; the report uncovered that the number of earthquakes
rapidly increased from 240 earthquakes (1900 – 1980) to 2718 earthquakes (19811997), and again a rapid increase to 8588 earthquakes (1998- 2004)16. This reveals an
alarming increase in the frequency of seismic hazard and if magnified by increased
vulnerabilities, a catastrophe would eventually occur. The October 1992 earthquake
at Dahshur, 45 kms to the Southwest of Cairo, has affected Cairo, El Fayoum, Beni
Suef, Giza and Qalyubiya and was the second biggest17 natural disaster in Egypt.
Consequences
Although the magnitude of the earthquake was relatively weak, there were a
large number of human losses and damages due to the increase in vulnerability of
affected populations. With regard to the 1992 earthquake impact, it had resulted in an
estimated 561 deaths, 9,929 injuries and 40,000 homeless18. The government stated
that around 5,000 houses collapsed and 11,540 damaged and estimated that total
damage to be around 500 million LE. 19 However, Munich Re, one of the largest
reinsurance companies that compile international statistics on disasters, estimated that
the socio-economic damage amounted to US$1,200 billion 20 . The earthquake had
severly affected Cairo, Bulaq one of Cairo’s most densely populated districts was
among the worst part affected by the earthquake, resulting in high number of people
left homeless21. In addition, the earthquake resulted in the disruption of livelihoods.
For example, a nationwide survey reveled that 1,087 schools were damaged, 3,569
15
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require intensive reconstruction, and 2,301 were in need of restoration. 22 If the
government had invested in educational infrastructure in the first place, school
buildings would not have been so vulnerable to earthquakes (i.e. physical
vulnerability).
Causes
A study formulated, after the 1992 earthquake, revealed that the level of
seismic hazards is relatively high in densely populated areas in Egypt, which can
directly affect the socio-economic development of Egypt23. This increase in seismic
risks is attributed to an increase in people’s vulnerabilities. One of the factors that
increase the society’s vulnerability to seismic hazards is rapid urbanization. Hewitt
examined the literature on earthquake impacts and found that urbanization was
closely related to damage to once-new multi-storey buildings and to the concentrated
illegal poor housing of squatter settlements. This situation was typified in the 1992
earthquake in Egypt, in which two high-rise buildings collapsed in Cairo, as well as
the destruction of Islamic monuments, and entire rural villages in Fayoum
governorate, near to the damages. In addition, a study compared the 1992 earthquake
in Egypt with an earthquake in Japan with same magnitude, it was found out that the
Egyptian earthquake far exceeded the Japanese one in terms of human losses, injuries
and livelihoods destruction 24 . The Japanese earthquake did not result in any
casualties, which is mainly attributed to the low level of vulnerability among the
Japanese population with respect to seismic hazards compared to the high
vulnerabilities of the affected population in Egypt25. In epicenter of the earthquake,
suffered severe Egypt, the high costs of the 1992 earthquakes were mainly attributed
22
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to rapid urbanization with respect to the damage of houses in shanty settlements and
to corruption with respect to the destruction of multi-story buildings.
Another factor that increases the physical vulnerabilities to earthquakes is the
poor land use and inadequate enforcement of planning, design and building
standards.26For example, according to the Housing Committee at the Parliament, there
are 850,000 units in Egypt that there life spam has ended, 102,000 unimplemented
demolition decisions, and 2 million buildings that are likely to fall27. Natural disasters
are the monitors of development; the 1992 earthquake disaster exposed the
shortcomings of preceding development failures. What the development process has
done or failed to achieve in previous decades was exposed in the 1992 disaster
aftermath as the “debt of development… disasters are the unpaid bills”28, in which the
affected populations is placed in a vicious cycle of underdevelopment.
In addition, cultural factors play a major role in shaping vulnerabilities. A case
study was carried out by Jacqueline Homan in 2001 to understand the socio-cultural
contextualization of earthquakes in Egypt by interviewing 136 community members
close to the earthquake epicenter 29 . The field work was conducted in five
communities in Gerza, Barnasht, EL Gamaleyya, central Cairo and El Kattamia. The
survey aim was to come up with a bottom-up mitigation approach that is culturally
sensitive by reviewing people’s perceptions. The study revealed a science - religion
interface by detecting people’s concerns toward the 1992 earthquake. The respondents
were asked to discuss their general experiences, give explanations on the reason
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behind the occurrence of the earthquake, explain the reason behind high impact of the
earthquake in terms of damage and disruption, and discuss how scientist can play a
role in limiting the effects of such disasters 30 .

The dominant perception of

interviewees, 116 out of 136 respondents, revealed that the 1992 earthquake is an “act
of God”, “everything comes from God”, and is “due to the anger of God due to the
behavior of people” 31 .

Another respondent from Kattamia argued that “the

earthquake was related to God; I heard that it is in the nature of the ground to crack
and lead to earthquakes in the Fayoum region, but I don’t believe this myself.”32 The
study attributes the reluctance of vulnerable populations in the Egyptian society to
accept scientific explanation is that indigenous population are denied access to
scientific information on the basis that they will violate local culture, which lead to
their marginalization and disempowerment33. The author argues that the origins of
cultural vulnerabilities must be studied carefully before attempting to implement any
mitigation efforts in order to ensure that they are culturally sensitive.
b. Floods
Scope
According to the Crises and Disaster Department (CMDR) at IDSC34, floods
are regarded as the only potential natural hazard that can lead to a catastrophe in
Egypt. Flash floods occur in Egypt every couple of years. The most vulnerable
governorates to floods risks are the governorates of North and South Sinai and Upper
Egypt governorates (Beni Suef, Minya, Assiut, Sohag, Qena, Aswan, and City of
Luxor). Flash floods occurred in Egypt in 1972, 1979, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998
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and 2008. In addition to the current floods hazards in Egypt, the 2008 UNDP HDR
entitled Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World revealed that
six million Egyptians could be affected by flooding as a result of global warming in
the coming decades.
Consequences
Most of the flash floods that occurred in Egypt had led to massive losses in
lives, houses, lands, livelihood resources, livestock, and damage in infrastructure.
The worst natural disaster during the past fifteen years was the November 1994 flash
floods in Upper Egypt. The 1994 flash floods affected 134 villages35 in Assiut, Sohag,
Qena and Luxor where 600 killed, 302 injured, 140,00036 became homeless, 11,148
houses destroyed and 11,085 buildings damaged.37 In Asyut and Sohag, 31 schools
have been completely destroyed.38 In addition, 24,000 feddans of agricultural land
were destroyed and thousands of livestock were dead, which severely affected the
livelihoods of affected population. It was estimated that 160,000 persons were
affected from the 1994 floods, and the total economic losses were estimated to be
140,000 US$ 39 . Most of the deaths were not a direct result of the floods but the
consequence of an electrical fire that ignited a fuel depot (eight fuel tanks) in Drunka
in Assiut governorate, in which ignited fuel swept through Drunka on the flood
waters. The flood situation was compounded at Drunka by leakage of fuel as a result
of explosion in depot tanks; the burning oil gushed through the village on top of the
floodwaters igniting timber houses along its path. A lot of people were trapped inside
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their burning houses while others ran out into a burning river. This incidence alone
results in 475 deaths40, 200 injuries41, and around 20,00042 became homeless.
Causes
There are several risks that increase vulnerability to floods in Egypt. The
primary factor is that the GoE still perceives floods risks from a “physical hazard
agent” perspective, in which they are “natural” hazardous events that are dealt with
through “structural technical” solutions such as early warning systems and the
construction of drainage basins. According to the IDSC "Annual Report of Major
Disasters in Egypt during 2008", the primary cause of flash floods in Egypt is heavy
rain, which result in the assembly of huge amounts of rain waters in small valleys that
gather force and momentum during its journey to the main valley43.
The GoE does not tackle the underlying socio-economic processes which
create conditions of risks when dealing with the causation of flash floods since, for
example, vulnerable communities in Upper Egypt settle in illegal flash flood prone
areas without government intervention. Dr. Mahmoud Abu Zeid, revealed in Al
Dostour news paper that governorates North of Assiut in Upper Egypt is at very high
risk of flood disasters due to the increase in the rain levels on one side and the
prevalence of high vulnerabilities on the other side; he adds that most of the flood
drainage basins were transformed to agriculture land and were inhabited by large
populations in shanty settlements 44 . The CMDR stated in the “Interim National
Progress Report on the Implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action that “one
of the lessons learnt from the 1994 flash floods was to prevent construction of
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settlements in hazard prone areas most affected by flash floods”45. However, this did
not take place 15 years after the devastating 1994 floods.
The issue of flash floods in normally high on the political agenda shortly after
the disaster takes place and then gradually its importance fade away and the issue is
ignored until the same disaster occurs after couple of years, which put it again on the
government’s agenda46. Moreover, the government often redistributes the allocated
funds for floods prevention to perform engineering structural measures (such as the
construction of drainage basins, sand dunes, and dams) and non-structural measures
(such as raising awareness among vulnerable populations) to other overriding
development priorities since floods are not perceived by decision makers as a priority
issue except when the disaster takes place 47 . Another factor is the lack of flood
experts at the local level; most of flood expertise and technical knowledge are
concentrated at the central level48. An IDSC report acknowledged the failure of the
Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation to engage the local communities in their
efforts to disseminate important technical information on for example underground
water to local communities49. In addition, the lack of coordination between weather
monitoring agencies, early warning authorities and vulnerable populations is also
lacking50. All these factors contribute to the high costs of floods and the increased
disruption of livelihoods. This increased vulnerability to floods have affected the
development process in Egypt, however there is no official data available on this
regard. The researcher will attempt to link these impacts with attaining the MDGs in
the following sections.
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Human-made Disasters
Human made hazards, also known as technological hazards, are the negative
consequence of human innovation that can result in harm or the destruction of life,
property, and the environment51. Technological hazards differ from natural hazards in
the sense that societies have chosen to assume technology’s associated risks in
exchange for some realized benefits52. Egypt has witnessed an increase in the number
of human-made disasters such as transportation accidents (Traffic accidents, Maritime
accidents and Trains), and fire disasters as a result of human-induced practices during
the past fifteen years. This section will examine transportation accidents due to its
intensity and huge losses as well as fire accidents due its socio-economic impacts.
a. Road Accidents
Scope
With regard to traffic accidents, according to the IDSC Annual Report of Major
Disasters in Egypt, road accidents are ranked the first in the list of human-made
disasters that occurred in 2008 in terms of human losses. 53 There is an alarming
increase in the number of people killed, number of injured and number of accidents
from 1990 till 2007. IDSC affirms the seriousness and intensity of traffic accidents in
Egypt since it result in enormous human losses as well as material damages.
According to an IDSC report entitled Road Accidents in Egypt, there were around
22,000 road accidents in Egypt in 2007 compared to 19,000 accidents in Egypt in
2006, which amounts to an increase of 16.7% 54 . According to the IDSC 2008
Disasters Report, it estimate the number of traffic accidents to be 18,701 in 2008,
however this decrease in the numbers of traffic accidents might not reflect an accurate
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picture since these figures only reflect the numbers of accidents IDSC received from
the different operation rooms at the governorate level.
Consequences
According to official figures, the number of people killed in road accidents in
2008 and 2007 are 4,651 and 4,244 respectively.55 What is even more alarming is that
the percentage of people killed increased by 36.7% from 1990 till 200756. According
to the IDSC, the number of injuries from traffic accidents is 43,616 in 2008 alone57;
this figure might be a modest estimate since it only reflects the reports received from
the governorates’ operation rooms. Moreover, it is also interesting to notice that some
of the government official figures are not consistent with each other, which is an
indicator of lack of transparency, which downplays an important dimension of good
governance. Ironically, the same entity, which is the IDSC, published two reports in
2008 with different figures of the number of injured in road accidents in 2007. One
report revealed that there was a 13.2% increase in injured people in 2007 (around
30,000 in 2007 compared with 26,000 in 2006).58 While the other report stated that
the number of injured people was 43,382 in 200759, which means that there is an
alarming 66.8 % increase and not a mere 13.2%. With regard to the loss in assets,
around 20,000 cars had fatal damages in 2007 compared with 9,000 cars in 1990,
which is an increase of 106%.60 These official figures are just an indicator to reveal
the intensity of the situation and are not accurate figures. The IDSC in its Annual
Report of Major Disasters in Egypt in 2007 acknowledged that number are not the
exact figures since the IDSC publishes these figures based on the notifications it
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receives at the central emergency room at IDSC; IDSC continues to declare that
figures might be higher since there is no binding mechanism the oblige emergency
rooms at the governorates to report the accidents to the IDSC emergency room61.
Causes
The GoE is also dealing with traffic accidents as “events beyond its control”.
Road accidents are still considered by government officials as a matter of “fate”, “act
of God”, “unavoidable consequence of modern life”, and/or “unavoidable-cost-of
development”.

The primary cause behind the increase in road accidents can be

attributed to the physical vulnerability of transportation infrastructure in Egypt caused
by rapid increase in the number of vehicles that is not matched by adequate
transportation infrastructure (roads, high ways, bridges…etc). According to the IDSC
Annual Disasters Report for 2008, the “indirect causes of road accidents can be
attributed to the rapid increase in the number of vehicles and the lack of development
of the road infrastructures that have the enough capacity to match this increase”62. In
addition, the report revealed that most of the roads do not abide by international safety
regulations and standards63. Poor urban planning and poorly maintained roads lead to
congestion, speeding, and dangerous “black spots” that are characterized by frequent
accidents. In addition, the physical vulnerability of transportation infrastructure can be
attributed to failure of good governance manifested in the prevalence of corruption.
For example, a license can be bought with bribes without undergoing a driving test;
what is even more alarming is that when a license is ceased it is easily returned for a
bribe. In addition, many vehicles are not functional and not properly maintained and
still get licensed. Moreover, there is overcrowding on public transportation and
especially on minibuses, which are often packed to the brim with passengers
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(sometimes coming out of windows and doors) and driven by young inexperienced
drivers without driver’s license. All these conditions increase the risks for road
accidents, and can be attributed to “failed development”.
b. Maritime Accidents
Scope
With regard to maritime accidents, the sinking of Al-Salam Ferry in the Red
Sea in February 2006 during a tip from Saudi Arabia to the Egyptian port of Safaga
was one of the most catastrophic crises in the past decade in Egypt. According to a
study conducted by Swiss Re, the world’s second largest reinsurance company that
publish reports on disasters , the sinking of the Egyptian ferry “Al-Salam 98” off the
coast is ranked the fifth worst catastrophe around the world in 2006 in terms of the
number of victims64. The ship had 1,312 passengers on board and 96 crew members.
Consequences
According to the IFRC, around 400 people were rescued and around 1,069
lost their lives.65 Most of those killed were poor seasonal workers and peasants who
were returning from Saudi Arabia where they were employed as “guest workers,”
mostly in the low-paid service and construction industries66. With an unemployment
rate of more than 20 percent, large numbers of Egyptians are forced to support their
families by working in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The passengers on the
ferry were mostly Egyptian migrant workers, “some of whom were bringing months',
if not years', worth of savings to their families back home”67. This can reveal the
extent of losses in human capital as well as the livelihood disruption of hundreds of
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Egyptian families as well as the psychological stress endured by families and
children, who lost their loved ones.
Causes
According to the IFRC, shortly after the ship’s departure, an electrical fire
broke out which the crew tried to extinguish with water68. The crew used pipes to
spray water on the fire; however the fire spread and the crew sprayed more and more
water to put the fire out69. Gradually the water collected inside Al Salam and flooded
the ship
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. According to the Egyptian special parliamentary commission

investigations, the ferry’s drains were blocked, causing an accumulation of water
which led to the sinking of the ferry; they found out that the ferry’s drains had not
been inspected by the Maritime Safety Board, the fire extinguisher was not working,
and that there was shortage in lifejackets and safety rafts.71 The 36-year-old vessel
was routinely overloaded with passengers and despite being originally licensed in
Italy to carry 1,187 people, was permitted to carry up to 2,890 passengers by Egyptian
authorities.72 The overloading of Al Salam ferry, to maximize financial returns, was
one of the primary causes of the disasters since it accelerated the tipping of the ferry
when passengers panicked and ran to one side of the boat. In addition, the failure of
maritime authorities to carry out routine inspections and the inadequate security
procedures is an indication of high level of corruption within maritime authorities.
This was also verified when the owner of Al Salam, a former member of parliament's
upper house, was sentenced in March 2009 to seven years in jail over the sinking of
the ferry back in 2006.
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c. Train Accidents
Scope
In the 1990s and early 2000s, Egypt has witnessed a large number of train
accidents that lead to significant number of people killed and injured. According to an
IDSC report, Egypt witnessed 1,203 train accidents only in the year 2000 73 . The
report also stated that the numbers of train accidents have decreased by 19% in the
year 2004 with 975 accidents compared with 2000, and then increased again to reach
1,231 accidents in 2007 with an increase of 26.3% compared to 200474. The most
recent train accident was the July 2008 train accident when a train from Marsa Matruh
to Alexandria ran into three vehicles at a rail junction. This is not the first accident of
its kind; as shown below train accidents are common phenomena in Egypt rail road
accidents. The following is a time line of major train disasters that occurred in Egypt
from 1992 till 2008, according to an IDSC Information report75:
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
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July 2008: A train from Marsa Matruh to Alexandria smashed into three vehicles
at an intersection, killing at least 44 people and injuring 50.
August 2006: Two trains collided (a commuter train with a freight train) in
Qalyoub Governorate, where 58 passengers were killed and 140 were injured76.
February 2002: A train from Cairo to Upper Egypt was set on fire from a
passenger stove, killing 373.
November 1999: Train between Cairo and Alexandria hits truck and runs off
track, killing 10 and injuring 7.
April 1999: At least 10 people die and nearly 50 are injured in northern Egypt
after collision between trains.
October 1998: About 50 people are killed and more than 80 injured when train
failed to stop at buffers and ran into a busy market square. Reports suggested that
passengers travelling on the roof of the train may have tampered with an air pipe,
disabling the brakes.
February 1997: At least 11 people die and 75 wounded after two trains collided.
February 1996: Train hits truck at an intersection killing 11 people.
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•
•
•
•
•

December 1995: In thick fog a train rams into the back of another, 75 people die.
Driver was blamed after findings that the train was travelling well above the speed
limit
May 1995: Nine die after train hits a barrier just north of Cairo and derails.
April 1995: A train and a bus collide on a level crossing in Nile Delta, killing 49.
December 1993: At least 12 people die and 60 are injured when two trains
collided.
February 1992: Two trains crashed, killing 43 people.
Analysis of major train disasters in Egypt from the above timeline revealed that

around 755 passengers have been dead and around 500 have been injured. These
figures are a modest indication since they are a rough estimate that only covers the
above major train accidents. Train accidents entail a lot of causalities due to the high
numbers of passengers as well as the huge magnitude of train accidents, which differ
completely from road accidents. Most of the accidents occur as a result of two trains
colliding or as a result of a collision of a train and buses and/or cars at intersections.
The exact causes behind these collisions will be addressed in following sections.
Consequences
One of the worst train accidents in the history of Egypt was the 2002 Upper
Egypt train accident, in which a fire caught up in the train near Al Ayat district. This
resulted in 386 deaths and 136 injuries in the year 2002. Moreover, in 2006, there
were 278 injuries as a result of the collision of two trains near Qaliub North of Cairo.
There are no published data on the accumulated costs in terms of human and financial
losses for all train accidents in Egypt in the past decades.
Causes
The previous timeline reveals that many train accidents occur due to collisions
at intersections. The Qatar Raya news paper published an article entitled Fifty-Nine
Train Accidents in Six Years Killing and Injuring more than 6,000 Egyptians in
August 2006 which states that, according to surveys, road/rail junctions is the primary
reason behind 40% of train accidents in Egypt, to the extent that it is named “death

77
intersections”77. Surveys revealed that there are 1,264 road/rail intersections in Egypt
with very poor conditions, which constantly lead to disasters. This article was
published after the 2006 train accident, when a commuter train collided with a freight
train at an intersection. The 2008 train accident also occurred in an intersection, which
reflects the lack of preventive measures at the central level, specifically within the
concerned sectoral ministry, which is the Ministry of Transportation. In a parliament
session after the 2008 train accident, the Minister of Transportation pointed out that
“replacing Egypt's 1,261 road/rail junctions with bridges and flyovers would cost at
least LE36 billion, far beyond the ministry's budget” 78 . This reflects the lack of
financial resources allocated for disaster prevention, which will be explored in depth
in chapter 4.
Another reason behind train accidents is the outbreak of fire on board the
trains, which gets out of control due to the speeding train that ignites the fire; poor
passengers packed into cramped compartments in old crumbling trains on long
journeys to Upper Egypt often carry large amounts of baggage, take small animals
and prepare their own meals on board the trains using portable gas cookers. This
creates conditions of high risk on board trains, which was exactly the case in the 2002
train disaster to Upper Egypt that lead to 373 deaths.
d. Fire Accidents
Scope
Fire accidents are regarded as one of the common and recurrent human-made
disasters in Egypt. In March 2009, several large fires swept across the entire nation
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leaving a lot of destruction and damages in El Salalmlek Hotel in Alexandria, Ezbet
Bilal in Al-Sharabeya area, Gaziret El-Ward Hotel in Mansoura, the Tunsi Bridge in
the Khalifa area in Cairo, in Helwan in Al Tawheed and Nour store, and the Tama
Elementary school in Sohag also caught fire. The total number of fires that occurred
in Egypt in 2008 is an alarming 8,298, according to official figures, compared to only
374 fires in 200779. Some independent sources estimate the number of fires to be
30,000 annually in Egypt. A study conducted by the Centre for Nuclear Security
showed that Egypt suffers around 20,000 fires every year if not more. Among the
popular fires that occurred in 2008 are the Upper House of Parliament fire and the
Balloon Theater fire. Previous years have also witnessed several devastating fires
such as the Beni Sweif Theatre fire that left more than 30 dead and more than 35
injured80.
Consequences
The 2008 fires led to 136 deaths and 1,459 injuries, according to official
estimates 81 . The costs of these fires are estimated to reach 400 million Egyptian
pounds in 2008, according to a report published by the Nuclear Security
Department82. The socio-economic impact of disasters is immense since it disrupts
population livelihoods since fires can destroy one’s shelter or work place. In addition,
fires destroy public buildings, government entities, historic buildings, hotels and
factories have a direct effect on the national economy due to the huge human and
financial losses. Among the fires that took place in 2008, one of them stands out due
to its socio-economic, cultural and political significance. The fire of the Upper House
of Parliament occurred on the 22nd of August 2008, which lasted for 16 hours. This
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disaster not only has a socio-economic dimension, but also has political and cultural
dimensions. This disaster resulted in one death, 6 injuries, and the destruction of a 19th
century palace, in which the estimated damages are worth 6 million and 800 thousand
pounds83. With respect to the cultural dimension, this 150 years old building is a loss
to Cairo’s architectural heritage.
Causes
There is a very dramatic increase in the numbers of fires and their devastating
effects; the question is to what these fires can be attributed. The Parliament fire has
revealed the lack of the GOE to prevent and reduce the risk of fires in its own
strategic premises. The lack of a culture of prevention is one of the primary factors
that increase the numbers and the impacts of fires in Egypt, which was clearly
revealed during the course of the Upper House of Parliament crisis. "God protect
us!” stated Fathi Sorour, the Chair of the People’s Assembly, commenting on the
reduced number of losses in lives, said in a live interview on Nile News television84.
The reason why the parliament fire did not result in looses in lives is because it took
place in the afternoon after employees have left the buildings. Moreover, due to
increased corruption among government officials, opposition groups claimed that
this fire was carried out deliberately by state security officials to destroy critical
documents at the parliament library, where documents for several corruption cases
were kept. A former high-ranking state security official, General Fouad Alam, has
“suggested that only arson could have been the cause of this fire”85. A member of the
parliament affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhoods stated “arson is a safe way in
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Egypt for corrupt officials to get rid of important documents and files”86. Headlines
of the banned El Badeel edition said the fire had destroyed files on recent
controversial cases, such as “Al-Salam ferry, contaminated blood case, cancerous
pesticides issue and Upper Egypt train accident”87. It is interesting to realize that all
the documents claimed to be destroyed were all related to recent disasters in Egypt,
which reveals that the prevalence of corruption is among disasters-related trends and
patterns in Egypt.
With regard to reducing disaster risks, the Parliament fire revealed that the
GOE did not carry out structural preventive measures and also failed to implement
non-structural measures to prevent and mitigate the impacts of fires. With regard to
the structural measures, the daily newspaper el-Badeel claimed that the building had
no adequate fire-protection systems88. In addition, the IDSC argues in a report that
the disaster management policies were not adhered to during the course of the crisis.
For example, according to the General Procedures for Crises and Disaster
Management Guide, an inter-ministerial steering committee chaired by the Ministry
of Interior was supposed to be formulated in theory , which did not take place89. In
addition, the National Plan for Fires Preparedness and Response, formulated by
IDSC and endorsed by the Cabinet on the 7th of February 2008, was not implemented
in practice90. Also, there was lack of communication; for example, a government
spokesman should have been appointed to disseminate necessary information to the
public, which lead to the spread of inaccurate information and rumors.
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Hybrid Disasters
A hybrid disaster is a combination of a natural hazard, human decisions and
human-made actions91 . This category of disasters is somehow subjective since for
example some experts regard Avian and Human Influenza as a natural hazard while
others perceive it as a human induced hazard. The researcher will argue that AHI is a
hybrid disaster, since the origin of the H5N1 virus is natural but improper human
practices and behavior is what causes the disaster. In addition, a landslide is
categorized by many disaster experts as a natural phenomenon. Despite the fact that
the fall of the rock is a natural phenomena, this study will regard it as a hybrid disaster
since this natural hazard was magnified by human practices such as the spread of
illegal urban settlements in high risks zones close to hazardous places, high
population density and crowded living conditions, and the construction of illegal
drainage system that affects the soil.
Some specialists argue that almost all of the natural disasters have a humanmade causal element in them, however the researcher believes that the primary
difference lies in the “rapid onset” character of natural disasters versus the “slow
onset” frequent nature of hybrid disasters. Small scale and frequent hazards create
conditions of vulnerability, which lead to larger disasters 92 . Hybrid disasters are
characterized by a “slow onset nature”; i.e. they start off as small frequent incidents
that pass unnoticed and then transform to fully fledged disasters. The recurrence of
small scale frequent events known as “slow-onset” disasters is caused by rising
vulnerability of affected populations as a result of “failed development”, and at the
same time these small scale disasters dramatically increases society’s vulnerabilities,
which result in a vicious cycle that eventually halt sustainable development.
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Attending to frequent slow onset disasters is a preventive strategy for reducing
disaster risks and their impacts.
a. Avian and Human Influenza
Scope
The GOE confirmed its first H5N1 outbreak in domestic poultry on 17
February 2006. The first case of the H5N1 human infection was discovered on 15
March 2006. 93 Egypt was the ninth country to report laboratory-confirmed human
cases in the current outbreak.94 According to the WHO, from 15 March 2006 till 20
May 2009, 74 cases were confirmed positive and there have been 27 fatalities.95 It is
interesting to note that out-side Asia, Egypt has had the highest number of human
infections and deaths due to the H5N1 virus.96 More alarming is that between January
2009 and May 2009, Egypt had 23 confirmed cases of H5N1 virus, 4 of which died,
which makes Egypt the first on the world in terms of confirmed cases in 2009.97
Consequences
According to several reports and studies, it was found out that the socioeconomic impact of the Avian and Human Influenza disaster is immense. The
following is a brief overview of the AHI impacts that will be deeply examined in my
case study. It is estimated that Egypt's total losses due to the deadly strain of H5N1
to be at LE862 million since the disease appeared in Egypt until February 2008 due
to the slaughtering 36.8 million birds98. Since the first outbreak of bird flu in Egypt
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in 2006 until the end of 2007, the Ministry of Health and Population has spent LE238
million to provide vaccines for the Avian Influenza virus and launch various types of
campaigns to increase people's awareness of the dangers of the deadly strain99. The
Health Ministry will further allocate an extra LE300 million to combat bird flu in the
coming period100.
Causes
It is worth noting that most positive cases occurred due to direct contact
with dead or infected household birds. This reveals that cultural factors play a crucial
role in people’s vulnerabilities to AHI as a hazard. According to the Supreme
National Committee to Combat Avian Flu, the primary factor behind the continuous
spread of AI is the traditional poultry keeping, i.e. poultry keeping in a household
setting, in backyards, or in rooftops.

According to a poll conducted by IDSC, in

which a sample of 1,102 was surveyed, it revealed that 28% of Egyptians surveyed
still raised birds at home101. In addition, three-quarters of respondents reported to eat
freshly slaughtered poultry. 102 Moreover, 47% of respondents have relatives who
raise poultry at home 103 . This reveals that cultural habits can increase people’s
vulnerability and put them at increased risk of AHI. This cultural issue will be
addressed in depth in the case study.
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b. Landslides/Rockslides
Scope
Landslides involve the movement of material (such as rock, mud, soil and
sometimes even rubbish) that may vary considerably in its nature104. On the 6th of
September 2008, a rock slide had took place when at least eight massive rocks fell
onto the impoverished Manshiyet Nasser shantytown on the outskirts of Cairo, which
lead to 107 deaths105 , 72 injuries106, and 100 to150 families lost their houses107. This
disaster is not the first of its kind; there were two similar events in 1993 and 1994 in
the same area, which led to 30 and 70 deaths respectively108. In 1993 a 4,000-ton
block of limestone rock slide fell on 14 workshops in a slum area of Al-Moqattam,
North Cairo 109 . This shows that landslides disasters are recurrent events. Many
residents of Manshiyet Nasser revealed that they have reported small rocks falling to
the authorities several weeks before the disasters but no one responded. This shows
how landslides are “slow onset” hazards that if ignored would turn into a full blown
catastrophe.
Consequences
The reoccurrence of such types of frequent slow onset disasters over the years
reveals that the culture of prevention is totally lacking within the government. The
idea of blaming “nature” and “fate” is still prevailing within decision makers in
Egypt. The Minister of Housing responded to numerous acquisitions at the people’s
assembly by wondering why people do not believe in fate. He stated that these
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families whom their houses were destroyed were supposed to move to Suzane
Mubarak housing project in a week times but “fate did not give them the chance”.
Causes
When trying to examine the vulnerabilities associated with landslides, we
need to move beyond the immediate physical hazard and inquire about human
activities that act as triggers for the physical event110. The spread of slums that are
characterized by high disasters risks are primarily a result of rapid urbanization
associated with the rapid influx of poor rural migrant looking for jobs111. It is widely
recognized in the literature that slum residents often incur greater risks from hazards,
especially landslides or mudslides, as a result of having to live in very closely-built
structures, which can disturb natural land drainage patterns and watercourses 112 .
Manshiyet Nasser is described as "the largest squatter area" in Cairo, in which
350,000 people live in the area on about 850 acres, a density of more than 400 persons
per acre, according to a survey carried out by UN Habitat. The 2008 rockslide in the
case of Egypt was the result of human induced practices, which is the spread of illegal
urban settlements characterized by increased vulnerabilities such as poverty, high
population density, and crowded living conditions close to hazardous industry or in
places exposed to natural hazards.113 The UN Habitat report stated that "the area is
suffering from poor living qualities, inadequate services, and lack of infrastructure
and deteriorated environmental conditions".
To conclude, it is apparent how deep rooted vulnerabilities in the Egyptian
society magnify hazardous events and lead to increased disasters; it is also evident
that poor policy initiatives such as allowing high density population concentrations in
110
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flood plains and in landslide hazardous zones, having unenforced earthquakes
building codes, providing inadequate floods warnings, having poor transportation
infrastructure, and not addressing the vulnerabilities associated with poultry raising in
household settings are far more important than dealing with the hazard agent itself.
The following section will deal with the relation between the prevalence of disasters
and livelihoods sustainability.
DISASTERS AND LIVELIHOODS IN EGYPT
This section will provide an analysis of the impact of disasters on
communities’ livelihoods. However, this goal was met with several challenges given
the scarcity of data and resources on the impact of disasters on the development
process in Egypt. First, there is a lack of primary data that link the socio-economic
impacts of disasters to the stagnation of the development process in Egypt. Another
constraint was the limited secondary studies and reports on the relation between
disasters and livelihoods in Egypt. This section is a modest attempt to examine the
impact of recent disasters on vulnerable communities’ livelihoods and on sustainable
human development in Egypt, based on the available resources.
In Egypt, disasters can disrupt the functioning of a community causing
extensive human, social, material, economic and environmental losses which exceed
the capacity of the affected people to cope using their own resources. Disasters in
Egypt destroy livelihood assets and thus lead to the failure of attainment of livelihood
outcomes. For example, all sorts of disasters examined earlier can destroy or disrupt
livelihood assets such as homes, land, crops, live stocks …etc. Disasters interrupt the
income of poor people by affecting their daily food production, which is selfconsumed and/or sold for income. This was the case with the AHI crisis, in which the
crisis drastically affected the food production of poor households that rely on
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domestic poultry as a source for cheap protein, as will be shown in my case study.
Also, disasters can affect the micro-income generating projects of the poor as with the
case of CRS project discussed later in chapter 5. Moreover, public facilitates and
services are also vulnerable to the damaging effects of natural disasters. This often
affects vulnerable populations since the destruction of essential infrastructure such as
roads, schools and heath facilities (physical capital) result in poor human capabilities
on the long term. After the 1992 earthquake, the education process was disrupted in
Egypt due to the destruction of schools; this disruption lasted for years.
Disasters exert an enormous challenge on achieving sustainable livelihoods
and thus would pose a significant threat to the prospects of achieving the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). The UNDP emphasized in 2004 in its report entitled
Reducing Disaster Risk: a Challenge for Development that: “Meeting the MDGs is
extremely challenged in many communities and countries by losses from disasters
triggered by natural hazards.”114 Not only do disasters affect MDG1, disasters hinder
achieving all other MDG targets. The two MDGs Midpoint Assessment Reports (2004
and 2008) formulated by the Ministry of Economic Development did not refer to
disaster risk in the reports. The two reports failed to address any disaster impact that
occurred in Egypt and link it to sustainable livelihoods; the reports did not even
recognize the risk of disasters as one of the challenges faced by government in its
progress towards achieving the MDGs. The question is: can disasters set back the
progress towards achieving the eight Millennium Development Goals in Egypt?
With respect to MDG1 (eradicating extreme poverty and hunger), the direct
impact of disaster would be income and capability deprivation. According to an IDSC
report, flash floods, the most serious natural hazard in Egypt, affects mainly Upper
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Egypt and Red Sea governorates almost every year with varying scale and
intensity115, which raise questions about the linkage between the recurrence of floods
disasters and the human development status of these governorates. It is also
interesting to link this to a report published by the World Bank and formulated by the
Ministry of Economic Development, which reveals that poverty is concentrated in
Upper Egypt Governorates; there is a particular concentration of poor in the rural
Upper Egypt region, which accounts for 66 % of the extreme poor in the country, 51
% of its poor, and for 31 % of the near poor, far exceeding its 25 % population
share116. The direct correlation between the huge impacts and devastation of floods
and the increased incidence of poverty in Upper Egyptian governorates should be
further investigated.
With regard to MDG2 (achieve universal primary education), the direct impact
of disasters would be that educational infrastructure will be damaged and destroyed,
and thus the indirect impact would be the disruption of the education process for
students. L. Herrera argues that natural disasters have contributed to the problem of
deterioration of school facilities, in which a number of schools suffered structural
damage in Greater Cairo in the wake of the 1992 earthquake117. She also adds that
flooding in Upper Egypt in recent years has also taken its toll on schools 118 . A
nationwide survey reveled that 1,087 schools were damaged, 3,569 require intensive
reconstruction, and 2,301 were in need of restoration.119 After the 1992 earthquake,
the total destruction and damage of schools have lead to a shortage in safe school
buildings, in which many of them are used for multiple shifts up till now resulting in
115
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further reduction of the daily school schedule. This disruption of the education
process and the overcrowding of students in classes will jeopardize the quality of
education, which will directly affect the human capital of future generations.
With regard to empowering women (MDG3), women are one of the most
vulnerable groups in the Egyptian society with respect to disasters risks. More women
have died and have been injured than men in the 1992 earthquake120. In addition, most
of the AHI fatalities are among women. It is interesting to note that among the 74
confirmed cases of AHI, there are around 20 positive female cases (above 18 years
old), 16 of which died. In addition, AHI is a major challenge that would hinder
Egypt’s efforts to meet MDG4 (reducing child mortality) since 50 out of 74 cases are
children (under 18 years old); this is attributed this to their unawareness of the danger
of playing with infected birds at their back yards. In addition, AHI increased the
financial burden of the Ministry of Health by providing stocks of tummy flu
vaccination, which will affect its capacity when combating HIV/AIDS and other
diseases (MDG 6). With regard to MDG 7(ensuring environmental sustainability), the
unsustainable land-use patterns such as settlement in hazardous areas, the overexploitation of natural resources, and deforestation can trigger disasters like landslides
or floods, which was the case in landslide that took place in Manshiyet Nasser.
To conclude, the exploration of all these diverse disasters in Egypt reveals
that there are certain patterns that take place during and after disasters. In almost all
disasters, the poor are the ones who are mostly affected by disasters. Moreover,
another pattern observed was the lack of government responsiveness before, during
and after crisis. The following chapter will be examining the ineffective institutional
arrangements and legal framework that deal with disasters in Egypt.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS OF CURRENT DISASTER ARRANGMENTS IN EGYPT

INTRODUCTION
This chapter will examine the legal framework and the institutional arrangements
within the GOE at the strategic, central, and local levels that deal with disasters in order
to examine whether these mechanisms are capable of reducing disaster risks, by
managing hazards risks and addressing related vulnerabilities. This chapter will tackle the
following questions: what are the current laws dealing with disaster management in
Egypt? How do they relate to DRR? What are the governmental bodies that are mandated
to deal with pre-disaster planning? What are their functions? Are they efficient? This
chapter will particularly examine the mandate of the Crisis and Disaster Management
Department (CMDR) at the Egyptian Cabinet Information and Decision Support Center
(IDSC), since it is the focal point for DRR in Egypt on the national level. The main
postulation, for this chapter, is that institutional vulnerability is prevailing within the
GOE since there is no entity in the national government legally responsible for
orchestrating DRR policies and programmes and integrating it into development planning
in Egypt. The lack of adequate legislation and institutions, mechanisms, and processes for
DRR in the GoE is an indicator for the lack of political will.
According to a Preliminary Regional Stocktaking of Natural Hazard Risk and
Disaster Management Capacity in the Middle East and North Africa by the World Bank
and UN/ISDR, it was observed that “arrangements within most MENA countries exist for
emergency management and are organized and coordinated at a national level, either
90
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through a specially constituted agency or through the office of the Prime Minister or
President”1. The report added that “these are typically arrangements for dealing with
response activities, that is actions directed at containing and controlling the hazard event,
immediate protecting life and critical property and with the short term aftermath of
humanitarian aid, and maintaining public safety.”2 This observation totally corresponds to
the Egyptian case since all the current laws, policies and processes only deal with the
“physical hazard” creating disasters risks and neglect the causal vulnerabilities that
magnify these hazardous events.
The governmental entities dealing with disasters in Egypt only perform
unsystematic short-term post disaster emergency management. In practice, the way in
which the GoE is presently managing a crisis is to assign a Supreme Inter-Ministerial
Disaster Committee headed by the Minister of the directly involved ministry and number
of relevant ministries as members to handle the disaster after it takes place. This approach
was applied in the case of Avian and Human Influenza crisis, Al Salam Ferry disaster,
Train accidents, and recently in the Swine Flu disaster (Influenza A/H1N1). However, in
Magles El Shaab (Parliament) Fire, this committee was not even formulated, which
reveals the lack of consistency and that the government deals with disasters on an ad-hoc
basis without conforming to the guidelines laid out in the IDSC’s Manuel entitled
General Procedures for Crisis and Disaster Management. This Manuel explains that the
Prime Minister should be notified when a disaster reaches the “red/very high level”,
which means that there are more than 20 deaths and 50 injures, more than 5 million LE in
losses and/or the occurrence of extraordinary disasters that are not frequent in strategic or
1
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public locations and the PM would then form the Supreme Inter-Ministerial Disaster
Committee to handle the situation.3 The following section will examine all the relevant
regulations with respect to disasters, and whether they lay the foundation for a DRR
strategy or not.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Legislation provides the framework around which DRR strategies can be
incorporated into the design of development projects and activities. The Hyogo
Framework for Action (HFA), a 10-year global blue print for DRR, identified legislation
as an essential component in moving towards a comprehensive and mainstreamed DRR
approach. Unfortunately, the legal framework that currently exists in Egypt deals with
post-disaster arrangements (disaster response and relief). These laws and decrees have
been inaccurately affiliated with disaster risk reduction due to the novelty of the term
among policy makers in Egypt. The following are laws and decrees that regulate disasters
in Egypt, according to a report submitted to the UN World Conference on Disaster
Reduction(WCDR) in Hyogo in 20054:
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Table 4: Current Crisis and Disaster Management Laws in Egypt

Laws

Main objective

Law 148/1959

• Defined the mandates of the Civil Defense Administration
(CDA)
• CDA is the implementing agency for laws dealing with
crisis management (Article 3).
• Set the measures to be taken for early warning system, fire
brigades, and carrying out evacuation plans, and search and
rescue operations as well.
• Freed all financial transactions in times of disaster from all
fiscal regulations (Article 9).

Presidential Decree
No. 1651/1971
Law 30/1977
Ministerial Decree
No. 11/1966
Ministerial Decree
No. 382/1970
Ministerial Decree
No. 1182/1981
Ministerial Decree
No. 107/1982:
Joint Ministerial
Decree No. 63/1983
Ministerial Decree
No. 349/1986:
Presidential Decree
No. 132/1992

• Established the Supreme Council of Civil defense (SCCD).
• Regulated the civil defense procedures inside industrial
establishments to minimize human-induced risks and protect
workers.
• Formulated the Civil Defense Committees in the
Governorates.
• Detailed the membership of these committees, chaired by
the Governor.
• Established Civil Defense Units in different sectors
• Amended Law 148/1959 by adding the protection of civilian
population from both human-induced and natural disasters
in peace and wartime to the mandates of CDA.
• Organized the co-operation between the CDA (Ministry of
Interior) and the Armed Forces (Ministry of Defense) in
specific cases such as relief work in natural disasters.
• Regulated voluntary work in civil defense

• Re-formulated the SCCD to be chaired by the Prime
Minister to lay down the general policy for Civil Defense.
• Established the Crisis and Emergency Management Affairs
(CEMA) to be the centralized structure that will receives
information, make decisions and mobilize the response
Prime Ministerial
resources appropriate to any form of wide scale disaster.
Decree No. 746/2000
• Planed and developed strategies and policies that strengthen
the protection of Egyptian society from potential disasters.
Prime Ministerial
• Issued for the establishment of the National Committee for
Decree No.746/2006
Crisis and Disaster Management (NCCDM).

These laws and decrees spelled out by the GOE in a report submitted to the UN
WCDR, Hyogo, 2005, only deals with post-crisis emergency management. Thus, there is
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no legal framework for reducing disaster risks. The main legislation that revolves around
it all others laws and decrees is the 1959 law that was developed in the outdated 1950s
political and war-time context, which is irrelevant to the natural, human-made and hybrid
disasters of the 21st century. It should not be assumed that an obsolete national legislation
for crisis management should necessarily include a disaster risk reduction component.
The above mentioned laws only dealt with the post-disaster management (rescue, relief
and recovery) and did not deal with pre-disaster planning (prevention and mitigation)
aspect of crisis and disaster management in Egypt. The current laws for disasters are not
clearly defined and the roles of different entities are not clear. This reveals that
“predictability”, a dimension of good governance, which is concerned with clearly
defined laws and policies regulating DRR and their consistent implementation, is not
reflected in the current disaster legislation. Moreover, until recently the primary body
authorized to deal with disasters, according to the laws, is the CDA. Egyptian legislation
dealing with disasters was not amended to reflect the shift from the civil defense
approach to the crisis management approach in the 1990s.
The Egyptian Civil Defense Administration (CDA) was founded in 1953, within the
Ministry of the Interior. The CDA is the implementing body for laws dealing with crisis
and disaster management as set out in Law No. 148/ 1959 and amendments by
Ministerial Decrees No. 10 (1965), 175 (1981) and 107 (1982). According to Law
148/1959, the Civil Defense Authority (CDA) is the primary body responsible for
disaster prevention and the protection of civilians, protection of the infrastructure (such
as the safeguarding of transportation, communications and the functions of the public
utilities), and the protection of the cultural and historical heritage and public
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establishments (such as national museums). Initially, the main role of the CDA was the
protection of civilians during external military assaults. After the signing of peace
accords, the 1982 Ministerial Decree introduced protection of the civilian population
from both human-made and natural disasters in peace and wartime into the CDA’s
objectives. The CDA was renamed Civil Protection Authority (CPA) and its mission, in
theory, is to mitigate the consequences of disasters on people and properties, undertake
preventive action by ensuring the necessary measures for a better handling of
emergencies, sensitize the population so that they are less vulnerable when catastrophes
occur, train executives and provide the necessary practice opportunities for civil defense
staff, administrate available resources (national or foreign) and coordinate their best
possible use. “Civil protection systems already play an essential role in coordinating
rescue and relief aid, but they can play a bigger role in proactively addressing the root
causes of disasters to reduce disaster impact”, stated the Director of the UN/ISDR
secretariat5. Thus, the CPA in Egypt should undergo a genuine shift from crisis
management towards disaster risk reduction.
There is wide-spread government rhetoric about reducing disaster impacts,
however the most genuine indicator of the GoE political commitment for DRR is the
launching of a reform process that formulate legislation on risk reduction. In order for the
GOE to be committed to DRR, it should initiate a national process for legislative reform
to be the foundation of a national strategy for DRR. According to the HFA, countries
should "adopt, or modify where necessary, legislation to support disaster risk reduction,
including regulations and mechanisms that encourage compliance and that promote
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incentives for undertaking risk reduction and mitigation activities"6. Legislation for DRR
is a first step in mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into development.7 A Presidential
Decree must be formulated, as a proof of political will, to set up a National Council or
Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in Egypt, with accordance to the UN/ISDR
guidelines8. This platform needs to be established by a Presidential Decree to give it
executive power and political weight and should be established within either the Prime
Minister’s Office or the Office of the Presidency to ensure its implementation. This
decree should clearly state the role, structure, and responsibilities of this new entity and
its legal parameters in order to ensure accountability and transparency. In addition, this
decree must be accompanied by a law to set the chain of command between this
platform/council, ministries and governorates. Despite the fact that Egypt does not have
DRR legislation, it can build on the positive current sectoral legislation dealing with
disasters since any reform process must take account of the existing sectoral legislation.
The failure to acknowledge pre-existing sectoral policies with a DRR component can lead
to further alienation of these sectors, resulting in resource competition that can hinder
progress.
Moreover, during this reform process, the Egyptian Government should look at
international experiences and best practices in legislative reform with regard to DRR. For
example, South Africa’s Disaster Management Act passed in 2003 was applauded
internationally as a path-breaking example of national legislation that promotes disaster
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risk reduction.9 In the South African (SA) experience, there was a shift from civil defense
to civil protection in 1970s then a shift to disaster management in 1994 and finally a shift
to disaster risk reduction in 2003. Up until 1994, civil protection was the norm in SA
until the government realized its shortcomings after the inadequate government response
in the 1994 Cape Flats floods10. The occurrence of the devastating Cape Flats floods and
the emergence of a new democracy were both the catalysts for SA move from civil
protection to disaster management, which culminated in the publication of the Green
Paper on Disaster Management in 199811. The Green Paper was soon flowed by a White
Paper on Disaster Management in 1999, which indicated that “priority is given in this
new approach to prevention. Preparedness measures for more efficient rescue operations
will remain necessary but much greater attention must be directed to the introduction of
preventive strategies aimed at saving lives and protecting assets before they are lost.”12
On 15 January 2003, the Disaster Management Act was promulgated that ensured
a disaster risk management comprehensive approach to development, which marked a
new era in the way in which South African government perceived disaster risk, hazards
and vulnerability13. In 2005, a National Disaster Risk Management Framework
(NDRMF), the legal instrument specified by the Act that provides “a coherent,
transparent and inclusive policy on disaster risk management”, was finalized14. The South
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African NDRMF recognizes a diversity of risks and disasters that occur in SA, and gives
priority to developmental measures that reduce the vulnerability of disaster-prone areas,
communities and households15.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
This section will explore the institutional arrangements within the GOE that deal
with pre-disaster planning, which is to manage hazards, vulnerability, and disaster risks
by focusing on the capacity of the government both at the central and local levels to
perform risk analysis. The development of disaster management bodies, the structure
and functions of different entities at each level of government both in theory and
practice will be examined. In addition, this section will look at existing instruments,
processes, and policies, on all government spheres and the politics around there
formulation.
The GOE submitted a report to the WCDR in 2005 to report on their current
progress in the area of disaster risk reduction16. The report showed that DRR concepts is
not even understood by government officials since all the responses where dealing with
crisis management and not risk reduction, which revealed the lack of culture of
prevention. The GOE asserts in the report that “all institutions are committed to elevating
disaster risk reduction as a policy priority”17, a claim that is completely incorrect. The
GoE is by no means “committed" to DRR with respect to the existence of adequate
legislation in line with DRR international standards. All bodies working on disaster
management in Egypt deal with it on an ad hoc basis in their own capacity without legal
grounds. The report continued to argue that “public agencies, both central and local,
15
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allocate necessary resources for preparedness”18. This claim to an extent is valid, but the
GOE is not aware that preparedness is only one component of disaster risk management
and does not equate with disaster risk reduction. There is no formal funding mechanism
for prevention and mitigation initiatives, the two components of DRR, at the national and
local levels, as will be revealed in the upcoming sections.
In addition, during field interviews at IDSC whenever the researcher interviewed
a government official to discuss disasters prevention and mitigation initiatives, they
diverted the researcher’s discussions to post-disaster efforts; i.e. they only refer to
preparedness and emergency responses since these are the current areas the government
is engaged in. This revealed that new DRR concepts, terminologies, policies and
processes discussed in depth in the literature review are not yet understood by policy
makers in the Egyptian government.
The Institutional Structure of DRR in Egypt19, as shown in figure 4, divides the
institutional structure into three levels. The following section will examine the roles and
responsibilities, functions, activities of the three levels. The strategic level, which is
highly political, is represented by the Supreme Ministerial Committee for Crisis and
Disaster Management. In addition, the second tactical level will be examined, which
consist of the National Inter-Ministerial Committee, the Crisis and Disaster Management
Department, and sectoral Ministries. The third level that will be explored is the local
operational arm, which is responsible on implementing disaster strategies and policies.
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Figure 4: Institutional Structure of Crisis and Disaster Management in Egypt
Strategic Level

Tactical Level

Supreme Ministerial Committee
for Crises and Disaster
Management
Chaired by the PM

National Committee for Crisis and
Disaster Management
Chaired by IDSC

The Crisis and Disaster
Management Department at IDSC

National
Operation
Room
at IDSC

Technical Committee for Crisis
and Disaster Management

Operational
Level

Directorate Level

Governorate Higher Committee
for Crisis Management
Chaired by the Governor
Governorate
Operation
Room
Sub-Committee for Disaster
and Crisis Management
Chaired by the Chairperson of
the Directorate

Sub-Committee for Disaster
and Crisis Management
Chaired by the City Chief

Center for Operations

Center for Operations

City level

Source: Ministry of Local Development, The Government of Egypt, National Report and Information on Disaster Reduction, WCDR 2005, p.10.
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THE SRATEGIC LEVEL
The Supreme Ministerial Committee for Crises and Disaster Management
(SMCDM) is the highest political executive authority dealing with disasters, in which it
is headed by the Prime Minister and consist of the following members: the Minister of
Defense and Military Production, the Minister of Interior Affairs, the Minister of
Information, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Health and Population,
concerned Minister / Governor (according to the type of the Crisis/Disaster),
representative of National Security Council, and Specialized Experts (according to the
need). The SMCDM functions, according to the IDSC “Manuel on General Procedures
for Crisis and Disaster Management” are to20:
1)
2)
3)
4)

5)
6)
7)
8)

manage a disaster when the danger level reaches “very high”;
delegate responsibilities to different entities to manage the disaster;
adopt a plan to deal with the disaster;
initiate necessary recommendations and decisions on how to deal with the disaster
on the executive level, how to control it, and how to mitigate the negative impacts
of disasters;
coordinate between all stakeholders to unit all efforts to control the disaster and
mitigate its impact;
decide on the media mechanisms that will deal with the disaster and the public
spokesman for the disaster;
dissolve obstacles that would challenge the quick and efficient implementation of
policies;
formulate a political report for the highest executive level on the nature of the
disaster, giving a general evaluation of the situation and explaining the initiated
policies to deal with the disaster.

The analysis of the above mentioned functions reveals that the SMCDM is
involved in the disaster after it has taken place, which contradicts with the basic
foundations of DRR. The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks is achieved
through the “systematic efforts to analyze and manage the causal factors of disasters
20
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through reduced exposure to hazards and lessened vulnerability of people and
property”21. The mandate of the SMCDM does not include laying down any strategies for
analyzing and managing the causes of disasters.
In addition, there are no legal grounds for this strategic committee per say; it is
most likely that the SMCDM is the evolution of the Supreme Council of Civil Defense
(SCCD) formulated by a Presidential Decree in 1971 since both entities have the same
objectives and strategic framework. The researcher believes that when the government
decided to shift from civil defense to crisis management in the early 1990s, in conformity
with international trends, they just changed the names of all bodies from “civil defense”
to “crisis management” without really changing its roles and functions.

Thus, the

Supreme Council of Civil Defense was renamed the Supreme Committee for Crisis
Management. This means that the 1992 Presidential Decree No. 132, which reformulated
the SCCD to be chaired by the Prime Minister, might be regarded as the legal basis that
regulates SMCDM. The vague procedures and mechanisms associated with these
committees and the unclear functions, roles, and responsibilities reveal that still notions
of predictability are still not adhered to in practice. Moreover, when the SMCDM legal
basis and mandates with regard to DRR are not clear, this means that members of this
committee cannot be held accountable if failed to achieve their goals.
The issue of disaster management started to gain weight in the Egyptian arena
after the WCDR in Japan in 2005. In April 2006, the Prime Minster, as the head of the
SMCDM, has issued a decree to form the National Committee for Crisis and Disaster
Management. Also, the IDSC was also instructed by the PM to establish crisis
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management units at all ministries and governorates, providing them with necessary
support and capacity in terms of knowledge, training and technical expertise22. In
addition, the Prime Minister issued instructions to several ministries, including the IDSC
to finalize the preparation of National Plan for Disaster and Crisis Management with
identification of the role of all ministries, governorates, and other stakeholders, and to
prepare a National Training Plan for Disaster and Crisis Management to build the
capacity of personnel at all levels. It is worth noting that all these instructions have no
legal basis since they are not based on any legislation nor decrees, thus there
implementation cannot be ensured. Moreover, the failure of the government to put the
SMCDM , its strategies and recommendations in a legal framework reveals the lack of
political commitment with respect to DRR.
THE CENTRAL LEVEL
This section will examine the central level, where all disaster plans are initiated
and disaster related policies formulated and where coordination takes place. During the
field work, the researcher found out that in practice the GOE does not have an entity that
carry out risk analysis on the national level. In theory, the central government should
assume the main responsibility to ensure that hazard and vulnerability reduction policies
are cross-sectoral and integrated in development planning, policies and programming23.
However, in the Egyptian experience, hazard mapping is carried out on a sectoral basis in
a limited scale and the government does not perform vulnerability assessment in practice.
The following section will provide an in-depth discussion on the functions and
responsibilities of the National Committee for Crisis and Disaster Management, the
22
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Crisis and Disaster Management Department, and the sectoral ministries, which will
reveal their degree of political commitment to reducing disaster risks.
The National Committee for Crisis and Disaster Management
In 2006, the Prime Minster has issued a Decree, No.746/2006, to formulate The
National Committee for Crisis and Disaster Management (NCCDM); the PM has
instructed the IDSC in cooperation with the Department for Crisis Management at the
Military Forces to chair the NCCDM, which consists of representatives of the 31
Ministries, representatives of 26 Governorates, and some specialized governments
agencies such as the Suez Canal Authority, EEAA and Security Agencies at the Ministry
of Interior in addition to the IDSC, and specialized experts. The politics behind the
formulation of the NCCDM was increased criticisms in the wake of the sinking of the AlSalam Ferry disaster in the Red Sea in February 2006. According to Blaikie et al. (1994),
it is highly common that political will is most likely to originate from a major failure to
deal with a disaster.24The formulation of the NCCDM was a reactionary decision as a
result of the failure of the government to manage Al Salam Ferry disaster, in which there
was heightened political will in the wake of the ferry catastrophe which resulted in the
establishment of the NCCDM within a legal framework.
Despite the fact that the NCCDM was established by a Prime Ministerial Decree,
there is no clearly defined institutional and legal framework that governs it roles,
responsibilities and mandates and its relation with other entities on the strategic and
tactical levels. It is unclear whether the NCCDM, according to the decree, has executive
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functions or if it is only a coordination mechanism. With respect to the mandate of the
NCCDM in theory in the pre-disaster phase, it should25:
1) transform the decisions and recommendations of the SMCDM on the strategic
level to executive procedures and supervise their implementation;
2) follow up on all decisions and procedures initiated to control the disaster and
mitigate its negative impact;
3) supervise all search, rescue and evacuation operations and follow up on them;
4) coordinate between involved sectoral and local entities;
5) ensure media follow up of the event;
6) formulate a comprehensive evaluation of the situation at hand, decide on the
needed procedures and suggest solutions and recommendations in order to control
the disaster and mitigate its negative impact;
7) formulate necessary reports to be submitted to the SMCDM.
These mandates are typical of disaster and crisis management techniques and do
not tackle any DRR components since they are only covering preparedness efforts,
rescue, and relief efforts. This problem exists due to the prevalence of older militaristic
disaster response arrangements (“command and control” based civil defence) since only
rescue and relief operations are the ones understand and is the ordinary mode of
activity26. The only attempt that was made to try and give the illusion that these
objectives are in line with DRR principals is by adding the phrase “mitigate its negative
impact” in the second and sixth objective; this phrase does not fit in the overall rationale
of these objectives. What further proof this point is that a high level key informant
interviewed revealed that the National Committee for Crisis and Disaster Management
was renamed to National Committee for Crisis and Disaster Management and Reducing
its Risks in the wake of international DRR trends and increased UN/ISDR pressure to
“obtain commitment from public authorities to implement disaster reduction policies and
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actions”27 and that this modification in the name of the committee did not result in any
substantive amendments in its mandates. This reveals that there is still not enough
political will to make a genuine move from disaster management to disaster risk
reduction, and the government is trying to give a false impression that they are adopting
DRR mechanisms by merely amending the names of different committees.
The Crisis and Disaster Management Department at IDSC
The Crisis and Disaster Management Department (CMDR) at IDSC is the
operational arm of the NCCDM and is the main body responsible for, supposedly,
mainstreaming DRR in development planning in Egypt. The CMDR has been assigned,
in April 2008, to be the official HFA Focal Point in Egypt28. The CMDR was established
in 2000 under the umbrella of IDSC by a Prime Ministerial recommendation, which is an
informal decision, and not with the same legal power as a decree. Thus, there is no legal
basis for the establishment of CMDR and governs the relationship between the CMDR,
different ministries and governorates, which makes it a weak department with no legal
executive powers. Thus in practice, the CMDR’s instructions and recommendations are
not binding and might not be implemented by relevant ministries and governorates. With
regard to the CMDR’s mandates in the pre-disaster phase in theory is the following29:
1) to develop contingency plans;
2) review national strategies and policies for crisis and disaster management on the
national level;
3) review and evaluate plans of ministries and governorates for crisis and disaster
management, evaluate them and provide recommendations for further
improvement;
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4) supervise different ministries, governorates and other agencies while performing
simulation exercises in the realm of disaster management;
5) coordinate between all stakeholders and provide support in formulating disaster
plans before the disaster takes place by taking into account international best
practices;
6) revise and evaluate crisis management training plans for ministries and
governorates;
7) spread cultural awareness on disaster management;
8) conduct training workshops for ministries’ and governorates’ officials to upgrade
their capacity in the disaster management field;
9) develop early warning systems for disaster management.
However, most of these mandates are not implemented in practice. During an interview
with a CMDR official, it was mentioned that most of the mandates of the department are
still not implemented. Despite the fact that risk analysis is the core of disaster risk
reduction and entails the analysis of both hazards and vulnerabilities, the CMDR revealed
in the HFA interim progress report that “there is no detailed or integrated studies, reports,
nor atlases on multi-hazard analysis exist in the country for the national and local
levels.”30 Although that the basis for reducing disaster risk “lies in the knowledge of the
hazards and the physical, social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities to
disasters”, according to the HFA31, it was evident during the field interviews at CMDR
that the department is not engaged in systematic hazard mapping and vulnerability
assessment. In a nutshell, hazard and vulnerability analysis are simply not carried out by
CMDR although they are among its mandates. The CMDR has undergone some random
initiatives in the field of hazard mapping for some hazards such as floods and
earthquakes.
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The lack of systematic risk analysis is attributed to first budget constraints and
second to the lack of technical capacity, each will be discussed consecutively. “We do not
have the necessary financial resources nor the human resources to carry out hazard,
vulnerability, and cost-benefit analysis”, stated a CMDR official. The CMDR lack
financial resources to enable it to conduct pre-disaster planning, coordinate, and build the
capacity of other ministerial units. In addition, Ms. Heba Ibrahim, Senior Researcher at
CMDR stated “IDSC distributes its financial resources among its departments equally;
i.e. the CMDR has a set budget like its sister departments at IDSC regardless of its
objectives and activities”. With regard to the technical capacity, “the IDSC's department
should be upgraded to be able to deal with the chain of hazard assessment, risk reduction,
intervention and recovery”, according to Dr. Samir Riad.32 The IDSC revealed in the
HFA interim national progress report that the CMDR lack the human capacity in order to
manage disaster risks33. Moreover, a key informant at CMDR mentioned to the researcher
that the CMDR is facing challenges with respect to the limited resources; she revealed
that “both financial and human resources are not adequate at national and local levels.”
She continued to say that “although human capital is widely available at all levels but not
well trained to implement disaster risk reduction initiatives.” Unlike hazard mapping,
which can be computerized using geographic information systems (GIS) or even satellite
images, vulnerability cannot be seen from above. CMDR ignored vulnerability analysis
since they lack the needed human resources and financial capacity to constantly engage
in a bottom-up analysis of the prevailing social, economic, cultural and political
circumstances for every hazard in different communities.
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Not only there is lack of resources and technical capacities that hinder the
systematic implementation of risk analysis, but also there is no political will to perform
such uniform hazard and vulnerability analysis. It was apparent through observation
during field interviews that there is an embedded lack of political will. The researcher
believes that the GoE does not have the political will to prevent disasters because they
can have political benefits from disasters. Disasters divert attention from the underlying
development failures and weakness of development strategies34. Even if the opposition
criticizes the GoE on handling of disaster relief and recovery, the government has the
advantage of implementing “emergency law” at a time of political instability. In addition,
in Egypt shortly after the disaster occurs and after heightened criticisms from the
opposition, they quickly tend to forget about it. Disasters also mean the channeling of
foreign humanitarian aid to the government in millions of pounds. Several scholars argue
that “aid-dependent and corrupt state can, in fact, actually welcome disasters”35.
Moreover, the GoE will adopt DRR since this issue is highly politicized. Although,
hazard analysis is an important step in communities’ resilience, it can turn extremely
political when for example it is accompanied by calls to relocate people from hazardous
places. Moreover, vulnerability analysis can reveal the deep rooted development failures
of the GoE, as reveled in chapter 3. The question is does the CMDR adhere to measures
of good governance if they are not performing risk analysis, supposedly one of its main
mandates?
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Accountability, participation, predictability and transparency are identified as the
key features of good governance that supports risk reduction36. “Transparency”, one of
the dimensions of effective governance structure, is a crucial element for reducing
disaster risks since it reduces opportunities for corrupt behavior by informing the public
especially vulnerable population of its policies37. “Transparency”, which is the
dissemination of information through the publication of reliable information to other
actors in a timely manner, is not adequately carried out by the CMDR. As mentioned
before, the CMDR does not have the essential technical capacity to formulate hazards
databases and GIS maps due to their lack of human capital, financial resources and
political will. In addition, the CMDR claims that the crisis management website “will
enable the accessibility on relevant information on disasters at all levels, to all
stakeholders”, however this claim is inaccurate in practice38. Despite the fact the CMDR
has its own website for awareness raising through the dissemination of information, most
of the documents are not accessible and require a password to access them. Most of the
essential disaster management documents are “classified” since these documents “involve
the role and responsibilities of sensitive agencies and entities within the government”,
stated a CMDR official who refused to disclose his name, which reveals that the “culture
of possession” is still prevailing within the CMDR. For example, the CMDR “National
Plan for Floods”, “National Plan for Earthquakes” and “National Plan for Fires”, are not
published on the CMDR website and even when the researcher requested to obtain a copy
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of them from the department but they refused explaining that they are “top secret” since
these documents uncover the capacities of such “sensitive entities”, such as the Ministry
of Interior and Ministry of Defense, in times of disasters. The researcher attributes the
unwillingness of officials to publish these documents is to avoid being held
“accountable” by the public and legislative authorities if they failed to carry out the laid
out plan. In addition, disaster figures that are published by IDSC on several disasters are
not accurate and inconsistent with other reports also published by IDSC on the same
disaster, as reveled in the conflicting figures on road accidents in chapter 3. The
researcher is not quite sure whether the CMDR does not have the accurate figures due to
lack of resources and statistical capacity or due to their unwillingness to disseminate the
“real and accurate” information.
Central Ministries
This section will critically examine the role of several ministries in prevention
and mitigation efforts. The reason why the researcher is examining the general role of
several sectoral ministries is that some form of hazard mapping and analysis is carried out
in some sectors. During field work, it was found out that each Ministry has its own crisis
and disaster unit and its own budget line for it. Disaster units in ministries do not have a
uniform structure and functions; each ministry has its own unit based on its capacity. For
example, both the Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of Tourism have
sophisticated disaster centers with huge budgets, while other ministries have weak centers
with very limited budgets. Some ministries do not even have crisis centers; they created
virtual centers with one official as the disaster and crisis focal point. For example, the
Ministry of Local Development does not have a center but appointed an official from its
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information center to be the crisis and disaster focal point. The variation in Ministries’
capacities with respect to disasters resulted in huge inconsistencies between ministries
and is reflected in their DRR efforts. This can also be attributed to the lack of a national
DRR legal framework that would unify all DRR-related structures in all ministries and
create parallel uniform structures in all ministries. Despite the fact that CMDR is the
government entity that is mandated to coordinate between all ministries in theory,
however the CMDR in practice does not even have records of the structure and
composition of the disaster units at each ministry, their work nor their capacities, as
reveled during the field work at CMDR.
In practice, each sectoral ministry is responsible for mapping its own related
hazards depending on its capacities. Some ministries take hazard mapping seriously while
other ministries have other contesting priorities on their agendas. For example, The
Ministry of Health (MoH) conducts vulnerability and capacity assessments for various
epidemics according to studies of “black points of recurrent disasters and red spots of
prone disaster all over Egypt”39. While the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation
(MWRI) prepared mapping system for the possible locations of flash floods and their
spillways for all governorates. In addition, MWRI is trying to carry out structural
measures such as the removal of buildings from flash floods spillways to reduce the
impacts of these hazards. The Academy for Scientific Research ad Technology (ASRT)
has developed two hazard maps, one for the seismic risk and the other for flash floods
risk. The Egyptian Environmental affairs Agency (EEAA) carry out hazard mapping and
assessment for environmental risks and hazards. The GOE also claim in the report
submitted to the WCDR in Kobe- Hyogo, Japan 2005 that the Ministry of Planning has
39
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“established an integrated hazard mapping system to project all the possible hazards,
according to their type”. However, this claim is not based on any solid evidence.
According to a key informant, “until now, there is no hazard mapping system or hazard
guide for Egypt”.40 This reveals that there are no systematic hazard mapping, which
result in giving attention to a certain hazards while totally ignoring others.
With regard to the budget, each ministry allocates a budget for its crisis center;
the allocation severely varies from one ministry to the other. Some ministries dedicate
limited resources for disaster management. For example, the Environmental Protection
Fund (EPF) allocated for the Egyptian Environmental affairs Agency (EEAA) to
enhance, among other activities, strategies for environmental disaster management and
risk reduction41. While others do not have certain funds for DRR; the GOE explains in
the report submitted to the WCDR that although there should be specific line budget in
every government agency for DRR, other pressing development priorities often compete
for the limited funds available to these agencies. 42 This reflects the politics surrounding
the channeling of funds, in which politicians want to focus on development priorities that
will lead to quick and visible gains to their constituents rather than invest in long-term
risk reduction initiatives.
THE LOCAL LEVELS
This section will examine the role of the local government in managing disasters
in the pre-disaster phase in Egypt. The study will examine how the lack of legal
40
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framework, the limited available financial and human resources hinders the application of
DRR initiatives on the local levels. While the researcher did not engage in governorate
level field research, the researcher relied on the interviews conducted with officials at the
central level and the field work carried out in Fayoum governorate; further research at the
local levels can be carried out in future studies. For the purpose of this study, the
researcher wants to clarify that the term “local government” refers to the governorate
level.
According to figure 4, in theory each governorate should have a Governorate
Higher Committee for Crisis Management, which consists of the governor, heads of
Directorates, head of Security Department, and representatives of districts, cities, towns,
and villages. The General Procedures for Crises and Disaster Management Manuel
spells out the role and responsibilities of the governorates in the pre-disaster phase, which
is to43:
1)
2)
3)
4)

forecast disaster related hazards;
establish an operation room in the governorate;
review the existing resources in the governorate for disaster management;
formulate action plans for emergency situations (sectoral plans for electricity,
water and irrigation, transportation, communication, and health);
5) organize coordination plans with other nearby governorates;
6) coordinate volunteer efforts and formulate teams of volunteers on the city level;
7) select a spokesman on behalf of the disaster management team;
8) train rescue and search staff;
9) relocate populations from risk areas;
10) develop different scenarios for hazards and conduct simulation exercises;
11) store food and medical supplies as a preparedness measure;
12) conduct awareness raising and formulate a communication strategy.
During interviews with government officials, it was revealed that most of these
roles and responsibilities are not implemented in practice. For example, each governorate
does not perform its systematic hazard analysis, detect disaster risks, and analyze
43
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vulnerabilities generating these risks since some governorates does not even have a
functional disaster committee. Formulating a Governorate Higher Committee for Crisis
Management has not yet been enforced on the governorate level in practice. According to
the GoE HFA interim progress report, “there are crisis management entities established in
all governorates at the local level”44, however this claim is not true. During the field work
conducted at Fayoum governorate, there was no sub-committee for disaster and crisis
management at the governorate level. The researcher attributes the failure to formulate
this committee on the local level to the lack of a legal framework that clearly spells out
the role of this entity, its functions, and objectives. In addition, another impediment for
the formulation of this committee is that governorates do not have the financial and the
technical capacity to carry out delegated mandates. This process is referred to in the
literature as the “de-politicization of vulnerability”45 by “placing much of the
responsibility for local vulnerability reduction to local officials who lack the jurisdiction
or political power to address wider factor and processes that contribute to
vulnerability”.46
The GoE claims that “training is offered to the institutions at local level;
however, research, data collection and dissemination activities remain at central level.”47
However even these trainings that the government is referring to is not disaster risk
reduction training. Despite the fact that the Civil Protection Authority (CPA) and the
Centre for Crisis Management of the Military Forces have training centers in
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governorates48, the training they provide is on disaster management and not disaster risk
reduction.
In practice, these mandates can be implemented if there is a genuine political will.
For example, one of the above mentioned objectives was partially carried out in practice,
which is the “development of scenarios for hazards and conduct simulation exercises”. In
the wake of mounting international pressure on the GoE with regard the Avian and
Human Influenza crisis and the calls for the formulation of vital preparedness measures,
the IDSC assisted the Menofiyah governorate to develop Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness and Response Plan. This plan was verified by Simulation Training
Exercises in Menofiyah in order to test and revise the procedures placed to encounter the
Pandemic Influenza, test the reporting track, check the soundness of the procedures, test
different roles of the directorates, and ensure comprehensiveness of the plan. This success
story was a unique case of Menofiyah and at no point there was uniform formualtion of
pandemic preparedness plans and application of simulation exercises among all
governorates. The government replicated this success story in a three additional
governorates which are Al Sharqeya, Al Garbeya and Al Qalubiya; each governorate
formulated their “Plan for Pandemic Influenza”, however simulation exercises are still
not performed. Moreover, the formulation of preparedness plans for each potential
disaster and the execution of simulation exercises is not a systematic approach that is
carried out by each governorate. These initiatives are haphazard and are based on the
availability of funding matched with political will.

48

Ibid, 4.

117
Despite the fact that the central government in Egypt plays the primary role in
formulating disasters-related plans and policies, disaster risks are first and foremost the
result of dynamic local processes that affect individuals, households, communities and
local governments, as will be closely revealed in the case study, and thus pre-disaster risk
analysis and planning must take place at the local levels. The GoE claim that “the
decentralization of authority is ensured through the representation of all governorates in
the NCCDM”49. However, it was apparent from the field work that the government is not
implementing decentralization, which is “a transfer of decision-making authority from
central to local governments”50, but is carrying out “de-concentration”, which is the
“transfer of authority within central administrative structures (e.g., from the central
ministry to its directorates offices)51. Moreover, the government failed to the build the
technical and human resource capacity at the directorates and units at the local levels with
respect to reducing disaster risks and concentrated all technical expertise at the central
level, as will be revealed in the case study chapter.
Moreover, some officials claim that the government’s reluctance to decentralize
risk reduction efforts and delegate responsibilities to the local levels is due to the fact that
the local levels do not have necessary financial resources, skills, legal and political
powers to carry out preparedness and mitigation activities. This claim is true to a certain
extent since currently all financial and human resources are still decentralized at the
central level but the question is: what are the politics that are hindering the channeling of
funds and human resources from central to local levels with respect to disaster risk
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reduction? The GoE is currently not committed to put in place a legal framework that
would politically and financially empower the local levels.
Although it was revealed during interviews that officials at the CMDR are
convinced that there should be legally decentralizing responsibilities and financial
resources to governorates, the IDSC revealed that “although the government is
implementing decentralization in order to implement a bottom-up approach to ensure the
community participation, funding for DRR will remain centralized since authorities at the
local level have long lived dependant on the central government”52, according to the HFA
report. This contradictory statement reveals that the lack of political will among decision
makers at the central level to undergo financial decentralization due to their
unwillingness to let go of their financial powers. Decentralization of financial resources
to governorates in practice means that the funds will be channeled from sectoral
ministries and their directorates at the local levels to the governorates, districts, cities and
villages. For example, currently foreign in-kind contributions in the aftermath of a
disaster are channeled though the Ministry of Local Development, its directorates and its
units to the affected populations, while the Ministry of Social Solidarity receives all
financial contributions from within Egypt and from abroad for disaster relief and
administers the distribution of funds to local levels53. This reveals that financial
decentralization in Egypt is a highly political matter that could be opposed by the central
government.
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CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDY: THE IMPACT OF AVIAN AND HUMAN INFLUENZA
CRISIS ON TRADITIONAL POLUTRY KEEPERS’ LIVELIHOODS
IN FAYOUM

INTRODUCTION
This chapter will examine the Avian and Human Influenza (AHI) crisis from
February 2006 until April 2009 in Egypt, as an example of a hybrid hazard. This case
study will utilize the basic elements of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework,
previously examined in the literature review, in order to closely examine the outbreak
of the AHI in Fayoum governorate and explore how the AHI crisis affected traditional
poultry keepers in Fayoum from a livelihoods lens. The first section will examine the
most vulnerable groups to AHI in Fayoum. Second, the cultural dimensions,
traditional practices and behavioral patterns that played a vital role in increasing the
vulnerability of traditional poultry keepers, their children and their poultry to AHI
will also be examined. Third, this study will assess the impact of the AHI crisis on
traditional poultry keepers’ Livelihood Assets in Fayoum through the destruction of
physical, financial, human, and social assets, and how it affected women’s Livelihood
Strategies and examining their coping mechanisms employed to resist the AHI crisis.
The final section of the case study will deal with the government policies in
reducing the risk of AHI from the perception of poultry keepers. The questions that
will be raised are the following: what are the mechanisms mandated to deal with the
AHI crisis on the three levels of government? How did the local arm of the
government deal with the AHI crisis in Fayoum in particular? Not only it is crucial to
examine the government’s Transforming Structures and Processes in the AHI crisis,
but also it is vital to observe poultry keepers’ experiences with NGOs in the wake of
the AHI crisis. That is why the following section will deal with the Catholic Relief
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Services (CRS) Avian Influenza mitigation project. The following questions will be
raised: Did the CRS employ bottom-up approaches in its design and implementation
of business development services? Did the CRS project alter the behavioral pattern of
the poultry keepers? How did the project help women cope with the AHI crisis?
OVERVIEW OF THE AHI OUTBREAK
One of the recent and ongoing disasters that occurred in Egypt is the
outbreak of the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, type A virus strain, subtype
H5N1 (HPAI H5N1), commonly known as Avian Influenza or Bird Flu. Avian
influenza is an infectious disease; while all birds are thought to be susceptible to
infection with avian influenza viruses; many wild bird species carry these viruses with
no apparent signs of harm. However, domestic poultry when infected with HPAI
H5N1 develops sudden onset symptoms of severe disease, rapid infection, and its
mortality rate can approach 100% within 48 hours since the HPAI virus affects the
respiratory tract and also invades multiple organs and tissues1. The GOE confirmed its
first HPAI H5N1 outbreak in domestic poultry on 17 February 2006. A report
conducted by the IDSC estimated Egypt's total losses due to the deadly strain of
H5N1 to be around 863 million EGP since the disease appeared in Egypt until
February 2008 due to the slaughtering 36.8 million birds2.
With regard to H5N1 human cases in Egypt, the first case in humans was
discovered on 15 March 2006. 3 Egypt was the ninth country to report laboratoryconfirmed human cases to the WHO.4 Egypt is in WHO phase 3, which means that
infection occur from animal-to-animal with a new influenza virus subtype is causing
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disease in humans, but is not yet spreading from human-to-human. According to the
WHO, between 15 March 2006 and 20 May 2009, 74 cases were confirmed positive
and there have been 27 fatalities, ranking the third on the world in terms of confirmed
human cases (after Indonesia and Vietnam) since the beginning of the crisis5. Out-side
Asia, Egypt has had the highest number of human infections and deaths due to the
H5N1 virus.6 What is even more alarming is that since 1st of January 2008 till May
2009, Egypt had 23 confirmed cases of H5N1 virus, 4 of which died, which makes
Egypt the first on the world in terms of confirmed cases in 20097. Then the question
is: what are the Egyptian governorates most vulnerable to AHI?
AHI VULNERABILITY CONTEXT
According to the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, a range of assets is
required to achieve positive Livelihood Outcomes; access to assets and the strategies
people employ are influenced by the Vulnerability Context. This section will attempt
to examine the vulnerability of governorates with respect to AHI, according to
confirmed human cases. Afterwards, the most vulnerable groups in these
governorates to AHI will also be explored.
With regard to geographic vulnerability, there is no official data with regard to
the governorates most vulnerable to AHI. Although the government is taking a more
transparent stance in the AHI crisis compared with previous disasters, it still should
inform the public with up to date information with regard to the most affected
governorates by the AHI crisis. During an interview with a key informant at the
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CMDR, the researcher inquired about the most vulnerable governorates to AHI,
however the informant refused to give a clear cut answer. When the researcher further
questioned the reason behind the execution of pandemic preparedness simulation
exercises in Al Monofeya, Al Sharqeya, Al Garbeya and Al Qalubiya as pilot
governorates to verify each governorate “Plan for Pandemic Influenza”, the
respondent responded with a mysterious smile. That is why the researcher in the
coming section will attempt to identify the most vulnerable governorates.
With regard to the vulnerability to AHI according to governorate, it is very
difficult to detect the numbers of poultry dead and/or culled according to governorates,
especially in the traditional poultry sector. In the current situation it is almost
impossible for the government or any other civil society organization to accurately
estimate the real numbers of H5N1 infected household poultry per governorate.
During the field work in Fayoum, the researcher discovered that almost all women
interviewed tend to get rid of dead or sick birds by throwing them in Ter’a, i.e. water
canals, burying them, or burning them and then throwing them in garbage areas in
streets as will be revealed in the following sections. According to table 5 that is
compiled by the researcher, the governorate with highest number of positive cases is
Monofeya with 8 confirmed human cases followed, in the second place, by Fayoum
and Gharbiya each with 7 confirmed cases. In the third place is Qena with 6 positive
cases.
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TABLE 5: H5N1 HPAI Confirmed Human Cases by Governorates (15 March 2006 – 22 May 2009)

Governorates
1) Alexandria
2) Assiut
3) Aswan
4) Behera
5) Beni-Suef
6) Cairo
7) Dakahleya
8) Damyetta
9) Fayoum
10) Kafr EL Shiekh
11) Gharbiya
12) Menya
13) Monofeya
14) Qalubiya
15) Qena
16) Sharqeya
17) Sohag
18) Suez
19) 6th of October
Total

2006

2007

2008

2009*

Cases Deaths
--------------------------------2
--3
--5
4
1
1
3
3
3
2
--------1
----------18
10

Cases Deaths
--------3
------2
2
1
1
3
1
2
1
2
2
--------2
--2
1
1
--5
1
1
--1
----------25
9

Cases Deaths
----1
1
----1
1
----1
1
--------2
1
--------1
--1
----------1
--------------8
4

Cases Deaths
1
--1
------2
------1
1
2
1
----1
--2
1
2
--1
--2
--1
1
1
--1
--3
--1
--1
--23
4

Total
Cases Deaths
1
--2
1
3
--3
1
2
2
3
3
5
2
2
1
7
3
5
1
7
4
5
1
8
4
5
3
6
1
3
--5
--1
--1
--74
27

Source: Compiled by the author from WHO Situation Updates for Egypt. Available at: http://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/country/egy/
* Data for 2009 only covers between January and May 2009.
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With respect to the most vulnerable group, there are no official data that spells
out the most vulnerable groups in these governorates. That is why the researcher has
compiled table 6, which classify confirmed human cases according to gender. A
disproportionate number of H5N1 confirmed cases have been poultry keepers and
their families; 72 out of the 74 confirmed cases had direct contact with domestic
poultry with the exception of two farm workers. According to table 6, children and
women respectively are the most vulnerable groups with regards to AHI since they
are in close contact with backyard and rooftop poultry. Among the 74 confirmed
human cases, 50 cases were children under the age of 18 years old, which accounts
for 67.5% from the total number of positive human cases. In addition, among the 27
fatalities, 16 women died, which accounts for around 60% from total number of
deaths. Thus, the most vulnerable groups are women who keep poultry in household
settings and their children, whom are at very high risk of contracting the H5N1 virus
as a result of being unaware of the dangers associated with being in close proximity to
the birds. Children often play with household poultry which can be sick or even dead.
In just five months, between January 2009 and May 2009, 19 children around the age
of two years old were confirmed H5N1 positive in Egypt.
TABLE 6: H5N1 Confirmed Cases by Gender (March 2006 – May 2009)
WOMEN
CHILDREN
MEN
TOTAL
DATE
(>18 years)
(up to 18 years )
(>18 years)
2006
2007
2008
2009*
TOTAL

CASES

DEATH

CASES

DEATH

CASES

DEATH

CASES

DEATH

6
8
2
4
20

6
6
2
2
16

9
17
5
19**
50

3
3
1
2
9

3
--1
--4

1
--1
--2

18
25
8
23
74

10
9
4
4
27

Source: Compiled by author from WHO Situation Updates for Egypt.
* Data for 2009 only covers until 22 May 2009.
** All 19 cases are children around 2-4 years old.
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VULNERABILITY OF TRADITIONAL POLUTRY KEEPERS
IN FAYOUM
Egypt is located along the main wild birds’ migratory route between Asia and
Europe; millions of birds migrate all year round searching for warm weather and
foods. Scientists are increasingly convinced that at least some migratory water birds
are now carrying the HPAI H5N1 virus, sometimes over long distances, and
introducing the virus to poultry flocks in areas that lie along their migratory routes8.
Fayoum is located at the western desert 90 kms south west of Cairo. It is surrounded
by desert from three sides and by Beni Suef governorate from its south east. The
Fayoum population is 2,575,740 million, according to 2007 census, divided among 6
districts and 163 villages.

Fayoum is a hot spot for AHI in Egypt since it is

characterized by moderate weather all year round and has two important natural
attractions for migratory water birds, which are Qarun Lake and Wadi El Rayan Lake.
The location of Fayoum, with its natural attractions, is an important factor that
increases its vulnerability to HPAI.
"Egypt remains at high risk of continuing outbreaks of Avian Influenza,
despite the recent contraction of the poultry industry and reduction in the density of
poultry farms."9, according to the MoH. This is primarily due to the prevalence of
domestic poultry in most of rural households in Egypt, in which the government has
almost no control on this traditional poultry sector. Poultry is a very important source
of income and an important livelihood strategy for many rural households in Egypt.
Official figures estimate that around 30% of the population own poultry in Egypt.

8

WHO, “Avian Influenza Bird Flu Fact Sheets”.
Ministry of Health, Government of Egypt, "Comprehensive Approach to Addressing Avian and
Human Influenza in Egypt", 4.
9
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According to the government, 4-5million households currently keep poultry 10 .
According to Mrs. Manal Ibrahim, officer at Business Enterprise Support Tools
Foundation (BEST) in Fayoum, “before the AHI outbreak almost every household in
Fayoum raised poultry.” The reason why women, in many rural households, are
typically the main owners of backyard and rooftop poultry is because poultry
production is one of the most suitable livelihood strategies for poor women since their
mobility, income earning opportunities and access to formal markets are restricted.
Poultry keepers’ duties include: feeding; watering; cleaning; detecting sickness;
seeking veterinary care; buying feed and medicine; making decisions about selling;
and managing poultry-derived income11.
Traditional poultry keeping, which is the upbringing of poultry within a household setting, i.e. in backyards and/or rooftops, with flocks of less than 50 birds is the
primary factor behind the continuous spread of AHI in Egypt since most positive
cases occurred due to direct contact with sick and/or dead household birds. The
proximity observed between poultry and humans in traditional rearing systems present
a high risk of virus dissemination12. Traditional poultry keepers are one of the most
vulnerable communities in the Egyptian society. Among the 74 confirmed human
cases in Egypt, seven of which are traditional poultry keepers and their children from
Fayoum, whom got infected as a result of direct contact with domestic poultry. An
informant in Fayoum even believes that real figures are much higher in Fayoum. She
continues to argue that, “I know a woman who used to raise poultry her household
and was hospitalized for flu-like symptoms and shortage of breath and died; the
hospital attributed her death to a respiratory attack.” Children under two years old are
10

The Government of Egypt, “Integrated National Plan for Avian and Human Influenza 2007 – 2008” ,
Final Draft, May 2007, 5.
11
Miers, H., “Poverty, Livelihoods and HPAI- A Review”, Mekong Team Working Paper No.1, Rome,
June 2008.
12
Ibid.
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also a highly vulnerable group in Fayoum. During the field work, it was common to
observe children playing in front of their houses with live poultry, which make them
at high risk of catching H5N1 virus. On the 2nd of March 2009, the MoH has reported
a new two-year old boy confirmed case of avian influenza from Yousef el seddik
district of Fayoum Governorate whose symptoms began on 25 February due to direct
contact with sick poultry13.
POLUTRY KEEPING CULTURAL DIMENSIONS
IN FAYOUM
Cultural factors have been a crucial element in the way people assess,
respond and cope with hazard risk differently. The primary reason behind the spread
of AHI is wrong traditional practices associated with poultry bearing at home 14 .
Cultural and traditional factors played a crucial role in increasing the vulnerability of
poultry keepers’ to HPAI as a hazard in Fayoum. This section will examine the
cultural dimensions that played a vital role in increasing the vulnerability context of
women, their children and their poultry to contract the HPAI H5N1 virus. This section
will focus on women poultry keepers’ practices and behavioral patterns associated
with poultry raising in a household setting in several villages in Fayoum. In addition,
traditional slaughtering practices will also be explored. The question is: how can
cultural norms and traditional customs of poultry keepers in Fayoum increase the risk
of HAPI in poultry and humans?
During my field work in Fayoum, it was observed that poultry bearing at
home is a traditional norm among rural households. Almost all the women
interviewed raised poultry inside their households even after the AHI outbreaks, with
a flock size of 50 birds on average. Having poultry run in front of households and on
13

WHO, “Avian Influenza Situation in Egypt- Update 5”, Available at:
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_03_02/en/index.html
14
IDSC, “Poll on Citizen's Awareness about Bird Flu in Egypt”.
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the streets without being caged is a traditional habit in Fayoum, which is based on
certain cultural beliefs. “Poultry keepers have several places to put their poultry in;
women can restrict their poultry to rooftops or backyards but they don’t, and this is a
traditional habit”, said Mrs. Iman Mohamed, extension officer at Zawyet Al Karatsa
CDA in Fayoum district. Leaving poultry in streets and on water banks is a cultural
practice in Fayoum villages and has nothing to do with the limited household space.
Many women in Fayoum believe that caging their birds will make them lose weight,
become unhealthy, and get sick. “Women in Fayoum believe that ducks should swim
in canals to be healthy”, stated Mr. Ahmed Mahmoud Abdel Alim, AHI Project
Coordinator. During the field research, several women also confirmed this during
personal interviews. “Ducks, specifically Bikini Ducks, must swim in the canal”,
stated Soad Ragab at Zawyet Al Karatsa village in Fayoum district. In addition, Mrs.
Iman Mohamed affirmed that there is a wide spread misconception among women in
Fayoum that poultry should not be kept in coops for its well-being. She said that
“traditional poultry keepers believe that the more the chicken runs here and there, the
bigger its size and the better its health.”
Some women claimed that after the AHI outbreak, they altered their
practices and confined their birds to rooftops and backyards.

However, during

transect walks with extension officers, it was apparent that the majority of poultry
keepers still did not change their embedded practices of keeping their poultry loose. It
was very common to observe chicken in front of the houses in the streets and to view
ducks running on stream banks and swimming in canals. Upon entering different
households, the researcher smelled poultry all over the place although women claimed
that poultry are restricted to rooftops and backyards, and in some instances the
researcher even saw feathers lying on the floor. When questioned the reason why
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some women still release their poultry in households and on the streets after the AHI
outbreaks, the researcher was informed that this was a cultural habit that women are
accustomed to. In addition, during one of my focus group discussions at Al Mandara
Village in Fayoum District, ironically, a pigeon flew inside the discussion room, and
the researcher was told that it belonged to one of the neighbors. The women
participating in the discussions were familiar to this incident since they believe that
pigeons specifically should not be locked up for its wellbeing. “Pigeons fly anyways;
we do not put pigeons in coops because they will die if we cage them”, confessed
Manal Attiya. The problem with this practice is that it increases the risk of poultry
getting infected with HPAI since there is a high probability that poultry left on streets
and on water banks would infect each other. Also, this custom increases the
vulnerability of local communities from become infected with H5N1, especially
children playing in the streets.
Even the women that confine their poultry to rooftops or backyards
confessed to release all kind of poultry from their coops for the entire day. “During
the day, I get all of my poultry out of the cages and put them in the sun on the rooftop
to eat and run so they can get bigger”, stated Magda Ibrahim in Al Zawyat in Fayoum
District. Having the poultry stay for the entire day loose on rooftops or backyards
make it at high risk of getting infected from other H5N1 infected wild and migratory
birds, which land on rooftops to eat and drink with them and hence can infect
domestic poultry. What is even more alarming is that some women revealed that they
spend their spare time sitting with their poultry on rooftops. “I go up to the roof and
sit with my poultry; I enjoy their company”, stated Doniya Ramdan.
The prevalence of domestic poultry keeping in rural households in Fayoum is
widely prevailing due to cultural preference for eating freshly slaughtered Balady
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birds. All of the women interviewed in Fayoum confessed to like the taste of Balady
chickens and dislike frozen poultry, what poultry keepers refer to as “white” chicken.
"I continue to raise poultry because we like the taste of Balady meat that are freshly
slaughtered”, according to Sabah Rabie’ in the Fayoum district. She continued to
reveal that the “soup that is made out of the Balady chicken has a beautiful taste
unlike the frozen chicken”. While other women confessed that they dislike the taste
and smell of frozen chicken. “Frozen poultry stinks; I get disgusted from the frozen
poultry”, stated Sokareya Abdullah. Women in Fayoum argued that they don’t even
trust frozen poultry, especially after the AHI outbreaks. “I do not trust the frozen
chicken since it might have been sick before slaughtering and freezing it. I would not
even know but I am sure that my freshly slaughtered poultry is healthy and that the
feed is of good quality”, stated Hayam Aly. From the previous discussions, it is
apparent that one of women’s traditional practices is to keep poultry loose all day in
streets, rooftops and open yards, which put their domestic poultry at very high risks of
getting infected with the H5N1 virus. Thus, women cannot be sure that even there
domestic poultry that are fed “home-made feed” are healthy and are not infected with
H5N1 until they develop bird flu related symptoms.
Not only do women raise their poultry in household settings, but also several
traditional poultry feeding and slaughtering practices are not biosecure. “Bio” refers
to “life” and “secure” means “protection”; what the researcher means by biosecurity
with regard to traditional poultry keeping is that they adopt clean and hygienic
measures. During one of the focus groups, it came to my knowledge that women still
feed ducks with their bare hands, commonly known as tazgeet. Another alarming
practice is mouth-to-mouth feeding of baby pigeons in Fayoum. “I put water in my
mouth and spit it inside the pigeons’ mouth so I make sure that they drink after they
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are fed since baby pigeons cannot drink alone;”, stated Sharbat Mohamed in Al
Mandara Village in Fayoum District. Moreover, most women stated that before the
appearance of bird flu, they used to slaughter their birds with their bare hands without
following any biosecure measures such as wearing gloves, masks, and using
disinfectants. “I slaughter my poultry like I am used to by just using my hands and a
knife”, stated Kawkab Abdel Mawgood.
While other women claimed that after the AHI outbreak they changed their
poultry feeding practices and slaughtering methods. In the beginning of any focus
group discussion, women alleged that they wear something plastic bags in their hands,
put a scarf on their face, wear old clothes, and put on a specific slipper when dealing
with poultry; i.e. they claim that they abide by the hygienic procedures advertised on
national television. “I have an old gallabiya and an old flip-flop specifically for
feeding and cleaning under my poultry”, stated Karima Abdo. However, usually at the
end of the discussions they confess that most of the time they “leave it to God” and
feed and clean for their poultry without any preventive measures since they are sure
that it is not sick. “Some women claim that they wear a scarf on their face and plastic
bags in their hands when slaughtering chicken, but the majority of my family and
neighbors do not wear anything in reality”, revealed Manal Attiya. The only thing that
all women interviewed agreed on doing, in the wake of the AI crisis, was using a big
bucket to slaughter the poultry in so that the blood and the feather do not spread on
the floor in the house. “I slaughter my chicken in a bucket , then clean the chicken
from the feathers inside the bucket, then throw chlor, i.e. detergent, on the chicken
remainings, and then dispose of it in a plastic bag”, said Gamal Eid Ahmed. This
procedure was not traditionally followed by the women before the AHI crisis. The
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reason behind the alteration in some of the women’s behavior and attitudes will be
further elaborated in subsequent sections.
Traditional believes affect women’s perception to risk and how they will
respond to it, thus affecting their vulnerability. Due to certain cultural beliefs,
traditional poultry keepers in Fayoum short after the AHI outbreak started restocking
without taking adequate preventive measures since they didn’t believe that the bird flu
is a new event that would threaten their lives. There was a frequent argument brought
forward by several women in Fayoum, which is that women believed that the bird flu
phenomena is not something new in rural communities; poultry keepers revealed that
for ages long before the appearance of avian influenza in Egypt, it was ordinary
among poultry keepers to wake up and find their poultry dead. Women didn’t have an
explanation for it; most women refer to this event as Al hool, while some call it Al
hafa; whereas few women call it Al fira. “Our grandparents and parents used to wake
up in the morning and find all their poultry dead; we refer to this incident as Al hool”,
stated Mona Nasr El Dine. This statement was repeated eight times during my field
work. Mona adds that “nowadays they discovered that it is influenza”. Other women
stated that “Al hafa used to come and take our poultry”. This reveals that some
cultural beliefs dominate women’s perception of avian influenza as a hazard; women
attribute the death of their poultry to a cultural construct. These beliefs provide
women with a false sense of security and a feeling of resilience against AHI, since “Al
hool is not something new; we are accustomed to such events”, according to one of
the women.
In addition, traditional poultry keepers in Fayoum are reluctant to undergo
surveillance to their poultry due to certain embedded cultural and religious beliefs.
Most of the women interviewed would not even allow a veterinary to servile their
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poultry, regardless of being a government employee or a private doctor. The main
factor behind their refusal is there fear from evil eyes, commonly known as hasad. In
addition, during one of the focus groups at Al Mandara Village, women confessed
that in the case they were approached by government veterinaries to servile their
poultry they will not allow the doctor to see all their flock because they are afraid of
hasad. During a focus group discussion, women agreed that strangers are not allowed
to inspect their poultry since “hasad is mentioned in Quran”. Karima Abdo stated, “I
don’t let veterinaries in my 3’esha because I don’t want them to see my poultry as not
harm them with his eyes (hasad); especially el roomy chicken, it can easily get
harmed from a stranger’s eyes.” She continued to say, “If I have a sick chicken I will
only show it to the doctor or take it to the veterinary unit to have a medication for it.”
Moreover, during the field work, it was very obvious that women in Fayoum tend
either to lie about their flock size or refuse to give a precise number of their poultry
all together because they are afraid of hasad. During home visits, women did not
allow the researcher to check out the poultry on the rooftops and backyards; the
researcher would only observe poultry by coincidence.
AHI IMPACT ON LIVELIHOODS ASSETS OF
TRADITIONALPOULTRY KEEPERS IN FAYOUM
Raising poultry at home represents an essential livelihood strategy for poor
rural women in Fayoum since it is a domestic low-cost activity that contributes
towards household protein consumption and provides a quick source of income. HPAI
had a strong negative socio-economic impact on the livelihoods of rural female
headed households since poultry “contributed to the economic, nutritional, social and
cultural well-being of households”15, according to a FAO/ WFP rapid socio-economic
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impact assessment of four governorates in Egypt, one of which is Fayoum. In Egypt,
the estimated share of income from poultry is 114 EGP, which is around 45% of
household income16. Vulnerable households that depends the most on poultry have
moved from the “poor” to the “very poor” socio-economic classification and from the
“medium” to the “poor” classification17. The spread of HPAI have led to massive
culling of birds which resulted in decrease in flock sizes. During my field work, it was
almost impossible to quantify the numbers of poultry dead as a result of the AHI
outbreaks per household since women did not reveal exact numbers. Out of 25 women
interviewed, 21 revealed that “most of my poultry got sick and died” while the rest of
the women said “some of them died”. The FAO/WFP study gives us a quantification
of mortality rates among domestic poultry. The “very poor” suffered the most in the
AHI crisis since they witnessed a reduction of 92% in absolute bird numbers, while
the “poor” and “medium” suffered a reduction of 82% and 72% respectively18. The
following section will examine the impact of AHI on traditional poultry keepers’
assets.
a. Financial Capital
Amongst very poor producers in Egypt, especially female headed households,
poultry-derived income from the sale of poultry and eggs as a share of overall income
could be as high as 100%, although on average amongst the poor and very poor it was
44% 19 . According an interview with a key informant at BEST, “almost all rural
households in Fayoum totally rely on poultry as a livelihood asset”. The culling of
domestic poultry, in Fayoum, had negative financial consequences since traditional
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Ibid, 40.
Ibid, 26.
18
FAO, “Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: A Rapid Assessment of the Socio-Economic Impact on
Vulnerable Households in Egypt”, 32.
19
Miers, H., “Poverty, Livelihoods and HPAI- A Review”, 8.
17

135
poultry keepers relied on their polutry for quick cash. “I used to sell the eggs to feed
my children and my poultry; when most my poultry was culled, I had no money to
feed my children”, stated Madiha Ragab. In addition, some women also had
difficulties repaying their loans since all poultry was dead or culled. “As a result of
the AHI crisis, I could not repay the loan I took and I was indebted”, stated Sabah
Rabea. Moreover, a common element that was mentioned a lot during the focus group
discussions and personal interviews is that some women slaughtered all their healthy
poultry when they heard about the outbreak in the news due their fear of getting
infected, which badly affected their income levels. This meant that one of the coping
strategies of poultry keepers in Fayoum was to destroy one of their vital livelihood
assets as a result of the AHI shock.
Consumer fear to eat poultry and eggs had devastating effects on women
micro-entrepreneurs in Fayoum. Despite the fragility of the H5N1 virus, destroyed at
75°C, most consumers halted their intake of poultry and eggs leading to a sharp
decrease in poultry consumption, which badly affected poultry keepers. As a result,
women micro-entrepreneurs in Fayoum were forced to sell their poultry for very low
prices to get rid of them, which did not even cover their initial expenses. All poultry
was sold with a fraction of their original costs with huge losses; the Balady chicken
that used to be sold with 15 LE was sold for 1 LE and the deek roomy (a rooster),
which was originally sold for 200 LE was sold for 20 LE. “The chicken that was
usually sold for 15 LE was hardly sold for 5 LE during the initial months of the
crisis”, stated Sabah Rabeea owner of a small farm on her rooftop in Zawyet El
Karatsa Village in Fayoum District. She continued to add that “I used to buy the one
day old chick for 5 LE, which means that during the crisis I did not even cover the
initial costs of these chicks such as the feed, water, worker salary…etc”. This abrupt

136
66 % drop in chicken prices coupled with a prolonged period of consumer fear
severely devastated the livelihoods of women micro-entrepreneurs, who relied on
poultry and/or eggs for income. Fear from the H5N1 virus was so intense in Fayoum
to the extent that an owner of a small roomy farm in Fayoum district had released all
his flocks in the streets because of fear from the H5N1 virus, according to Mrs. Iman
Mohamed, an extension officer. This meant that traditional poultry keepers’ primary
source of income had disappeared over night.
One of the extension officers in Fayoum district revealed that “during the
course of my work with the CRS project, I experienced psychological problems as a
result of my close interaction with the women on a daily basis. I was engaged with
their livelihoods problems and their inability to repay loans and debts as a result of the
AHI outbreaks and the death of their poultry.” She explained that “in some instances
due to emotional pressure and the knowledge of the inability of some poultry keepers
to pay the fines on their loans, I would pay it for them.” This stressful work
environment drove the extension officer to quit her job at the CDA and her primary
source of income; the officer choose to stay at home and resigned from her
community job to avoid engaging with women and hearing their sad and stressful
stories on a daily basis. She continued to reveal that “I once went home and kept
crying after I saw one of the project’s clients sit in the sun for hours trying to sell her
poultry to be able to repay her debt until she got sun-burned, and when my husband
saw me depressed and how my work with poultry keepers affected my psychological
status he asked me to quit my job and I instantly did.”
During the field work, it was stated that two types of coping strategies were
employed by women in Fayoum to resist the AHI shock. First, some women were
unable to give up their main source of income and continued raising poultry secretly,
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as a coping strategy and took the risk of being infected. However, several women
voiced that restocking of poultry just after the AHI outbreaks was very difficult due to
several factors. The primary reason behind their inability to restock was the decrease
in demand for poultry. Another factor was the lack of initial capital to buy chicks;
women were unable to pay even a small deposit to purchase chicks and feed.20 To
overcome these challenges, women would utilize several coping strategies such as
borrowing money from their relatives and marketing their products to their neighbors
since altering their business was impossible for several women. “My family could not
take the risk of entering into other business; we also did not have any money; we were
indebt”, revealed Sabah Rabea. The second coping strategy was that some women
started diversifying their household income due to the high financial and health risks
associated with poultry raising. A huge portion of the women interviewed who altered
their income-generating activities changed from poultry to cattle since these two
businesses have somewhat similar conditions. Both of them can take place inside the
household without having women leave her house and both of them generates
products that can be sold for quick cash (such as eggs in poultry and milk in cattle). “I
do no raise poultry any more in my household; I shifted to raising sheep, goats and
cows, which is a much safer buisness”, stated Rida Ramadan.
b. Human Capital
Human capital is a livelihood asset, which is a mean of achieving livelihood
outcomes. Human capital represents the skills, knowledge, ability to labour and good
health that together enable people to pursue different livelihood strategies and achieve
their livelihood objectives 21 . Its accumulation can also be an end in itself. Many
people regard ill-health or lack of education as core dimensions of poverty and thus
20
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overcoming these conditions may be one of their primary livelihood objectives. In the
wake of the AHI outbreaks, the premature reduction in the numbers of domestic
poultry and sometimes the lack of poultry all together had lead to the reduction in
animal protein consumption (poultry meat and eggs) per household, which affected
the health of the entire family in general and specifically had a direct impact on
children’s nutritional value. In Fayoum, most of the women interviewed reveled that
they eliminated poultry from their diets for around 4-5 months after the 2006
outbreaks. Most women interviewed (23 out of 25 women) revealed that they reduced
their consumption of animal proteins (eggs and poultry meat) and shifted to cheaper
sources of protein such as beans, lentils, and chick peas, as a coping strategy. Only
one woman stated that her family switched from poultry consumption to occasional
meat consumption, which did not affect her families’ protein intake. “We did not eat
poultry and bought meat, when the outbreak occurred”, stated Hayat Abdel Maboud
Zayed. In addition, during a focus group discussion one of the participants stated that
“we used to boil eggs to put in our children’s sandwiches to take to school but there
are no eggs anymore.”22 This meant that children’s diet was affected on a daily basis
as well.
Another manifestation of ill-health was the increased stress and depression
among poultry keepers as a result of the AHI outbreaks. Women had experienced
severe stress because they started to feel bored and restless since they used to spend
plenty of their time in taking care of their birds, feeding, cleaning, preparing feed and
selling eggs. “My old mum underwent psychological depression when her poultry
died since she was used to their company; they filled the house on her”, stated Karima
Abdo. That is why the loss of these chicks has generated feelings of worthlessness
22
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and tediousness. During my field work, one of the things the researcher detected was
that poultry keepers regarded their poultry as their babies; it was mentioned several
times during personal interviews that “chicks are like babies that should be taken care
of”. Sokarya Abdallah revealed that “when I see that my chicks have grown up, I feel
thrilled and delighted.” Moreover, some women regarded poultry as a domestic pet
and like having them around their house. During one of my personal interviews at a
poultry keeper household, the poultry were running and jumping everywhere, the old
women was throwing pieces of bread to the chicken while talking with me; she treated
here poultry as a house pet. Many women revealed that they missed the company of
their poultry during the AHI outbreaks. Another reason behind women’s feeling of
anxiety and stress was the fear that they and/or their children get infected with HPAI;
women mentioned that they panic when ever their children show any flu like
symptoms.
Moreover, children’s education was also affected since income from poultry
was used to pay school tuition, private lessons, and school books and materials.
“Raising poultry enabled me to secure money for private lessons for my son and
daughter”, stated Howayda Mohamed from Snoras district. However after the AHI
outbreaks, Howayda stopped giving private lessons to her children in all subjects, as a
livelihood coping strategy. Private lessons is an integral element in primary,
secondary, and university education in Egypt since failing to take private lessons with
school professors might put the children at risk of failing in their examinations. This
reveals that the AHI outbreaks had indirect effects on educational achievements.
c. Social Capital
Social capital does not exist in isolation from other livelihood assets; it is
regarded as a cross-cutting asset, in which the lack of financial capital and human
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capital would definitely affect the livelihood status of individuals thus acting as a
barrier to involvement in social activities outside the household23. As a household’s
resources declines (including savings), it becomes harder to spend time and resources
on social obligations. “Last week, my cousin got married but I did not go to the
wedding because now with no poultry business I cannot afford getting her a gift”,
stated Nagah Mohamed at Kafr Mahfouz at Tamia District. Even simple neighborly
ties based on reciprocity can become difficult to sustain. Most women stated that they
no longer invite their neighbors over for lunch or dinner because there is no longer
poultry. “I used to invite my neighbor to come and have a breakfast with me after the
children goes to school but now I am embarrassed to do so because there are no eggs
to serve her”, stated Noha Ramadan at Tamia district. When there is a lack of poultry,
gifts cannot be bought and even common hospitality may be a burden, leading to
increased social isolation for poor women, who are already depressed from the death
of their poultry. One of AHI dimension on women’s social capital is that poultry
keepers in Fayoum revealed that they no longer can make gam’ia, i.e. rotating saving
schemes, which they were accustomed to as a form of mutual support and assistance.
“One of my friends wanted me to make a gam’ia with her to buy stuff for her
daughter for her wedding (gehaz), but I could not afford it”, revealed um Ahmed.
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BOX 1: HOWAYDA CASE STUDY
26 February 2008. Fayoum Governorate, Snoras District, Al Adel Village.
Howayda’s family is composed of three sons and a daughter, attending university,
primary and preparatory schools. Her husband is unemployed and Howayda does not
have a degree; she dropped out of school in the preparatory stage. Howayda’s work is
the main source of income to the household. Her Husband asks her to buy him
cigarettes without even worrying about the money. The family can be regarded as
“very poor”. Howayda’s household can be considered an extremely vulnerable
household since four children and one husband depend entirely on her income.
Howayda went through very tough times in her life, where she didn’t have any
income. Howayda only had 10 chicks in her house for home consumption. A lot of
people encouraged her to raise poultry for a living but she was afraid they would die.
After being convinced to raise poultry, she started buying poultry on behalf of
women in her village. Since she didn’t have enough capital to start her poultry
business, she made a gam’ia (rotating saving scheme) and collected the initial capital
from a group of ten women in order to buy chicks (initially 500 chick) and their feed.
She then raised the chicks for 30 days in a room inside her household and sold them.
Howayda’s business flourished and enlarged immensely from 2000 till 2006. She
used to buy and sell thousands of chicks per month. Poultry was the main source of
livelihood without any other alternative source; her monthly income was 400 EGP on
average.
One day, before the AI was officially announced in Egypt, Howayda discovered that
her chicken look sick and that their color turned blue. She went to the village
veterinary unit and told them about the symptoms of her poultry but they didn’t take
her comment seriously. While she didn’t know what to do with her dead poultry, she
buried them.
As a result of the AI crisis, Howayda lost almost all of her flock. In the beginning, it
was very difficult to restock since there was no demand for poultry and she was also
afraid to buy chicks and they die. Howayda was forced to close her business for two
years (February 2006- February 2008). Just before the AI outbreak, she used to cook
three times per week but again she returned to cook only once per week. In addition,
she stopped giving private lessons to her children in several subjects because she could
not afford them due to the lack of money. She also felt very depressed and sad because
suddenly her household was empty from poultry. She used to be very busy feeding,
cleaning and managing her small business, and after they have gone she would cry
herself to sleep every day.
Howayda could not shift to other business since poultry raising is regarded as a
“family friendly” and “quick business”; only after 15 days she can sell her chicks and
get quick cash. Any other business will take a long time to generate income. After two
years, Howayda started restocking. Howayda’s behavior has changed drastically after
the AI outbreak; she got a coop on her rooftop for the poultry and keeps every species
in a separate coop. She also wears plastic bags in her hands and put on her neqab (veil)
when dealing with her poultry. She also buy her chicks from a secure source, which is
the Integrated Project for Poultry Production, known as Al Azab project that produces
different hybrids of vaccinated and properly raised chicks. She taught herself how to
vaccinate her chicks from her regular visits to the IPPP and how to prepare hygienic
feed. She also checks on her chicks regularly and if they get sick she buys for them
medicine from private veterinary pharmacies that can cost her up to 10 EGP per chick
because she cannot afford losing them again. Nowadays Howayda’s poultry are in
good health and her micro business started improving once again due to the increase in
demand for poultry and eggs.
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AHI TRANSFORMING STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES
Access to Livelihood Assets and the formulation of Livelihood Strategies are
influenced by the prevailing institutional structures and processes
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. The

Transforming Structures and Processes are the levels of governments, institutions,
organizations, policies, and legislation, and the civil society that shape livelihoods,
which can affect the creation of assets, determine access to assets, and influence rates
of asset accumulation. Women’s access to livelihood assets is affected by the
Transforming Structures and Processes determining access to various types of
livelihoods strategies. This section will, first, examine the government institutional
structure and processes that are mandated to deal with AHI at the strategic, central
and local levels in theory. Afterwards, the impact of the government’s preventive and
mitigation measures on the livelihoods of vulnerable groups in Fayoum will be
explored in practice from the perception of traditional poultry keepers. In addition,
the role of various local government entities such us veterinary directorate,
department and units, will be examined in theory and in practice, also from the
perception of traditional poultry keepers in Fayoum that raise poultry as a livelihoods
strategy. The final section will deal with the Catholic Relief Services AHI mitigation
project and how did it affect the livelihoods strategies of traditional poultry keepers in
Fayoum.
GOVERNMENT ROLE IN AHI CRISIS
The GoE, in theory, should play a major role in the AHI crisis by
controlling HPAI in poultry through preventive and mitigation measures and reducing
the risks of human infections. The institutional structure that is employed to deal with
the AHI disaster is formulated along the same there institutional levels of the overall
24
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disaster management framework in Egypt, examined in chapter four, but are made
specific to AHI. The; the first level is the strategic level, which is the Higher
Ministerial Committee for Avian Influenza. This committee is headed by the Prime
Minister and involved ministers. The second level consist of the Supreme National
Committee to Combat Avian Flu, which was convened after the discovery of the first
H5N1 virus in birds under the chairmanship of the Minister of Health (MoH) with the
participation of the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Environment,
representatives from the Ministries of Interior, the Army and the Police, concerned
governors, and representatives of WHO, FAO and NAMRU-3, in order to monitor
and review HPAI development. Ironically, the CMDR is not a member of this
committee nor acting as an observer nor giving it any technical support25.
A lot of the politics take place on the level of these committees. During
2006 and 2007, the MoH has spent 238 million EGP to provide vaccines for human
cases and launch various types of campaigns to increase people's awareness of the
dangers of HPAI, according to the IDSC 26 .

However, after the Minister of

Agriculture became the chair of the Supreme National Committee, Dr. Talaat Khatib,
a professor of food hygiene at Assiut University claimed that there was slowdown in
the vaccination of poultry and awareness campaigns during the summer months of
2007, which leading to the spread and growth of the deadly virus in the following
winter,27. That is why a more ad hoc AHI Communication Committee has been also
formed to coordinate media and social communication interventions. The chair of the
committee is MoH with the membership of USAID, WHO, WB and UNICEF. Dr.
Nasr El Sayyed, the spokes person of the Supreme Committee to Combat Avian
25
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Influenza, announced during a round table discussion at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on 6 June 2007 with UN agencies and the donor community that AHI in Egypt
has a large negative impact on the household poultry sector. He continued to say that
one of the main challenges facing the government is the communication and
awareness raising component that is supposed to promote behavioural change and
address habits which have been existing for thousands of years.
Prevention: Theory vs. Practice
The third local level is the operational arm, which is responsible on
implementing central AHI policies and strategies. The primary responsibility for the
progressive control of HPAI H5N1 in domestic poultry lies in the General
Organization for Veterinary Services at the central level, an entity affiliated to the
MoALR. The Veterinary Directorates, Veterinary Departments, and Veterinary Units
are its operational braches at the three local levels. In theory, each governorate should
have a Governorate Higher Committee for Crisis Management headed by the
governor and the secretary general of the governorate to combat AHI with
representatives from the veterinary and health directorates. In practice this committee
does not exist in Fayoum governorate. According to a key informant, “there is no
committee to combat AI in Al Faoyum.” In addition, according to Dr. Nasr El Sayyed,
the spokes person of the Supreme Committee to Combat Avian Influenza, “in theory
the Integrated National Plan for Avian and Human Influenza should be implemented
at the village level; however this did not take place in practice” 28 . In theory, the
objectives of the National Plan for Avian and Human Influenza is to, first, increase
resistance of poultry to HPAI, limit the spread of the virus in poultry through early
detection and implement measures to contain the spread of the virus through
28
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vaccinations, and second minimize the likelihood of human exposure to infected
poultry. However, since the 2006 outbreaks until May 2009, the government fell short
of containing HPAI H5N1 in domestic poultry and preventing new outbreaks. During
the initial outbreaks in poultry, it was noted that the GOE tends to react rather than act
by focusing on short-term emergency response rather than long-term risk reduction.
The GoE is facing substantial challenges in achieving effective control of HPAI in
poultry. After an eight month interval (from April 2008 till December 2008), positive
cases have started to reappear in Egypt since mid December 2008 with very short
intervals all had direct contact with domestic poultry. Reducing the vulnerability to
HPAI will not be possible unless the incidence of H5N1 virus infection in poultry is
reduced. After almost three years of the initial outbreak in poultry, the GoE fell short
of being able to prevent future outbreaks in poultry. The case study will first explore
the governorate of Fayoum preventive measures in theory and in practice. What are
the roles of the various government entities in Fayoum (veterinary directorates, health
directorates, agriculture directorates …etc) to decrease the incidence of H5N1
infections in poultry and prevent future outbreaks?
The AHI prevention measures that the veterinary directorate in Fayoum should
carry out include ongoing surveillance, sustainable vaccination campaigns, movement
control, slaughtering restrictions, import bans, and imposition of biosecure measures.
According to a key informant at BEST in Fayoum, “government response to AHI is
very weak”; the informant continues to explain, “some women when first discovered
their dead poultry, they went to report the cases to the veterinary units in their
villages, however they did not get any adequate response.” In Fayoum, during an
interview with a doctor at the directorate of veterinary services in Fayoum, it was
revealed that there is no clear vertical chain of command between the directorate of
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veterinary services at the governorate level, the veterinary departments at the district
level, and the veterinary units at the village level. There is no follow up to ensure that
the AHI instructions received from the veterinary directorate had reached the poultry
keepers. “We are sure that AHI instructions reach the veterinary departments at the
district level but we do not know whether it reach the veterinary units at the village
level or not”, stated Dr. Soraya Ramadan at Veterinary Directorate in Fayoum
Governorate. She continues to say that “there is no monitoring procedure that we
follow to make sure that AHI required information reached the units at the villages,
except in the case of a confirmed human case.” There are no formal communication
channels between the veterinary units in the villages in Fayoum and the poultry
keepers.
It was also revealed during interviews that in practice the doctor at the
veterinary unit at the village level does not report back to the veterinary department
on the district level nor the veterinary directorate at the governorate level in case of
outbreak in poultry. In theory, when poultry keepers inform the veterinary of an
outbreak in poultry, he should report to the veterinary unit that in turn should inform
the veterinary department at the district level, which reports directly to the Directorate
of Veterinary Services at the governorate level. In addition, the veterinary at the
village level should take samples from infected poultry and send it directly to the
veterinary directorate, which will send the sample to the NAMRU labs in Abbasiya,
Cairo that would report the results in three days. In the case of confirmed infection,
sick poultry should be culled, the household should be disinfected, and the poultry
with 500 meters in proximity should be vaccinated. However, a veterinary revealed
that, in practice, they don’t report suspected poultry infection o the veterinary
department but handle it on the village level. “We do not report sick and dead poultry
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to the veterinary department; we show women how to burn their infected poultry”,
stated

Mr. Abdel Wanees Attiya Gibriel, Me’awen at Ezbet Gibriel Rashwan

veterinary unit at Mansha’et Bany Etman Village in Snoras District. This action is
justified on the ground that the veterinaries “are afraid that women would release their
sick poultry in the streets as result of being fearful of government culling
committees.” This reveals that poultry keepers believe that one of the government
policies to combat AHI is to cull all suspected poultry.
The initial reaction of local governmental bodies in the wake of the 2006
outbreak was top-down aggressive policies. This created a lack of trust between
veterinaries and traditional poultry keepers, which forced women not to report their
infected poultry to government officials; they tended to burn, bury, or threw them in
waterways. There was a general fear among women from the government since there
were rumors that the government is culling all the poultry whether her poultry are sick
or not. “We heard that in other villages the culling committee would go into the
houses and take all the poultry despite of the poultry keepers’ pleas that they are not
sick.” In addition, the government did not employ any incentive mechanism to
encourage poultry keepers to examine their poultry against H5N1 virus. When the
researcher discussed, during focus groups the reason behind the reluctance of women
to report the death of their poultry, it was evident that there is no incentive for women
to report suspicious cases of Avian Influenza. On the contrary, they are extremely
fearful of the government to cull their remaining poultry. Furthermore, none reported
given any compensation as a result of the losses in their backyard poultry in Fayoum.
Another factor is the lack of trust between traditional poultry keeper from one
side and the government from the other side. “We heard that veterinaries go into
houses and cull all birds whether infected or not, which is immoral”, stated a female
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headed household in El Zawyat district. The initial emergency mass culling of birds
in Fayoum have scared poultry keepers from dealing with government officials in any
way. “Poultry keepers do not trust the government anymore because they told poor
people that it is illegal to raise poultry in a household setting and ordered them not to
raise poultry in their houses”, revealed Mr. Mohamed Ashraf. He continued to reveal
that “whenever there is a surveillance campaign in the area, women hide the birds and
pretend that they have no birds out of fear they would be taken or slaughtered without
appropriate compensation.”
This lack of trust among poultry keepers and their unresponsiveness to the
government vaccination campaigns was mainly due to the wrong practices employed
by government veterinaries. In the beginning of the crisis, “the veterinary unit
announces in the microphones of the mosque that there will be vaccination in a
specified day, and asks the poultry keepers who are willing to vaccinate their poultry
to bring them in front of the unit at a certain time”, stated Dr. Ashraf Lutfy EL Sayed,
veterinary unit at Mansha’et Bany Etman Village in Snoras District. The veterinary
department would send the vaccines and one of the workers at the veterinary unit
would vaccinate the poultry. These vaccination campaigns are not obligatory; “only
the poultry keepers who wanted to vaccinate would show up”, revealed Dr. Rabeea El
Sayed El Araby, Veterinary Unit, Mansha’et Snoras in Snoras District. According to
the women, in the beginning of the outbreak, the vaccination campaign took place in a
public street, where women had to physically take their poultry to this place to get
vaccinated. This was unhygienic procedure and in the same time unpractical for
many women. “I will have to catch my poultry then put them in coops and afterwards
I have to physically take them to the veterinary unit; this is impossible”, stated a
women from Al Mandra village. Moreover, the workers who vaccinated the poultry
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used the same needle to vaccinate all chickens, stated an informant, which might
cause the spread of the virus from sick poultry to healthy ones. This means that in the
early days of the outbreak the government could have been increasing infections in
poultry and spreading the disease by using the same needle for hundreds of poultry
and vaccinating all poultry in one place thus increasing the risks of infection. These
wrong practices resulted in the death of a lot of domestic poultry just after they were
vaccinated, according to the women. As a direct result, women started refusing to
vaccinate their poultry because they were made to believe that the government wants
to kill their birds. This led to a wide spread misconception from AHI vaccination
among traditional poultry keepers in Fayoum.
Another factor behind the governments’ failure to prevent AHI outbreaks in
poultry is the weakness of veterinary services at the village/district level attributed to
the low numbers of veterinarians, limited personnel trained in surveillance, and
limited financial and logistical capabilities to carry out comprehensive vaccination
campaigns 29 , matters still not resolved three years after the initial out breaks.
According to poultry keepers in Fayoum, the veterinary authorities do not carry out
any surveillance of backyard poultry and regular vaccination campaigns. According to
an informant, who refused to publish his name, “veterinaries do not carry out
surveillance campaign in Fayoum since they do not have such capacity.” In addition,
almost all women interviewed stated that there was no surveillance carried out by
veterinaries to their backyard poultry. During a focus group discussion in Mansha2et
Baghdad village, E’tbar Abdel Azim revealed that “there is no government
surveillance at all; if veterinaries come to the village they give us quick awareness
raising instructions or carry out very limited vaccination campaigns.” Moreover, the
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lack of ongoing comprehensive vaccination campaigns is another reason behind the
prevalence of HPAI H5N1 virus among backyard poultry. Three years after the AHI
outbreaks, vaccination campaigns are still not enough. Howayda in Ezbet El Adel in
Snoras district stated, “veterinary units conduct vaccination campaigns only twice per
year for backyard poultry and they should be carried out every three months.” In
addition, most of the women interviewed revealed that in the beginning of the crisis,
for almost two years, they were not regularly approached by veterinaries to vaccinate
their poultry. In addition, a key informant stated that “veterinaries are government
employees at the end of the day; they only show up for two hours for vaccination
campaigns and then disappear.” However some women stated that, during the last
year, there was a slight improvement in the vaccination campaigns. The veterinary
units introduced a card system, in which every poultry keeper is given a vaccination
card upon vaccinating her poultry by government authorities with the number of
poultry vaccinated and date.
Another reason behind the failure of government bodies to limit the spread of
the virus in poultry is the poor enforcement of legislation dealing with AHI. With
respect to live bird shops and markets, it was evident that all live markets and small
poultry shops have reopened in Fayoum after ceasing to function for couple of months
after the initial outbreaks. During my individual interviews, several women confessed
to buy their chicks from Tuesdays and Fridays live bird markets. “I buy my chicken
from the Friday weekly market”, stated Sabah Mohamed. That is why the existence of
Tuesdays and Fridays live bird markets is an integral element in rural villages in
Fayoum since there is a high demand for live poultry. To the extent that two of the
extension officers at the CDA at AL Zawyet confessed to buy their chicks from
Friday markets. “Live bird markets only stopped for 5 months after the initial
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outbreaks but have reopened in Fayoum because merchants and workers complained
since their livelihoods depend on poultry without any supervision from local
authorities”, stated Mrs. Mona, one of the extension officers. In addition, some
women claimed that there are restrictions on transportation of live poultry to other
governorates. “Trading live poultry is restricted within Fayoum governorate and these
live poultry cannot be transported to other governorate”, stated Iman Mohamed.
However, one of the things that the researcher observed during the field work is that
there were several street vendors selling live poultry on the Fayoum-Cairo high way,
which reveals that movement of live birds between governorates is still prevailing.
Mitigation: Theory vs. Practice
The government, in theory, should be responsible for mitigating the negative
socio-economic impact of AHI and supporting the livelihoods of poor communities
heavily dependent on poultry for income and food security. Key mitigation measures
include compensation, re-stocking schemes, and low interest micro-credit schemes.
However, in practice traditional poultry keepers were not compensated by the
government for a variety of reasons. Women in Fayoum stated that poultry keepers
were not compensated for the loss of their poultry. “No one approached me for
compensation”, stated a female headed house hold in Tamiah district. The GoE
declared that they do not have the necessary funds to compensate the millions of
traditional poultry keepers. That is why women do not have any incentive to report
sick poultry. On the contrary they are afraid to report any sick poultry and put their
entire flock and their neighbors’ poultry at risk of being culled by government
authorities. According to a doctor at the veterinary unit in Mansha’et Bany Etman in
Snoras District, “we cull all poultry within 500 meters diameters around the infected
house.” Women suggested that the government should encourage poultry keepers to
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report sick poultry by giving them a motivation. For example, Howayda in Snoras
district suggested that “the government can offer poultry keepers to disinfect polutry
coops free of charge if they report sick poultry and assure them that they will not cull
healthy poultry.” In addition, the government should develop restocking packages,
compensation schemes and/or micro-credit schemes for poultry keepers as an
incentive to report infected poultry.
The veterinary units in the Fayoum governorate did not provide traditional
poultry keepers with restocking guidelines in practice. Poultry keepers started
restocking without taking adequate preventive measures since their livelihoods
depended on raising poultry for income and consumption,. This was due to the lack of
veterinary units to disseminate necessary information, undergo effective surveillance
and vaccination. During one of my home visits at Al Fayoum District, the women
explained, “I had stopped raising poultry for about 5 months but when I felt that the
danger disappeared and when I got sufficient information about Avian Influenza from
the television, I started restocking once more.” However, when I asked her about the
exact symptoms of H5N1 in poultry and in humans, ironically she could not answer.
This tendency of restocking without having basic information on preventive measures
was revealed in several personal interviews. Another woman claimed that she taught
herself all preventive measures from the television awareness raising advertisements
but she only mentioned that “I put my legs in a bucket of water when exiting from the
rooftop.” When the researcher asked her whether she uses any gloves, masks or even
wear plastic bags in her hands when slaughtering poultry, she stated “I leave it to
God.”
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CRS PROJECT: BDS TO MITIGATE AHI IMPACTS
ON WOMEN IN FAYOUM
Mitigation is considered one of the most effective medium to long term
DRR approaches which incorporates risk reduction measures into regular investment
projects 30 . That is why the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) designed a project to
mitigate the AHI impacts through BDS and micro-finance components. Since there is
little information in the literature reviewed relating to the effectiveness of mitigation
schemes on women’s livelihoods, the researcher will dedicate this section to
examining the CRS two years mitigation project funded by UNDP entitled The
Application of Business Development Services to Mitigate the Risks of AHI to Women
Micro-entrepreneurs in Fayoum and Minya Governorates in Egypt from September
2006 to September 2008 and later extended to February 2009. This section will
examine the impact of the CRS mitigation project on the livelihoods of women
poultry keepers in Fayoum.
This project is very interesting since CRS/Egypt partnered with Business
Enterprise Support Tools Foundation (BEST) in Fayoum as an implementing partner,
which is the umbrella organization that facilitates project outreach and the selection of
CDAs, assisted by two Community Development Associations (CDA’s) in two
districts in Fayoum to implement the project. This multi-stakeholder cooperation
reveals a lot of the dynamics of project implementation at the grassroots level as will
be revealed in the following sections. The overarching goal of the CRS project is
“women micro-entrepreneurs operating in the Egyptian traditional poultry industry
have minimized their vulnerability to Avian Influenza epidemic.” There are two
strategic objectives for the project; first, micro-entrepreneurs operating in the
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backyard sector are resilient to epidemics such as Avian Influenza, and second to
enable women micro-entrepreneurs diversify their livelihoods. According to Mr.
Mohamed Ashraf, CRS AHI Project Manager, the project will improve the
livelihoods of women and mitigate the impact of AHI on traditional poultry keepers
through two components, which are fostering Business Development Services (BDS)
and providing micro-finance loans. For the purpose of this study, the researcher will
only examine and access the effectiveness of the first component, which is the BDS.
With regard to BDS activities, they are the following: (1) educational and awareness
raising sessions; (2) joint home visits; (3) inter-firm cooperation (horizontal linkages);
and (4) coordination of vaccination campaigns.
With regard to educational awareness sessions, BEST and the CDAs organized
Avian Influenza related awareness sessions for women poultry keepers. They are
intended to educate the women on biosecure methods of raising their poultry and
stimulate the demand of traditional poultry keepers in the areas of veterinary services.
These sessions were facilitated by technical experts in the field of veterinary services
that would educate women on good and biosecure practices in poultry raising, feeding
and slaughtering.

However, in practice, these awareness sessions at Zawyet Al

Karatsa were not participatory nor targeted the entire community at Al Zawyat. The
awareness sessions were attended by limited number of women. The low level of
attendance jeopardized other project activities since during awareness sessions the
project staff would identify, first, women that are willing to vaccinate their poultry;
second, identify potential women who want to participate in business-to-business
visits; and third, identify women willing to take loans from the project. After realizing
that the failure to secure adequate attendance will risk the success of the entire project,
the project the staff used to serve women juice and biscuits as an incentive to attend
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the awareness raising sessions. After a while the project manager thought of linking
this incentive measure with the project itself and started giving women related in kind
hand-outs such as detergents, medical masks, and gloves free of charge to be of direct
relevance to the project goals and objectives. This approach eventually worked but
with limited success. During an interview with an extended family consisting of four
sister-in-laws living next door to the Al Zawyet CDA, the researcher discovered that
although they claim that Zawyet Al Karatsa CDA provides extensive awareness
raising sessions to the community, they do not know basic information on the
symptoms of HPAI in humans. Moreover, this family revealed that male members of
the household servile their poultry; they act as their private veterinaries. “When we
feel there is something wrong with the chicken, we show it to my husband and he will
tell me if it is sick or not.” When the researcher asked them whether they attended any
of the AHI awareness sessions conducted by Zawyet Al Karatsa CDA, they said that
their husbands do not allow them to go. This reveals that gender-power relations play
a huge role in households in Fayoum. This reveals that the project staff failed to carry
out an elaborate needs assessment that would identify such challenges and work on it
by designing other activities that overcome these gender power relations. For example,
the CDAs could have carried out house-to-house awareness raising briefings to
overcome this problem, which took place in a late stage during the project cycle.
The success of the educational sessions carried out in Zawyet El Karatsa is in
question. During observatory walks, the researcher discovered that the house just in
front of the CDA still had poultry inside the house. What is even more ironically, just
a few meters in front of the CDA door, there was poultry running in the alley. In
addition, during the personal interviews with BDS beneficiaries, a small proportion
stated that they wore something in their hand when dealing with poultry and put a
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scarf on the mouth and nose when dealing with their poultry. Also, very few women
reported to wear specific clothes for dealing with the poultry. “We got used to dealing
with our poultry with our bare hands.” Most of the women interviewed mentioned that
they don’t wear anything when slaughtering their birds because they are sure that
there are healthy. “We will not slaughter a chicken that we are hesitant that it is not
good”. Nonetheless, one of the positive alterations in attitudes and behavior is poultry
keepers’ awareness that children should be kept away from rooftops and backyards
where chicken are kept. In addition, some project beneficiaries stopped keeping ducks
and chicken together to avoid inter-species infection. However, most of women
interviewed do not use coops to isolate their poultry.
With regard to the vaccination campaigns, the project relied on the awareness
sessions to collect lists of women who are willing to vaccinate their poultry.
Afterwards, the project staff linked these women with the veterinary units at the
district level by coordinating vaccination campaigns to make sure that the project
beneficiaries made use of these campaigns free of charge. This would not have been
possible without the political support and back up of the project steering committee
headed by the Secretary General of the Fayoum governorate. One of the challenges
that faced the implementation of vaccination campaigns was the unwillingness of
traditional poultry keepers to vaccinate their poultry. Despite efforts to persuade
women clients in Fayoum to adhere to the project initiative to vaccinate most of the
households and backyard poultry prior to autumn when the new flu season starts,
Fayoum project staff only carried out two vaccination campaigns. The reasons cited
include mistrust as the local residents appear not to have confidence in the
government's abilities to control AHI and believed that through these vaccination
campaigns, they would be likely targeted for future culling campaigns. Some other
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poultry keepers believed that vaccinations would kill their birds since in several
instances some vaccinated poultry died immediately after they get vaccinated and the
project staff was to be blamed for it. Mr. Mohamed Ahsraf, CRS Project Manager
attribute this phenomena to the fact that some birds, especially ducks, are carrier to
the virus and do not show any symptoms and die as a result of being vaccinated, since
the vaccine is a portion of the virus itself. However, this can also be attributed to
wrong unhygienic practices like vaccinating all poultry with only one needle,
discussed earlier in the government section, which resulted in the deaths of a lot of
poultry after being vaccinated. These incident resulted is the spread of wrong
misconceptions among poultry keepers that made women refuse to vaccinate their
poultry, which further complicates the vaccination campaigns that introduced mistrust
between the women and the project staff.
Moreover, Mr. Mohamed Ashraf stated that when CRS was trying to link
BDS clients with vaccination campaigns, it was often not successful for a variety of
reasons. With respect the wrong vaccination procedures employed by government
veterinaries, the project manager lobbied the Governorate Secretary General at the
Project Coordination Steering Committee on the Governorate Level, to change these
wrong practices and to carry out house-to-house vaccination campaigns, in which
each women would have her personal needle to vaccinate her poultry with.
Fortunately, the Secretary General agreed and gave orders to representatives of
veterinary directorates, health directorates, agriculture directorates, and social
solidarity directorates to employ this new technique. Now a day’s vaccination
campaigns at the village level are carried out door to door. Each house keeping that
vaccinated her birds receives an official card showing the date of vaccination and the
number of vaccinated poultry. The lack of cooperation of the local veterinary services
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in Fayoum is another reason mentioned for the failure of the vaccination campaigns.
For example, in one instance, although the CRS project invited a government
veterinary to a vaccination campaign organized by the CDA, he never showed up31.
Another BDS activity of the project was to create horizontal and vertical
linkages between traditional poultry keepers from one side and veterinarians, chick
wholesalers, large poultry producers, the local government, and micro-entrepreneurs
to increase poultry keepers’ resilience to AHI and improve their coping strategies.
Among the linkages activities, CRS and BEST in Fayoum in coordination with the
Fayoum Poultry Research Center (FPRC) managed to conduct nine field visits for 35
micro-entrepreneurs from Fayoum to FPRC to learn more about hygienic poultryraising practices and different breeds of Balady chicken available for purchase and
benefit from these linkages with large-scale farms. In addition, CRS and BEST
arranged a visit to around 50 women from various districts at Faoyum to the
Integrated Project for Poultry Production (IPPP), known as Al Azab, in Fayoum that is
under the auspices of the local Fayoum governorate, which sell different hybrids of
vaccinated poultry. CRS project organized a very successful field trip for its
beneficiaries to the IPPP in Fayoum and successfully linked women with such
credible source of day old chicks. A number of the traditional poultry keeper bought
vaccinated chicks from the IPPP, which show the change in behavioral patterns. “I
stopped buying any poultry from middlemen and I get all my chicks from Al Azab
project.” In addition, other BDS beneficiaries affirmed that they obtain their chicks
from secure sources such as government poultry labs and small private farms. Several
women were too afraid to buy their chicks from live markets. Soad Ragab said, “I am
afraid to buy chicks from the live weekly markets because the poultry my neighbor
31

Catholic Relief Services, “"Business Development Services to mitigate the AI Risks of Women
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bought from the market was sick and died.” However, the effectiveness of such
activity is in question since some women did not benefit from these linkage services
and still buy there chicks from unsecure sources. Ironically, one of the project
extension officers did not know anything about the IPPP project. When asked about
her source of chicks, she stated that she bought them from street merchants or live
markets. This extension officer is the one who should raise women awareness and
guide them to secure sources of chicks. It was evident that the project needed to raise
the extension officer’s awareness.
In addition, BEST and the CDAs assisted traditional poultry keepers to
conduct home visits for pioneering and innovative businesswomen in Senrow, ElE'elam villages in the Abshway district that employ safer chicken coop models. The
project beneficiaries were introduced to good practices employed by other women by
seeing models of chicken coops in their houses. These visits were made in light of
positive relationships between CRS and BEST and the Agriculture Directorate in
Fayoum. This activity filled an existing gap in the BDS project design since it did not
initially include any poultry coops to overcome the cultural issue of mixing different
species and mixing poultry of different ages. Mr. Mohamed Ashraf, project manager,
realized this shortcoming and planning to integrate this component in the design of
the next project phase. He wants to take the design of licensed chicken coops by the
Ministry of Agriculture and replicate the model for the project clients at a reduced
cost. However, this also meant that CRS did not engage in an elaborate needs
assessment to detect the needs of poultry keepers and their traditional customs in the
initial design of the project.
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Project Challenges
One of the early challenges that faced the project, which was reflected upon
during one of the interviews with CRS project staff, is the inability of the project
steering committee to identify and recruit credible CDAs. Even after choosing two
CDAs in two districts in Fayoum (Zawet Al Karatsa CDA and El-Mazatly CDA), El
Mazalty CDA had a lot of requirements. There was conflict of interest between CRS
and Al Mazalty CDAs since it wanted to recruit its project staff and to have full
control of the micro-credit component. However CRS was skeptical of the full control
of the CDA resources and decisions, and CRS was also afraid that the CDA would
manipulate the project activities and funds. To avoid this, the CRS suggested to only
rent the CDAs premises to be the project facility and made sure that the extension
officers hired by the CRS project manager are from the same villages they are
working in. The efforts to persuade Al Mazalty to adhere to the CRS demands slowed
down the implementation of the project in Fayoum. Zawyet Al Karatsa CDA agreed,
however Al Mazatly refused CRS offer. CRS had to replace Al Mazalty CDA with
Kafr Mahfouz CDA, which disrupted project activities on the short-term.
Despite the legitimate concern of the CRS, their decision to alienate the CDA
from managing the project has jeopardized the local ownership of the project. The
CDA employees were not part of the project staff and the CRS externally hired staff
was the ones implementing the project in the communities. In addition, the CDAs had
no say in the selection of staff and were not even part of the recruitment process of
extension officers that are from the local community. This resulted in the creation of
several obstacles that hindered the effective implementation of the project such as the
unwillingness of traditional poultry keepers to attend awareness sessions in the CDAs
since they are not familiar with the project staff. Moreover, the CRS did not work on
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building the capacity of local CDAs since it did not provide the CDAs with any
technical, managerial nor financial support, except for the premises rent.
Another related challenge to the CDAs degree of involvement, the CRS
project manager confessed that recruiting qualified staff was a main implementation
obstacle during the initial phases of the project. Despite wide dissemination of job
announcements, the number of qualified candidates who applied for the jobs was very
limited. Moreover, some of the staff nominated for these positions declined in the last
minute due to more competitive salary offers from other NGOs. Therefore, staff
recruitment and training took more time than what has been originally planned.
Another challenge that faced the project was the sustainability of BDS
activities after the project’s duration elapsed. The project staff claimed that poor
traditional poultry keepers are not willing and cannot afford to pay any nominal fees
for the BDS activities they make use of. One of the project staff stated, “It became a
custom that women do not pay for technical assistance and capacity building
activities.” However, during interviews with women, most of them expressed their
willingness to contribute nominal fees to the awareness raising activities and BDS
services. The researcher cannot tell whether the issue of financial sustainability of the
project is really a challenge or the project staff is making it up to justify their attempts
to mobilize additional resources from UNDP.

The sustainability of such local

initiatives is extremely crucial to the prevention and mitigation of AHI at the local
level; without these BDS efforts, the achievement of sustainable livelihood outcomes
of poultry keepers will be not attained.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

This study attempted to explore the linkages between disaster risk and
sustainable livelihoods both in theory and in the Egyptian context. The hypothesis of
the study was that low level hazards are magnified by high vulnerabilities, which led
to increase in disaster risks among vulnerable groups in Egypt. Impacts of disasters
will destroy people’s livelihood assets as a result of income and capability deprivation
and thus result in the failure of the attainment of sustainable livelihood outcomes in
the Egyptian society.
During the last decade the literature on disasters has moved from
conceptualizing disasters as only “acts of God” to examining the “root causes”,
“dynamic pressures”, and “unsafe conditions” generating vulnerability on one side
and the physical exposure to hazard on the other side. The study showed that disaster
risk is the product of the interaction of both hazards and conditions of vulnerabilities,
and not solely the result of the physical hazard, as claimed by the “dominant disaster
paradigm.” In the 1970s and early 1980s, the vulnerability approach to disasters
started dominating the disaster-development discourse and criticized the dominance
assumption in disaster research that disasters are “natural” events. Disaster risk is a
combination of the factors that determine the potential for people to be exposed to
particular types of hazards and also the vulnerabilities that fundamentally depend on
how social systems and their associated power relations impact on different social
groups1. In other words, it was revealed that to accurately detect disasters risks, we
should not only examine the different types of physical hazards, but also explore the

1

Wisner, Ben et al., 7
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cultural, social, economic, and political processes that produce the “progression of
vulnerability”. Thus, the “technical solutions” to preventing disasters with their high
costs were no longer the mainstream view, and a new approach to disaster prevention
and mitigation emerged in theory, which focused on the underlying causes of
increased vulnerability to disaster risks.
In practice, the interconnection between disaster risks, vulnerabilities, and
livelihoods in the case of Egypt was confirmed in this study. The study showed that
Egypt is at risk of destructive “rapid-onset” natural disasters (primarily earthquakes
and floods), susceptible to a large number of human-made disasters (road, maritime,
train accidents and fires), and also vulnerable to “slow onset” hybrid disasters (Avian
and Human Influenza and landslides). While exploring the potential hazards and
recent disasters that have occurred in Egypt, it was revealed that there is a positive
correlation between disaster risks and deep rooted population vulnerabilities in Egypt;
the higher the vulnerabilities, the increased risks of disasters. Thus, the study showed
that Egypt has a relatively high disaster risk that is a product of a variety of hazardous
events coupled with the high vulnerabilities of the Egyptian population (such as
population expansion in hazardous areas, rapid urbanization, and prevalence of urban
illegal settlements). Vulnerabilities are both causes and effects of disasters in Egypt;
for example, the cause of the 1992 earthquake’s devastation was primarily due to the
high vulnerability of affected communities as a result of high population density and
lack of enforcement of building codes. It was also revealed how different types of
disasters had various negative ramifications on communities’ livelihoods. The 1992
earthquake, for example, resulted in high number of people left homeless and led to
the increase of illegal settlements, which indirectly led to a further increase in
affected population’s vulnerabilities.
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In addition, it was revealed that disasters in Egypt exert an enormous
challenge to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). For example,
the recurrence of flash floods in governorates of Upper Egypt and the concentration
of poverty in these governorates is an indication of the correlation between disasters,
vulnerability and poverty, which will definitely affect the attainment of MDG1,
eradicating extreme poverty and hunger.

The GoE’s MDGs Midpoint Assessment

Reports (2004 and 2008) failed to refer to any disaster that occurred in Egypt and thus
did not explain how these disasters could have posed a challenge to the achievement
of the MDGs. The GoE did not recognize the socio-economic impact of disasters on
achieving the MDGs; the mid-term progress reports did not even regard the increased
disaster risk as one of the challenges to development. That is why the fourth chapter
examined the government’s political will with respect to the issue of disasters.
After examining the legal framework and the institutional arrangements
within the GOE at the strategic, central, and local levels that deal with disasters, it
was apparent that there is a lack of political will manifested in the absence of an
adequate legal and institutional setup for DRR. It was showed that the disasterrelated legal and institutional frameworks in Egypt are still trapped in the civil
defense and crisis management eras respectively. The current disaster management
institutional arrangements do not incorporate risk analysis in their functions, which
reveal that DRR is still not a national priority. All government entities examined at
the strategic, central and local levels are currently involved with post-disaster
emergency management. The current disaster management framework is mainly
concerned with preparedness, emergency response, and relief and rescue efforts. The
GoE moved in the 1990s from a “civil defense” age to a “disaster management” phase.
However, this institutional shift from civil defense to disaster management did not
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bring about a shift in the legal system, which meant that all institutions working on
disaster management in Egypt do not have legal foundations. This study showed that
the current disaster laws in Egypt, formulated in the outdated war context of the
1950s, are still trapped in the ideologies of the civil defense era.
The study revealed how the GoE did not undergo any fundamental changes
necessary to incorporate DRR concepts, policies and mechanisms in its pre-disaster
planning since it would involve sensitive political measures. The “dominance of
structural engineering measures and disaster preparedness measures”2 reflects their
inherently lower political sensitivity when compared to the problems that arise from
genuinely reducing risks and vulnerabilities such as the redistribution of income, the
reduction of poverty levels, the tackling of the root causes of inequality and
communities disempowerment3. Managing risk depends on political commitment by
policy makers since the politicians find it difficult to redirect priorities from visible
development goals to abstract long term possible threats4. Decision makers claim that
it is hard to gain votes by pointing to a disaster that did not even take place. Thus, the
GoE tends to react to disasters on an ad hoc basis by formulating an Inter-ministerial
Disaster Committee to deal with the disaster after it has taken place; this committee
deals with the symptoms of disasters rather than the causes as were the case in the
AHI crisis, Al Salam Ferry disaster, several train accidents, and recently the Swine
Flu disaster. In addition, other national priorities often contest with reduction of
disaster risks since there is a prevailing misconception among government officials
that development efforts such as employment creation, poverty reduction, and
educational reform will automatically reduce disaster risks.
2
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Moreover, the lack of political will among decision makers in Egypt with
respect to pre-disaster planning explains the failure of the government in reducing
disasters risks. The lack of government commitment to reduce disaster risk lies in the
lack of knowledge, lack of a culture of prevention, and limited resources. The GoE
recently incorporated some risk reduction rhetoric in its disaster work in the wake of
international DRR trends. Government officials use DRR terminology and
inaccurately affiliate it with crisis management processes. In addition, government
officials lack the awareness and understanding of pre-disaster planning; they
misinterpret prevention and mitigation and confuse them with preparedness, the phase
just before a full-blown disaster takes place. DRR efforts are currently inaccurately
associated with the occurrence of disasters among policy makers. The researcher
believes that government officials are “risk illiterate” since they are unaware of DRR
knowledge that is a direct result of the lack of a “culture of prevention”, a nation-wide
phenomena spread among policy makers as revealed by interviews with government
officials at IDSC and with veterinaries during the field work. In the wake of increased
international pressures to “obtain commitment from public authorities to implement
DRR policies”, the National Committee for Crisis and Disaster Management was
renamed National Committee for Crisis and Disaster Management and Reducing its
Risks without undergoing any substantive amendments in the committee’s functions,
which reveals the lack of genuine political will to shift to DRR.
The GoE has failed to adequately institutionalize the DRR agenda, and thus
put vulnerable populations at high risk of potential hazards. Egypt still has a long
way to go by first gathering political will, then by formulating new laws and decrees
that would incorporate DRR measures, and finally by creating an institutional
structure conducive to reducing disaster risks. The case study further showed that the
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political commitment of various government entities in Fayoum governorate is still
lacking in the wake of the AHI crisis.
The field findings have revealed that the AHI crisis destroyed vulnerable
population livelihood assets and disrupted the attainment of sustainable livelihood
outcomes of traditional poultry keepers in Fayoum. The study showed that cultural
norms and traditional practices increased the vulnerability of poultry keepers in
Fayoum and made them more susceptible to AHI. The poultry raising traditional
customs and improper slaughtering practices are among the root causes behind the
high risk of AHI among women in Fayoum. One of the improper poultry raising
practices is the free movement of poultry inside and outside the household, which can
be dealt with by confining poultry to coops and thus decreasing the vulnerability to
AHI. The case study also showed how the AHI crisis had destroyed several livelihood
assets of women who raise poultry as part of complex livelihood strategies. The AHI
outbreaks in domestic poultry have led to, among other results, the loss of one of the
primary sources of household income, loss of protein consumption, increased stress
and depression among poultry keepers, and the refraining of women from engaging in
social obligations. The case study further reveled how women in Fayoum were forced
to alter their livelihood strategies and adopt new coping strategies to deal with the
repercussions of the AHI crisis by shifting their micro businesses to cattle production.
The field work also revealed, according to traditional poultry keepers in
Fayoum, that the government veterinary services in Fayoum were unable to prevent
the spread of avian influenza in poultry due to lack of resources and qualified
personnel. Highly centralized local institutions with weak financial and human
resource capacities were a disabling environment for reducing AHI risks in Fayoum.
In addition, poultry keepers were fearful of government personnel and perceived them
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as threat to their livelihood survival. During interviews with poultry keepers, it was
revealed that women tend to get rid of sick or dead poultry by throwing them in water
ways, burying them, or burning them in garbage areas and they do not report any
suspected infection to government authorities since they are afraid that the
government would cull the entire flock. The women even believed that the
government is trying to kill their poultry through government vaccination campaigns;
this widespread misconception among women in Fayoum grew out of the fact the
poultry was dying after being vaccinated. Shortly after the 2006 outbreaks, the
government veterinaries were vaccinating birds with the same needle, which is an
improper vaccination practice that might have perpetuated and deepened the AHI
crisis. This misunderstanding was even reinforced among women in the wake of the
government early approach to cull thousands of birds during initial outbreaks and the
national campaign to urge women to stop raising poultry all together.
Through closely examining the CRS project in Fayoum, the case study
revealed that although the CRS BDS activities had some positive impacts on the
livelihoods of poultry keepers in two villages in Fayoum, some of these mitigating
activities were not successfully implemented in practice due to the top-down design of
the project; the project staff failed to carry out needs assessment prior to the project
design, which led to the limited success of, for example, the awareness raising and
educational sessions. The study showed that the awareness raising campaigns and
educational sessions conducted as part of the BDS project activities altered some of
the incorrect slaughtering practices of beneficiaries; however the majority of
traditional unhygienic poultry raising behaviors were not successfully changed due to
the inability of the project to tackle embedded cultural norms. In addition, the
vaccination campaigns that were coordinated by the project staff had limited
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effectiveness since the project relied on government veterinaries that did not have the
incentive and the capacity to carry out proper vaccination campaigns in the first place.
To conclude, AHI impacts have been proved to affect the livelihoods of
vulnerable groups in Fayoum. Attending to small scale frequent bird flu events and
the vulnerabilities associated with them is a preventive measure to ensure that these
random outbreaks would not turn into a full-blown massive disaster in the long term
and thus would deeply affect vulnerable populations’ livelihoods. Institution building
with the aim of improving the quality of governance is required to reduce disaster
risks. The GoE should substitute “disaster driven” decision making with “hazard and
vulnerability driven” policies at all levels of government. The GoE should work on
reducing the vulnerability part of the equation (Disaster risk = Hazard x
Vulnerability) since preventing the hazard from taking place is usually very difficult
or even impossible to achieve. On the other hand, reducing the vulnerability context is
relatively easier to address through dealing with the cultural, social, economic, and
political dimensions creating these vulnerabilities. The increased impacts of disasters
in Egypt is due to the tendency to treat symptoms rather than causes; the reason for
this bias is because vulnerabilities are deeply rooted, and any fundamental solution of
the root causes of vulnerability would involve massive political change. With regard
to the AHI crisis, the numbers of positive human cases will continue to increase
rapidly in Egypt until the GoE seriously addresses the “root causes”, “dynamic
pressures”, and “unsafe conditions” behind the vulnerability of rural poultry keepers
to the HPAI H5N1 virus. The livelihoods of traditional poultry keepers in Egypt will
only be sustainable when they can cope with and recover from AHI stresses and
shocks and maintain their livelihood assets.
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APPENDIX 1
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

DISASTER RISK REDUCTION FIELD WORK
1) Semi-Structured Interviews with Government Officials
•

•
•

Dr. Mohamed Fawzy, Director, Department of Crises and Disaster Management
(CMDR), Information Decision and Support Center (IDSC), Prime Minister’s
Office;
Ms. Heba Ibrahim, Senior Researcher, Department of Crises and Disaster
Management (CMDR) , IDSC;
Mr. Said Aly, Disaster and Crisis Management Coordinator, Ministry of Local
Development, Egypt.

2) Semi-Structured Interviews with UN Officials
•
•
•

•
•

Dr. Mostafa Mohaghegh, Head, United Nations International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction (UN/ISDR) Regional Office for West Asia and North Africa (WANA);
Dr. Ayoub Al Jawaldeh, Deputy Country Director, WFP Country Office, Egypt;
Mr. Jean Luke, Regional Planning Officer for Avian and Human Influenza,
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA),
Egypt;
Ms. Amany Nakhla, Regional Planning Analyst, United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), Egypt;
Ms. Rania Hedaya, Program Analyst and Disaster Prevention and Recovery Focal
Point, UNDP Country Office, Egypt.

CASE STUDY FIELD WORK: FAYOUM GOVERNORATE
1) Semi-Structured Interviews with Government Officials at Fayoum
• Dr. Soraya Ramadan, Animal Care ,Veterinary Directorate, Fayoum Governorate
• Dr. Ashraf Lutfy EL Sayed, Veterinary Unit, Mansha’et Bany Etman Village,
Snoras District.
• Dr. Rabeea El Sayed El Araby, Veterinary Unit, Mansha’et Snoras Village,
Snoras District.
• Mr. Abdel Wanees Attiya Gibriel, Me’awen, Veterinary Unit, Ezbet Gibriel
Rashwan, Mansha’et Bany Etman Village, Snoras District.
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2) Semi-Structured Interviews with CRS Project Staff:
• Mr. Mohamed Ashraf, CRS AI Programme Officer and Project Coordinator;
• Mrs. Sabah Mohamed, Extension Officer at Zawyet El Karatsa Village, Fayoum
District;
• Mrs. Mona Mohamed Ali, Extension Officer at Zawyet El Karatsa Village,
Fayoum District;
• Mrs. Iman Mohamed, Micro-Credit Officer at Zawyet El Karatsa Village,
Fayoum District;
• Mrs. Iman Ragab, Extension Officer at Al Mandara Village, Fayoum District;
• Mrs. Nora Rabei Soliman, Micro-Credit Officer at Manshaet Baghdad Village,
Fayoum District.
3) Interview with BEST Staff (headquarters in Fayoum)
• Mr. Ahmed Mahmoud Abdel Alim, AHI Project Coordinator
• Mrs. Manal Ibrahim El Dessouky, Marketing Specialist
4) Semi-Structured Interviews with Women (Total of 25 Interviews)
Ten Semi-structured Interviews at Zawyet El Karatsa Village (Known as Al Zawyat),
Fayoum District:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Sabah Rabeea
Sayeda Al Sayed
Amal Mohamed
Hayat Abdel Maboud Zayed
Sahar Attwa
Rabab Qurany
Afaf El Sayed Ibrahim
Sayeda Qutb
Sokareya Abdullah
Soad Ragab El Sayed

Five semi-structured Interviews at Manshaet Baghdad Village in Fayoum District:
•
•
•
•
•

Laila Ewiess Mohamed
E’tbar Abdel Azim Tawfik
Gamal Eid Ahmed
Magda Abdel Tawab
Nora Soliman
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Five semi-structured Interviews at Kafr Mahfouz Village, Tamia District:
•
•
•
•
•

Sayeda Said Mohamed
Noha Ramadan
Nadia Ewiss Aly El Said
Nagah Mohamed Mahmoud
Laila Mohamed Salem

Five semi-structured Interviews at Al Adel Village, Snoras District:
•
•
•
•
•

Howayda Mohamed Hassan
Kawkab Abdel Mawgood
Sabah Khamees
Nadia Shafei
Safaa Hamoda

5) Four Focus Groups in Fayoum Governorate (Total of 40 women)

First Focus Group in Zawyet El Karatsa Village, Fayoum District
•
•
•
•
•
•

Magda Ibrahim
Zeinab Abd Al Wahab
Amal Anwar Hassanein
Mona Nasr El Dine
Sabah Mohamed
Rida Ramadan Abdel Aziz

Second Focus Group in Al Mandara Village, Fayoum District
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Sharbat Mohamed
Samar Ragab
Manal Attiya
Karima Abdo
Darahem Shaaban
Hayam Aly
Zeinab Sheraei
Maha Mohamed
Doniya Ramdan
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Third Focus Group in Al Adel Village, Snoras District
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Howayda Mohamed Hassan
Sabra Abdel Mawgood Rashed
Fatma Nady
Marzoka Kamel
Madiha Sayed
Nora Sayed
Manal Fathy
Hala Hashem
Intesar Qourany
Sahar Rizk
Hayam Qourany
Amal Sawy

Forth Focus Group in Al Adel Village, Snoras District
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Rawya El Sayed
Fayza Abdel Mowlah
Latifa Abdel Mawgood
Sahar El Said
Redah Abdel Tawab
Fatma Moawad
Hamdeya Awad Allah
Doha Abd Al Ged
Wessam Hamed
Marwa Mohamed Abd El All
Neama Abd El All
Marwa Atteya
Sabah Toba

6) Two Case Studies in Fayoum Governorate:
• Howayda Mohamed Hassan , El Adel Village, Snoras Dirstrict
• Sayeda Al Sayed, Zawyet El Karatsa Village in Fayoum District

APPENDIX 2
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

Household Information:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)

Name:
District/Village:
Marital Status:
Age:
Level of education:
Number of family members (of which children)?
Number of people who regularly eat meals in your home?
Number of people earning income in your home? Who? What is their job?
Total household income?
Your contribution to this income, approximately, if any?
Who is the principal decision-maker in your household? (head of household):
Consumer assets owned in the household?
Do you own land?
Total earnings per month during the summer? During the winter?

Poultry Raising Information/Cultural Habits:
1) Do you currently own poultry?
2) If No, did you own poultry before the AI outbreak?
3) If Yes, what is your flock size? Is it different species? Or all chickens?
4) Where do u keep them? Do you keep them together (if different species)?
5) What is the purpose for raising poultry?
6) Do your children help you take care of the poultry? How?
7) Do your children play with the poultry? How?
8) Do you slaughter poultry?
9) How do you slaughter poultry? Do you wear gloves/plastic bags or masks?
10) If yes, do your children engage in slaughtering poultry with you?
11) Origins of poultry ? From where?
12) Is there in your village live bird markets and shops for selling fresh birds?
13) Do you prefer eating fresh slaughtered poultry or frozen ones? Why?
14) Did you vaccinate your birds? by whom? If not, why didn’t you vaccinate them?
15) Trading of poultry?
a. How much poultry do you sell a week/month? Does this vary in different seasons?
b. How many eggs do you sell a week/month? Does this vary in different seasons?
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Avian and Human Influenza:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)

Do you know what the Avian Flu is? How did you first hear about it?
Can you describe it? Of the following, which do you believe were symptoms of
Avian Flu for your poultry?
Has the Avian Flu affected your livelihood? (If so) In what ways?
Has AI affected the quantity of your poultry? (If yes) To what degree?
How did AI affected your eating habits/ consumption patterns?
Has AI affected your household income? How?
Have Avian Flu affected your behavior? How?
Do you take any other precautions to protect against Avian Flu? (If so) What kind?
Do veterinaries come to your village to do surveillance?
What do u do when veterinaries carry out surveillance campaigns?
Did any of your poultry died recently? What did you do?
Do you think women should contact officials when they find dead poultry? Why?
If you're poultry died from AI, what did you do with your dead poultry? Or what will
you do if this happen?
What did you do with your remaining live poultry?
How do you think Avian Flu is spread amongst the poultry?
How do you think AI can be transmitted to humans?
Do you fear being infected with Avian Flu yourself? Do you fear your children bet
infected?
What are the measures you take to prevent yourself from the disease?

Vulnerable Population Opinion on Government Role:
1)
2)
3)
4)

What do you think the government is doing to prevent the spread of Avian Flu?
Did you vaccinate your chicken in the government vaccination campaigns? Why?
Where you compensated for the loss of your poultry?
What do you think the government should do to prevent the disease from spreading?

CRS Project Beneficiaries (BDS Clients):
1) Did you have economic activities/enterprises other than poultry before you were
affected by Avian Flu? (If so) What kinds of activities?
2) Since the Avian Flu affected your enterprise, have you shifted to another type of
activity other than poultry? (If so) What kind of activities? Why?
3) How did this project help you better cope with the AI crisis?
4) What did you learn from the awareness raising sessions and any other BDS services?
5) From where you buy your poultry? Al Azab project? If yes, was CRS the linkage?
6) Are you willing to pay a nominal fee in the future for BDS activities? Why?

